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Der Denker stellt sich in den grossen Zusammenhang der 
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“Philosophieren auf eigene Faust”, bei dem jedes 
Individuum nur in einem persönlichen zufälligen Reflex 
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ein Ende gemacht werden. 
 […] 
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einer ideellen Gemeinschaft: und diese Gemeinschaft der 
Ideen ist es, die auch der geschichtlichen Betrachtung 
erst Sinn und Leben verleiht 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
To perceive and represent objects seems to be as ordinary as eating, sleeping or 
breathing. Yet, one only needs to take note of the vast amount of literature that has 
been produced on the subject to realize that the ordinary does not always coincide with 
the self-evident. The ground and genesis of objective experience is, and always has 
been, at the center of philosophical attention, and gives rise to fierce debate up to this 
day. Perception indeed seems to be a kind of ―everyday wonder‖, as Liebmann once 
noted, and the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon only adds to its 
complexity.1 
Addressing the problem of object experience inevitably involves a consideration of 
metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and physiological issues. This was, at least, 
Hermann von Helmholtz‖s stance on the matter. Although trained as a physician and 
physiologist, Helmholtz seemed to be very well aware that one does not simply produce 
a science of perception without also producing philosophy, and conversely, that 
reflections on the nature of the epistemological subject-object relation, the 
metaphysical status of the object, and the nature of the mind, play a crucial role in the 
creation of scientific paradigms of perception.  
Helmholtz‖s adherence to empiricism and transcendentalism in attempting to 
account for object experience has fascinated philosophers ever since the publication of 
his work. Classical apples of discord in this regard pertain to the extent of Helmholtz‖s 
allegiance to the transcendental tradition, his (alleged) naturalization of the Kantian 
categories, and the theoretical soundness of his empirico-transcendentalism. Most of 
these investigations, however, tend to focus primarily on Helmholtz‖s epistemology and 
his philosophy of science, and much less on the way in which his idiosyncratic 
philosophical perspective was determined by his psychological concerns. As the 
 
                                                     
1 Liebmann (1869), p. V. 
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problem of the psychogenesis of object representation in experience has always been at 
the core of Helmholtz‖s research interests, an exploration of this perspective is certainly 
worthwhile.  
 
Therefore, this dissertation takes the problem of the object, and more particularly 
the problem of object experience and objectification as a point of departure. The main 
aim of this analysis is to grasp the systematic purport of Helmholtz‖s empirico-
transcendentalism in addressing the ―everyday wonder‖ of the constitution of reality. To 
that end, Helmholtz‖s theorizing will be interpreted against the background of modern 
philosophical accounts of experience, and their mutual relation.  The choice for this 
perspective was motivated first and foremost by a concern with the internal consistency 
and dynamics of Helmholtz‖s psychological theory. Notwithstanding the great number 
of excellent studies and interpretations of Helmholtz‖s work, the question concerning 
the systematic connection between all the different philosophical perspectives 
entangled in his psychology remains open. It is common knowledge that Helmholtz was 
a self-professed empiricist, who also relied on Kant and Fichte‖s work in articulating his 
psychological theory of objectification. But what is the glue that holds all these different 
perspectives together, and what could be the motive for holding such a complex 
philosophical position in addressing the psychological problem of perception and 
objectification specifically?  
I sought to answer these questions by means of a historical investigation into 
subsequent accounts of objectification in modern philosophy. I soon realized that the 
historical progression from (Hume‖s) empiricism, over (Kantian) critique, to (Fichte‖s) 
metacritique – as it is internally regulated by an increasing concern for the structure and 
organization of the representing subject – provides an excellent framework for the 
interpretation of the systematic nature and purport of the different levels of analysis in 
Helmholtz‖s theorizing. The synchronic study of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object as 
presented in this work, is therefore informed by a diachronic, historical investigation 
into the development and transformation of philosophical modes of interrogating and 
addressing the structure and foundation of object experience and representation. 
Thanks to this particular angle, new light can be shed on Helmholtz‖s ―wavering‖ 
between empiricism and transcendentalism, and on some interpretative issues that 
have become commonplace in Helmholtz scholarship. 
 
As will become clear in the following chapters, this analysis unfolds mainly from a 
study of Helmholtz‖s (popular) scientific lectures, his work on visual perception, his 
articles on the epistemology and psychology of perception in general, and on spatial 
perception in particular. As the bulk of Helmholtz‖s work focuses on the paradigm of 
visual perception, I chose to rely mainly on his work in that area. It is important to note, 
however, that this emphasis on the visual faculty does not imply that Helmholtz 
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reduced perception to vision, or that I do so. Helmholtz‖s work on acoustics – briefly 
discussed in chapter 2 – for example, likewise provides an interesting illustration of his 
general views in this respect. Given the extent of his investigations into the nature of 
vision, however, and for the sake of clarity and simplicity, I have chosen to restrict 
myself to that paradigm in illustrating Helmholtz‖s general outlook.2  
 
In quotations, I have used ―standard‖ English translations of Helmholtz‖s work as 
much as possible (e.g. Cahan‖s translation of Helmholtz‖s popular lectures in Science and 
Culture and Southall‖s 1925 translation of the 1856/66 Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik). 
I studied these English texts together with the original German versions, and where I 
preferred another choice of words (or another translation altogether) this is mentioned 
in a footnote. The same holds for references to Kant‖s and Fichte‖s work.  
  
Parts of chapters 2, 4 and 5 are drawn from my forthcoming articles “Hermann von 
Helmholtz‖s Empirico-Transcendentalism Reconsidered: Construction and Constitution 
in Helmholtz‖s Psychology of the Object” (Science in Context) and “Voluntarism in Early 
Psychology. The Case of Hermann von Helmholtz” (History of Psychology). I am grateful to 
the editors of both journals, for providing critical feedback and helpful suggestions. 
Furthermore, my gratitude goes to all who have supported, inspired and motivated me 
in the past few years. I owe special thanks to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Gertrudis Van de 
Vijver for introducing Hermann von Helmholtz‖s work to me, and for her trust and 
support. I am also very grateful to my co-supervisor, Prof. Dr. Steffen Ducheyne, for 
guiding me through the writing process, and providing helpful feedback and 
suggestions. Special thanks to Liesbet Quaeghebeur and Tim Wijnant for carefully 
revising and correcting the manuscript of this dissertation, and to Thorsten Ries for 
transcribing two of Helmholtz‖s unpublished letters. Lastly, I want to thank mama, 
Henri, Charlotte, Frederik, and Ellen, for their loving support and patience, and Joris, for 
everything.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 An especially interesting account of the philosophical dimension of Helmholtz‖s acoustics can be found for 
example in Benjamin Steege‖s (2012) Helmholtz and the Modern Listener. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: The Poetry of Perception 
What I construct historically is not the result of criticism 
or speculation but of imagination seeking to fill the gaps 
in observation. To me history is still in a large measure 
poetry, it is a series of the most beautiful and picturesque 
compositions. 
 
 - Jacob Burckhardt (1943), p. 167. 
1.1 Hermann von Helmholtz: General Introduction 
1.1.1 Selective Biography  
The broad range of Hermann von Helmholtz‖s (1821-1894) scientific interests and his 
numerous contributions to the development of nineteenth century science, have never 
ceased to amaze scholars in the exact sciences, as well as philosophers. After obtaining 
his medical degree at the Friedrich-Wilhelms Institute in Berlin in 1842, Helmholtz 
quickly became one of the leading figures in the German intellectual and scientific 
landscape, thanks to his epochal work On the Conservation of Force [Ueber die Erhaltung 
der Kraft] (1889 [1847]), the Treatise on Physiological Optics [Handbuch der 
Physiologischen Optik] (1856/1866), and his invention of numerous measurements 
instruments such as the myograph (to study the speed of nerve impulse), the 
ophthalmoscope (to study the inside of a living eye), and the ophthalmometer (to 
 Introduction: The Poetry of Perception 
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measure the curvature of the cornea).3 The physicist, physiologist, and proto-
psychologist is not only widely recognized as “a leading figure in shaping philosophy of 
science during the second half of the nineteenth century”, he is even credited for being 
“one of the last great figures of the Aufklärung.”4    
 In the first ten years of his life, however, nothing indicated that such a bright 
academic future awaited the young Helmholtz. Due to his poor health, he could not go 
to school until he was seven years old.5 When his health finally allowed him to attend 
the Normal School of Potsdam, he initially struggled with languages, and found he had 
“a bad memory for disconnected things.”6 His physical well-being and learning abilities 
quickly improved, however, and a decade later, Helmholtz graduated successfully from 
the Potsdam Gymnasium.    
During Helmholtz‖s childhood, his father Ferdinand – teacher of German and 
philosophy at the Potsdam Gymnasium – went to great lengths to educate his eldest son 
in poetry and philosophy. Ferdinand Helmholtz entertained a lifelong intimate 
friendship with Immanuel Hermann Fichte (the son of Johann Gottlieb), who was also 
Hermann von Helmholtz‖s godfather and namesake.7 Ferdinand was very well-read and 
had a passion for German Idealist philosophy and classical and romantic poetry. It is in 
the “[m]etre and rhyme of poetry,” Hermann would later recall, that he first found a 
helpful mnemotechnical method that allowed him to overcome his difficulties with 
memorizing disparate facts.8 In a lecture from 1891, the then seventy year old Hermann 
 
                                                     
3
 For some interesting overviews of Helmholtz‖s experimental practice and invention of measurement 
instruments, see Olesko & Holmes (1993); Finger & Wade (2001, 2002b); Darrigol (2003). In the past decades a 
number of monographs on Hermann von Helmholtz have been published, illustrating the lasting impression 
he made on philosophers and scientists. Most notably see Hatfield (1990), Cahan (1993a), Krüger (1994), Turner 
(1994), Schiemann (2009);, and Meulders (2010). 
4
 Heidelberger (1993), p. 461; Cahan (1993a), p. 559. 
5
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]); Koenigsberger (1902/03). In what follows, both the original 1902/03 German edition 
of Koenigsberger‖s Helmholtz biography, and the (shortened) 1906 F.A. Welby translation are used. Quotes are 
mostly drawn from the English edition, except when the relevant passage was not included in the English 
translation.  
6
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 383. 
7
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]); Koenigsberger (1902/03). See chapter 5. 
8
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 383. Also see Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 399-400: “Rhythm and rhyme give […] a 
type of external order […]. I consider the prominent influence of the beautiful on the memory of man as an 
outward sign of what I have here called easily understandable or comprehensible. Poetry is remembered much 
more easily than prose. […] [I] believe that an essential part of the effect of the beautiful rests in this, its effect 
on the memory.” 
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von Helmholtz furthermore testifies of the way in which his father awakened his 
interest for philosophy and epistemology:9 
[T]he interest for questions of the theory of cognition, had been implanted in me 
in my youth, when I had often heard my father, who had retained a strong 
impression from Fichte‖s idealism, dispute with his colleagues who believed in 
Kant or Hegel. 
Although the mature Hermann von Helmholtz‖s philosophical views diverged 
significantly from his father‖s, the intellectual heritage of Ferdinand Helmholtz would 
remain tangible throughout his later work.10 
Hermann von Helmholtz initially wanted to study physics, but his parents could not 
afford to inscribe him at the University of Berlin. Therefore he embarked upon a study 
in medicine at the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, which was much less 
expensive, but required him to serve a few years as an army surgeon after graduating. 
Upon his arrival in Berlin in 1838, Helmholtz soon discovered that the great idealist 
metaphysical systems with which he was acquainted through his father, were in decline. 
Already in these early years in Berlin, Helmholtz developed the anti-metaphysical 
attitude that he would retain until his death (see chapter 2). However, he likewise 
maintained that his aversion of metaphysical speculation was “not intended against 
philosophy.”11 
 
As a medical student, Helmholtz was especially impressed by his professor in 
physiology, Johannes Peter Müller, who impassioned him with the study of the anatomy 
and physiology of the nervous system. The young scientist was soon taken up in the 
remarkable circle of students Müller had gathered around him, which included Emil du 
Bois-Reymond – who became one of Helmholtz‖s closest friends – Ernst Brücke and Karl 
Ludwig, among others. In 1842, Helmholtz obtained his doctoral degree in Berlin with 
his dissertation on the structure of the nervous system in invertebrates [De Fabrica 
Systematis nervosi Evertebratorum], supervised by Müller.12 In the decade after obtaining 
his degree, Helmholtz performed groundbreaking experiments on fermentation and 
putrefaction, heat production, muscular contraction and nerve conduction, and 
published his seminal paper On the Conservation of Force (1889 [1847]). Thanks to these 
accomplishments, Helmholtz became a renowned member of the Berlin Physical Society 
 
                                                     
9
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 390. 
10
 See chapters 4 and 5. 
11
 Helmholtz (1995 [1877a]), p. 325. 
12
 Koenigsberger (1902/03). 
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[Berliner Physikalische Gesellschaft] (BPS) and was appointed a professor in Berlin 
(1848-1849), and later in Königsberg (1849-1855), where he embarked upon an area of 
research that he would not abandon until his death in 1894, i.e. the study of the 
psychophysiological nature of human perception.13  
1.1.2 Helmholtz and the Problem of the Object 
After his experimental studies on muscle action and nerve conduction in the 1840s and 
early 1850s, Helmholtz turned to the investigation of the physical structure and 
physiological functioning of the sensory apparatus. In accordance with this evolution in 
his research interest, his scientific practice was no longer solely dominated by ―wet lab‖ 
science, but shifted towards the observational study of the nature and functioning of 
the sensory apparatus and the perceptual process.14 In the course of these studies, 
Helmholtz became increasingly aware of what we might call the natural defectiveness of 
the anatomical and physiological structure of the perceptual system, and the 
inadequacy of a purely physico-physiological explanation of perceptual experience.15 
With the aid of his ophthalmoscope, for example, Helmholtz could study the inside of a 
living eye and carefully examine the blind spot as well as the numerous blood vessels 
that caused gaps or distortions in the visual field. In the same vein, the ophthalmometer 
allowed him to measure the precise curvature of the cornea, and demonstrate, among 
others, that it “is not a perfectly symmetrical curve, but […] bent in various directions,” 
causing refractive error and a degree of astigmatism, even in healthy individuals.16 
Furthermore, Helmholtz described dark spots within the eye, irregularities in the 
structure and surface of the lens, and finally concluded that “the eye has every possible 
defect that can be found in an optical instrument”:17  
Now it is not too much to say that if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument 
which had all these defects, I should think myself quite justified in blaming his 
 
                                                     
13
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]); Koenigsberger (1902/03). After his professorship in Königsberg, Helmholtz took up 
a position as a professor in physiology in Heidelberg (1858-1871), later taught physics in Berlin (1871-1888), 
and finally became president of the physical-technical Reichsanstalt in Charlottenburg (1888-1894) 
(Koenigsberger 1902/03). Throughout this career, Helmholtz‖s main areas of study were visual perception and 
acoustics. An in-depth discussion of Helmholtz‖s relation to Müller (and his students), his membership of the 
BPS, and the significance and purport of his 1847 paper is presented in chapter 2. 
14
 Finger & Wade (2002b), p. 234. 
15
 See Chapter 2. 
16
 Helmholtz (1995 [1868]), p. 140.  
17 Helmholtz (1995 [1868]), p. 141, 147. 
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carelessness in the strongest terms, and giving him back his instrument. Of 
course, I shall not do this with my eyes […] [H]owever bad they may be, I can get 
no others. 
In addition to these anatomical flaws, Müller‖s insights regarding the inherently 
arbitrary relation between external stimulation and internal states of nervous 
excitation (as discussed in chapter 2) prompted Helmholtz to (i) reject naïve realism or 
objectivism (see section 1.2.1 and chapter 2), and (ii) deny that the experience of an 
object is fully reducible to physico-physiological processes (see chapter 2). Instead, what 
we have called the ―natural defectiveness‖ of the perceptual system convinced 
Helmholtz that there is an explanatory gap between the physico-physiological structure 
of the sensory apparatus and mental representation, and that hence, the perceptual 
process necessarily involves irreducible psychological processes of interpretation:18 
No doubt the first concern of physiology is only with material changes in material 
organs, and that of the special physiology of the sense is with the nerves and their 
sensations, so far as these are excitations of the nerves. But […] science cannot 
avoid also considering the apprehension of external objects. […] [A]pprehension of 
external objects must always be an act of our power of realization 
[Vorstellungsvermögen], […] [I]t is a mental function [Psychische Thätigkeit]. […] 
These concealed functions have been little discussed, because we are so 
accustomed to regard the apprehension of any external object as a complete and 
direct whole, which does not admit of analysis.  
In the winter of 1866, after ten years of strenuous dedication, Hermann von 
Helmholtz finalized the third and last volume of his magnum opus, the Treatise on 
Physiological Optics [Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik], one of the most extensive 
studies on human perception ever written. The work, praised for its systematic and 
exhaustive nature, was first published in its entirety in 1867, revised in 1896, and 
considered by many as a foundational work of reference for the science of vision at that 
time.19 The Treatise was the culmination point of Helmholtz‖s preoccupation with what it 
 
                                                     
18
Ibid., p. 127. As discussed in chapter 2, Helmholtz‖s psychological non-reductionism distinguished him from 
his contemporary Ewald Hering, who emphasized the physiological nature of the perceptual process. 
19
The first volume of the Treatise (The Dioptrics of the Eye [die Dioptrik des Auges]) appeared in 1856, the second 
(The Sensations of Vision [die Lehre von den Gesichtsempfindungen]) in 1860, and the third in 1866 (The 
Perceptions of Vision [die Lehre von den Gesichtswahrnehmungen]). In what follows, the 1867 and 1896 German 
editions, and the 1925 Southall translation are used. The volume referred to will be indicated with Roman 
numerals.  
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is to see at least from the early 1850s onwards.20 In the preface, the author specified that 
his Handbuch aimed in the first place at bringing order and coherence in the wide, 
disparate field of the study of perception. Hence, the subsequent volumes of the Treatise 
respectively go into the causal mechanisms regulating the physical, physiological and 
psychological aspects of sense perception. This search for causal lawlikeness, Helmholtz 
declared, was motivated by the desire to attain an “intellectual grasp of the connection 
of ideas.”21 In reading the work, one is soon convinced that the mature Helmholtz had 
succeeded in transforming one of his self-professed shortcomings, i.e., his inability to 
deal with ―disconnected things‖ (see section 1.1.1), into one of his greatest strengths as a 
scientist:22 
This impulse to dominate the actual world by acquiring an understanding of it, or 
what, I think, is only another expression for the same thing, to discover causal 
connection of phenomena, had guided my through my whole life and […] is 
possibly the reason why I found no satisfaction in apparent solutions of problems 
so long as I felt there were still obscure points in them. 
With regard to the study of perception, one particular obscurity occupied Helmholtz 
especially, namely the apparent gap or discontinuity between the physical and 
physiological structure and functioning of the sensory apparatus, and objective 
representation. One could even say that it is from within this gap, that Helmholtz‖s 
proto-psychology of perception as presented in the final volume of the Treatise, arose. 
This third part of his physiological optics was entirely devoted to this psychological 
dimension of perceptual experience, or outlines what we may call a psychology of the 
object.           
Interestingly enough, finishing up the third, psychological part of his opus magnum 
seemed to be a real ordeal for Helmholtz, at least if we go by his private correspondence 
with his close friend Emil du Bois-Reymond during the 1860s. From these it is clear that 
Helmholtz was really puzzled by the philosophical questions he was confronted with in 
attempting to articulate his psychological theory. More particularly, Helmholtz found 
himself to be faced with issues that could not be answered on a strictly factual basis, and 
required him to “persuade people” with “the most superior arguments.”23  
 
                                                     
20
 Helmholtz first expounded the physical, physiological and epistemological dimensions of his perception 
theory in his 1852 inaugural lecture On the Nature of Human Sense-Perceptions [Ueber die Natur der 
menschlichen Sinnesempfindungen]. 
21
 Helmholtz (1995 [1869]), p. 207. 
22
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 384. 
23
 Helmholtz, as quoted in Turner (1994), p. 74. 
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One of the distinctive features of Helmholtz‖s philosophical justification for, and 
psychological account of, his psychology of the object, that has been fiercely discussed 
ever since the nineteenth century, is his so called ―dovetailing‖ between empiricism and 
(transcendental) idealism or his attempt to reconcile both.24 While Helmholtz defended 
methodological empiricism, claiming amongst others that “[n]o other method is 
possible than that of endeavoring to arrive at the laws of facts by observations; and we 
can only learn them by induction”, his insistence on the pivotal role of a priori elements 
in the perceptual process afforded him credit as one of the earliest representatives of 
the neo-Kantian movement in Germany.25 To complicate things further, Helmholtz 
regularly referred to Fichte‖s philosophy in his writings, notwithstanding his 
fundamental anti-metaphysical attitude.26 This peculiar state of affairs has inevitably 
lead to very different readings of his work. While some emphasize its empirical 
dimension, others interpret it mainly against the background of German 
(transcendental) idealism, while still others have a more mixed reading and rather 
subscribe to the ―dovetailing‖ or ―attempt to compromise‖ – hypothesis.27  
This dissertation aims at exploring Helmholtz‖s empirico-transcendentalism from a 
very specific angle. That is to say, the main research question of this investigation 
pertains to the systematic purport of combining these levels of analysis – associated 
respectively with empiricism, Kant and Fichte – in dealing with the psychological 
problem of objectification. To that end, Helmholtz‖s theorizing will be considered 
against the background of the intellectual history of the problem of the object in 
modern philosophy, starting with Hume‖s associationism. Notwithstanding the large 
amount of Helmholtz interpretations that have been published in the past decades, this 
systematic point of view remains somewhat underappreciated.  
Before outlining the central research questions, structure and strategy of this 
analysis in detail, we will first present a preliminary overview of the philosophical and 
psychological assumptions that dominated Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. 
 
                                                     
24
 Hamner (2003); Westheimer (2008). This peculiar characteristic of Helmholtz‖s theorizing has been 
discussed extensively by Hatfield (1990), among others. Other analyses worth mentioning include Turner 
(1977), Lenoir (1993, 2006), Cahan (1993a), and DiSalle (2006).  
25
 Helmholtz (1995 [1877a]), p. 322. For Helmholtz‖s role in the early movement of physiological neo-
Kantianism, see for example, Schmitz (1996), Ferrari (1997), Friedman (2001, 2006), Makkreel & Luft (2010). 
Also see chapter 4. 
26
 See chapter 5. 
27 In this respect, a comparison between Schiemann‖s (2009) mainly empiricist interpretation of Helmholtz‖s 
philosophy of science with Heidelberger‖s (1993, 1994) emphasis on the idealist tenets in Helmholtz‖s 
philosophical perspective is especially instructive (see chapter 5). In 1850, Boring (1950, p. 304), even went as 
far as claiming that Helmholtz was univocally opposed the “German philosophy of Kant and Fichte.” A more 
mixed reading is presented in Hatfield (1990), and Friedman (2009), for example.  
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Helmholtz‖s work provides us with a fascinating narrative framework to guide this 
preliminary exploration, namely poetry, and more particularly, Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe‖s version of the tragedy of Faust.  
1.2 The Poetry of Perception: Helmholtz‖s Faust 
“I was first of all a great admirer and lover of poetry,” Helmholtz writes in his 1891 
Autobiographical Sketch.28 Not surprisingly, he was encouraged in this love by his father, 
who was more than willing to pass on his own passion for German literature to his son. 
During the last twenty years of his life, Helmholtz‖s poetical inclinations started to 
transpire in his scientific writings. Especially in his 1892 lecture on Goethe’s Presentiments 
of Coming Scientific Ideas [Goethe‖s Vorahnungen kommender naturwissenschaftlicher 
Ideen], and (to a lesser degree) in his 1878 The Facts in Perception [Die Thatsachen in der 
Wahrnehmung], Helmholtz enlivens the theoretical exposition of his theory of 
perception by means of Goethe‖s magnum opus, The Tragedy of Faust (I & II).29  
Goethe‖s Faust has been interpreted by many as an allegorical representation of the 
major religious, political and philosophical struggles of the modern era, or, in short, as 
one of the foundational myths of modernity.30 As early as 1836, Karl Gutskow interpreted 
Goethe‖s version of the play as “a boundary-stone […] where the past ends and 
modernity begins.”31 Later, Nicholas Boyle likewise described it as “the tragedy of self-
conscious modernity,” and more recently, Faust has been referred to as ―The Theatre of 
Modernity‖.32 The vast amount of literature on the way in which the masterpiece 
epitomizes the spirit of an era demonstrates the inexhaustible variety of perspectives 
from which the tragedy can be related to the various events, political, economic, 
religious and philosophical, associated with the rise of modernity.  
 
                                                     
28
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 383. 
29
 Goethe worked on his masterpiece during his entire life, with Faust I appearing in 1808, and part II in 1832. 
In what follows, English translations are derived either from Bayard Taylor (1871), or Constantine (2005), as 
indicated. The German text is derived from the 1977 [1808/1832] Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag edition. 
30
 Redner (1982), p. 42. 
31
 Gutzkow (1836) as quoted in Brown (2002), p. 84. 
32
 Boyle (1987), p. 36; Schulte et al. (2011). 
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Johann Wolfgang Goethe‖s literary work captivated Helmholtz during his entire 
career.33 Although Helmholtz firmly rejected the latter‖s 1810 Theory of Colors 
[Farbenlehre], he never ceased to appreciate Goethe as a poet.34 What is especially 
interesting about Helmholtz‖s 1892 lecture, is that he describes the poet and the 
scientist as allies in the quest for knowledge and truth, writing for example that “insight 
can be gained into the complicated mechanism of nature and of the human mind in yet 
another way than that of science […]. Such a way is given in artistic representation.”35 A 
bit further he reiterates that “art, like science can represent and transmit truth.”36 
 
                                                     
33
 From the letters to his father (written in 1830s), we know that Helmholtz enjoyed reading Goethe‖s literary 
work when studying in Berlin (Cahan, 1993b). Furthermore, Helmholtz dedicated two lectures to the romantic 
poet (the first in 1853, the second in 1892), and he quotes from Goethe‖s work in his 1878, 1891 and 1892 
lectures.  
34
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 400-401. Helmholtz gave a lecture on Goethe as early as 1853, in which he 
focused much more on Goethe‖s (flawed) anti-Newtonian theory of colours, and implied that the German 
poet‖s scientific work was blinded by his romantic aspirations (see chapter 2). In an appendix added in 1875, 
Helmholtz reiterates that Goethe‖s theory of colours remains an “inextricable jungle [unentwirrbares 
Gestrüpp]” (Helmholtz, 1896 [1875], p. 47 [my translation]). To be sure, Helmholtz did appreciate Goethe‖s 
work in descriptive natural science (anatomy and botany), but added that, unfortunately, they “are in sharp 
contrast with his work in the area of physical natural sciences” (Helmholtz, 1896 [1853], p. 30 [my 
translation]). In comparison to his 1853 lecture, the tone of Helmholtz 1892 speech is much milder, and 
focuses much less on Goethe‖s theory of colours. On Helmholtz‖s assimilation of poetic and scientific thought, 
see also Hatfield (1993), Hallet (2009), and Meulders (2010).  
35
 See for example Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 399: “It seems to me indubitable that an artist‖s work can only 
succeed if the artist bears within himself a fine knowledge […] of the presented phenomena, as well as with 
their effect on the listener or viewer. […] [A]rtistic representation […] must be a representation of the type of 
phenomenon concerned.” The main point here is that the artist, like the scientist, produces representations 
by subsuming particular phenomena or events under the idea of a general type.  
36
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 395, 398. As an example of this ―poetic presentiment‖ in Goethe, Helmholtz refers 
to the Earth Spirit [Erdgeist] in Goethe‖s Faust I, who, according to him, presents an ―allegorical figure‖ of the 
law of the conservation of force. In this respect, Helmholtz refers to the night scene in Faust I (German 
quotation taken from Goethe (1977 [1808], p. 21); English translation by Constantine (2005, p. 20-21): 
 
In Lebensfluthen, im Thatensturm    On life tides, in a storm 
Wall‖ ich auf und ab      Of deeds I rise and fall,  
Wehe hin und her!      Weave here and there 
Geburt und Grab,      For birth, for burial, 
Ein ewiges Meer,      A sea for ever,     
Ein wechselnd Weben,     A restless weaving, 
Ein glühend Leben,      A fiery living, 
So schaff‖ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,  I work at the hurtling loom, I make 
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleit.   Of time God’s living cloak 
 
In this scene, Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 411) reads a poetic expression of the idea of ―force‖ as an 
“indestructible and unincreasable supply of energy or effective motor power […] which, […] constitutes the 
active force in each effect, both in […] living nature and in inanimate bodies. The germs of this insight into the 
constancy of the value of energy were already at hand in the previous century, and could well have been 
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Although the meaning of artistic representation (its ―inner truth‖, as Helmholtz puts it), 
in contrast to scientific reasoning, is (i) not necessarily arrived at consciously, and (ii) 
not viable for expression in words [Wortfassung], Helmholtz maintains that artistic 
intuition [künstlerischen Anschauung] or artistic presentiment can grasp and present 
truths on a pre-conceptual level.37 In the context of this exposition, we are especially 
interested in the way in which Helmholtz read particular scenes of Goethe‖s Faust I & II 
as an artistic presentiment (or an allegorical presentation) of his own epistemological 
position in general, and his theory of perception in particular.  
 
Helmholtz‖s intense admiration for Goethe‖s ―divine poem‖ [göttliche Dichtung] dates 
back to at least 1839, when he gives his father a very lively report of the performance of 
the play in Berlin in a letter, writing that the play had left him with “a sense of satanic 
weakness in the stomach.”38 As Lenoir suggested, Helmholtz, in the two lectures 
mentioned, presents the tormented, truth-seeking Faust as a “proto-Helmholtz.” 
Surprisingly though, Helmholtz‖s rhetorical invocation of Faust is rarely mentioned in 
the secondary literature.39 Yet, his interpretation of three scenes of the play in 
particular, i.e. the Dark Gallery (Faust I), the Chorus Mysticus (Faust II), and the first Study 
Room scene (Faust I), provide an interesting introduction into the general outlines of 
Helmholtz‖s philosophical position. A discussion of the latter‖s interpretation of these 
scenes therefore presents us with the opportunity to give a ―helicopter view‖, so to 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
known to Goethe. […] [T]he Earth Spirit should be the representative of organic life on Earth […]. ” Helmholtz 
(1995 [1878b]), p. 365) wonders, “Has the poet intuited it?.”  
37
 See Helmholtz (1995 [1892]). According to Hatfield (1993, p. 524), Helmholtz‖s 1892 lecture emphasizes “the 
intellectual content of artistic and aesthetic judgment,” and “effectively reduced intellect to imagination.” I 
am not sure, however, whether Helmholtz‖s comparison of aesthetic and scientific thought is adequately 
described in terms of ―reduction‖. Rather, Helmholtz proposes a treatment of the (unconscious) artistic process 
as if it were a (conscious) intellectual one, with a form of inductive inference underlying both. Indeed, it seems 
that the content of the lecture is more appropriately described as an intellectualization of the imaginative 
process (as the first part of Hatfield‖s statement suggests), rather than the other way around. 
38
 Helmholtz to his father (1839), in Cahan (1993b), p. 62. 
39
 Lenoir (1997), p. 177. Helmholtz‖s relation to Goethe‖s work has hardly received any scholarly interest, let 
alone his particular reading of Faust. In itself, Helmholtz‖s love for poetry may be considered as quite a trivial 
biographical fact, and, as such, not relevant with regard to his theorizing. Furthermore, Goethe‖s general 
philosophical outlook can be seen as diametrically opposed to Helmholtz‖s anti-metaphysical stance. However, 
Helmholtz‖s view on the affinity of artistic/poetic and intellectual insight suggests that poetry, for him, may 
provide an alternative way of looking at ―scientific‖ topics, broadly conceived. The discussion of the poetic 
presentiment which Helmholtz read in Faust with respect to his own theorizing, can therefore be considered as 
an alternative way of gaining insight into the broad outlines of the former‖s thought.  
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speak, of the major themes, as well as the intellectual context in which they were 
embedded, which will be considered in detail in the next chapters.40  
1.2.1 The Realm of the Mothers: Faust in the Dark Gallery  
There is no way! Into the untrodden, 
Not to be trodden, a way to the unbidden 
The unbiddable.41 
 
- Goethe (2005 [1832]), p. 54. 
 
First of all, Helmholtz found in Goethe‖s Faust a poetic description of the 
fundamentally limited nature of human knowledge. Goethe‖s play famously unfolds 
from Faust‖s thirst for absolute knowledge, his melancholy over his insufficiency as a 
human being to ever obtain anything like it, and his readiness to overcome the latter by 
making a deal with the devil. At the very beginning of the play, the main character 
laments:42 
I have now, alas, […] studied philosophy, jurisprudence and medicine, - and to my 
sorrow, theology too. Here I stand, poor fool that I am, just as wise as before. […] 
and see that we can know nothing! This it is that cuts me to the heart.  
In 1878, Helmholtz had already quoted a section from the poet‖s “The Limits of 
Humanity” in this respect, whereas in 1892, he takes the Dark Gallery [Finstere Galerie] 
scene from Faust II as a point of departure.43 In the latter, Mephistopheles lets his pupil 
 
                                                     
40
 The order in which the scenes are discussed here does not follow the chronological unfolding of Faust’s 
tragedy, but rather the order of the philosophical themes that Helmholtz introduced through them, from the 
most general ones, to his specific treatment of the problem of perception.  
41
 Goethe (2005 [1832]), p. 54. 
42
 Goethe (2005 [1808]), p. 7. 
43
 For the Dark Gallery scene, see Goethe (1832 [1977]), p. 181-184, or Constantine‖s (2005) English translation, 
p. 52-57. The poem Helmholtz quotes in (1896 [1878b], p. 245) is the following (English translation by Bowring 
(in Hedge & Noa, 1882, p. 174) :  
Doch mit Göttern     For never against 
Soll sich nicht Messen    The immortals, a mortal 
Irgend ein Mensch.     May measure himself 
Hebt er sich aufwärts    Upwards aspiring, if ever 
Und berührt      He toucheth the stars  
Mit dem Scheitel die Sterne,   with his forehead, 
Nirgens haften dann     Then do his insecure feet 
Die unsicheren Sohlen,    Stumble and totter and reel; 
Und mit ihm spielen     Then do the cloud and the tempest 
Wolken und Winde.     Make him their pastime and sport 
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in on the secret of the realm of the Mothers of Being, described as “Goddesses whom 
mortals don‖t know and we are loath to name. […] [T]he untrodden – the not to be 
trodden.”44 In the context of the tragedy, they symbolize the unknown and the 
unknowable, and denote the obscure essence and origin of all things. The realm where 
the mothers are said to reside is described as a ―vacancy, eternally remote‖, that fills 
Faust with anxiety, but into which he nevertheless wishes to descend. In pondering 
upon Goethe‖s Mothers of Being, Helmholtz quotes the following lines:45 
Um sie kein Ort, noch weniger eine Zeit   No place around them, time still 
         less; 
Von ihnen sprechen ist Verlegenheit   To speak of them feels  
         discourteous 
 
[…] 
 
Nichts wirst du sehn in ewig leerer Ferne   But in that vacancy, eternally 
         remote  
Den Schritt nich hören, den du tust,   Nothing you’ll see nor hear 
         your taken step 
Nichts Fests finden, wo du ruhst!    Nor find a solid footing when 
         you stop. 
 
As Goethe describes the realm of the mothers as being outside of space and time, 
Helmholtz reads the scene as a poetic invocation of the Kantian thing-in-itself [Kant‖s 
Welt der Dinge an Sich], which he in turn conceptually links to his own notion of the 
unknowable Real [das Reale].46 At the very basis of his epistemology, Helmholtz 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Steht er mit festen     Let him with sturdy 
Markigen Knochen     Sinewy limbs, 
Auf der wohlgegründeten    Tread the enduring 
Dauernden Erde:     Firm-seated earth; 
Reicht er nicht auf,      Aiming no further, than 
Nur mit der Eiche     The oak  
Oder der Rebe     or the vine     
Sich zu vergleichen     to compare 
44
 Goethe (2005 [1832]), p. 54. 
45
 Goethe (1977 [1832]), p. 183, quoted in Helmholtz (1896 [1892]), p. 356; Constantine‖s (2005) English 
translation, p. 54-55.  
46
 Helmholtz (1896 [1892]), p. 356. As is well known, space and time, i.e. the a priori forms of intuition, are for 
Kant the primary conditions for something to be given in intuition. Hence, it is impossible for anything that is 
said to be beyond space and time, like Goethe‖s ―realm of the mothers‖, to be an object of possible experience. 
See for example CPR [A49/B66]: “[S]pace and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) 
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distinguishes this Real from the Actual [Wirklichkeit].47 Helmholtz articulates the the 
distinction between both as follows:48 
We have in our language a very fortunate designation for that which […] 
permanently influences us [auf uns einwirkt], namely: the actual [das Wirkliche]. 
Herein only the acting [das Wirken] is expressed; it is not related to existence as 
substance [bestehen als Substanz], which is included in the concept of the real, i.e. 
the thinglike.  
Helmholtz‖s Wirklichkeit thus refers to the world of possible experience, while his 
Realität denotes unknowable, thinglike being. A similar distinction is made by Kant in 
the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), in which the Prussian philosopher describes the Real 
(the first category of quality) as “the transcendental matter of all objects as things-in-
themselves” (Kant, CPR, [A143/B182]), and juxtaposes it with Actuality (the second 
category of modality) as that which is “connected with the material conditions [i.e. 
everything provided through sensibility] for experience” (Kant, CPR [A218]).49 For 
Helmholtz, the concept of the Real – as derived from the Latin ―res‖ – refers to 
permanent existence [dauernde Existenz] or subject-independent being, while 
Actuality, by contrast, is effective [wirkende] reality, or that which is capable of acting 
upon [wirken], or exercising an effect [wirkung] on human sensitivity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
experience, are […] conditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere 
appearances and not things given for themselves in this way; about these appearances, further, much may be 
said a priori that concerns their form but nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may ground 
them.” Also see chapter 4. 
47
 See Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 407: “Using the occasion of Faust‖s trip to the ―Mothers,‖ he [Goethe] has 
unforgettably […] described the aesthetic impression that ―Kant‖s world of things in themselves‖ made on 
him.” For Helmholtz on the ―Real‖ see Helmholtz (1995 [1878b], p. 361; 1995 [1892], p. 405). 
48
 Helmholtz (1896 [1878b]), p. 241 [my translation]. The reality-actuality distinction was likewise made by 
Leibniz, Fichte, Schopenhauer and Lotze, among others. As such, the philosophical differentiation between 
both concepts was quite common in Helmholtz‖s time, although it is not sure from whom he adopted the idea. 
For a historical overview of the philosophical use of the distinction between the Real and the Actual, see Eisler 
(1904), p. 788-793; and Falkenburg (2007). As was pointed out in the Herz/Schlick translation of Helmholtz‖s 
Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung , the English terms ―Actuality‖ and ―Reality‖ are quite adequate terms to 
replace the respective words used by Helmholtz, as Actuality incorporates the verb Acting in a similar way as 
Wirklichkeit contains Wirken (see Helmholtz, 1977 [1878b]). Unfortunately, the important distinction 
Helmholtz draws between Wirklichkeit and Realität is not always respected by translators. In David Cahan‖s 
1995 translation of Helmholtz‖s work for example, the distinction is not always preserved, as both German 
terms are frequently translated as ―reality‖, which can be somewhat confusing or even misleading with respect 
to the interpretation of Helmholtz‖s work. See for example Helmholtz (1995 [1878b]), p. 361 and p. 362. In 
relation to Kant, the same difficulties arise with regard to the English translation of his work; in this respect 
see Holzhey and Mudroch (2005). 
49 For Kant on the matter versus the form of experience, see for example CPR [A86/B118], [A266/B322].  
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Furthermore, Helmholtz adds, the Real is the hypothesized permanent cause [Ur-
sache] behind visible appearances, and as such, he relates it to the idea of “a power […] 
ready to take effect [zu wirken bereit] in every moment where the conditions for its 
efficacy [Wirksamkeit] occur,” i.e. to the notion of Force:50 
[S]ince […] force maintains itself as ready and able to take effect in every moment, 
we ascribe a continuous existence to it. […] [T]hereupon […] rests the designation 
of force as the cause of changes that occur under its influence; it is the permanent 
being behind the change of phenomena. The meaning of the term ―thing‖ 
corresponds to the Latin res, from which the terms “real” and “reality” are 
derived. 
Helmholtz thus associates the Real with substance and force, and therefore, his 
analysis of the concept of Reality automatically reminds one of the ontology of matter 
and force he presented in the introduction to his seminal 1847 paper On the Conservation 
of Force. In the latter, the joint action of matter and force is likewise put forward as the 
hypothesized cause of the quantitative and qualitative differences in visible 
appearances.51 However, it is important to grasp that Helmholtz maintained the 
unknowability of matter and force, and conceived of them as no more than scientific 
abstractions, whose hypothesized capacity to produce lawlike behavior on the 
phenomenal level cannot be hypostasized on the level of Actuality, but rather forms a 
necessary condition for the comprehensibility of nature as such:52 
[W]hen applied to nature, the concepts of matter and force cannot be 
distinguished. […] [A] pure force would be something that must be there, and yet 
is not [etwas, was dasein sollte und doch wieder nicht dasein]. […] [I]t would be 
likewise erroneous to explain matter as something actual [etwas Wirkliches]. […] 
Both are rather abstractions from actuality [dem Wirklichen]. […] One can 
therefore determine the task of the physical science of nature to be the reduction 
of natural phenomena to immutable […] forces […]. The possibility of this 
reduction is at the same time the condition of the complete comprehensibility of 
nature. 
 
                                                     
50
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 407; Helmholtz (1896 [1892]), p. 354; also see Helmholtz (1995 [1869]), p. 209. 
51
 Helmholtz (1889 [1847]); also see Heimann (1974).  
52
 Helmholtz (1889 [1847]), p. 5-6. Also see Helmholtz (1995 [1854, 1869]). It is interesting to note that in his 
CPR [B249/A204-B255/A209], Kant puts forward a similar view on the conceptual intertwinement of the 
concepts of cause, matter and force: “[C]ausality leads to the concept of action, this to the concept of force, 
and thereby to the concept of substance. […] Where there is action, consequently activity and force, there is 
also substance, and in this alone must the seat of this fruitful source of appearances be sought.” For an 
interesting discussion of the way in which Helmholtz‖s theoretical conceptualization of matter and force can 
be said to be rooted in Kant‖s critical project, see Heimann (1974). 
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In other words, to understand nature, for Helmholtz, is to reduce visible phenomena 
to the hypothesized lawlike action of real causes. Helmholtz thus concludes that the 
causal structure of understanding – which includes a reference to the Real as ―Ur-sache‖ 
– is an a priori condition of comprehensibility, or a “regulative principle of 
understanding.”53 Although Helmholtzian Reality is not capable of (scientific and 
perceptual) representation as such, the mere act of representing presupposes causal 
reference to Reality (or a belief in mind-independent being as cause) as a condition of 
possibility. Hence, understanding, by virtue of its very structure, generates the (empty) 
concept of the Real qua cause [Ur-sache], in order to make sense of visible phenomena. 
In 1892, Helmholtz conceptually links the Real to yet another Goethean notion, 
namely that of the Urphänomen . Goethe, Helmholtz states, was convinced that we have 
to seek “Ur-phenomenon, an ultimate event, to which the multiplicity of phenomena 
may be reduced.”54 Helmholtz uses Goethe‖s Ur-phenomenon to clarify his 
understanding of the Real as unknowable cause, and regulative point of reference for all 
objectifying thought. In Goethe‖s work, the Ur-phenomenon is defined as “an ultimate 
which cannot itself be explained, which is in fact not in need of explanation, but from 
which all that we observe can be made intelligible,” and “the limit of our perception.”55 
As such, Helmholtz interprets the Ur-phenomenon as the hypothesized causal origin of 
phenomenal diversity, and a principle of comprehensibility. Hence, Helmholtz states 
that careful use of the notion of the Real “provides the great advantage of being a much 
shorter linguistic expression than the description of the Ur-phenomenon in statements 
about conditions.”56  
 
                                                     
53
 For Helmholtz‖s a priori conception of the causal law, see among others Helmholtz (1896 [1855], 1867 
[1856/66, III], 1995 [1868], 1883 [1878a], 1995 [1878b], 1995 [1892], 1894). Helmholtz‖s (Kantian-inspired) notion 
of causality will be further discussed in chapter 4. 
54
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 403. 
55
 Goethe as quoted in Seamon & Zajonc (1998), p. 4, and Meulders (2010), p. 8. Helmholtz‖s assimilation of 
Reality with the Goethean Ur-phenomenon seems to be based on nothing more than a superficial conceptual 
similarity. Actually, Helmholtz quite explicitly assimilated Goethe‖s Ur-phenomenon to the mechanical force 
transformations that supposedly underlie the multitude of empirical phenomena, and interprets it as a 
―presentiment‖ of his ontology of force and matter, as is made clear for example by Helmholtz (1995 [1892], p. 
404): “Gustav Kirchoff begins his Textbook of Mechanics with the explanation: the task of mechanics is ―to 
describe completely and in the simplest ways the movements taking place before one in nature.‖ What 
Kirchoff […] understands by the ―simplest ways‖ of description may, in my opinion, not lie so far from the 
Goethean ―Ur-phenomenon‖.” As such, he relates the Goethean concept to a mechanical, Newtonian world 
view, and it is very questionable that the romantic idealist would have approved of such an interpretation. 
While Goethe‖s Ur-phenomenon is the result of an abstraction to the ideal, Helmholtz puts it on a par with a 
mechanical reduction. Hence, their respective use of the terms implies they have different methodologies as 
well as different epistemologies and worldviews.  
56
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 406. 
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So, for Helmholtz, the concepts of Reality, thing-in-itself and Ur-phenomenon in 
their most general sense all denote the general idea of being-in-itself, and hence, have 
no referent that can be described in positive terms, but forever remains a ―vacancy, 
eternally remote‖, to borrow Goethe‖s terms. Albeit a vacancy, i.e. a mere logical 
possibility without a necessary external correlate, that is the point of reference for all 
experience and knowledge, but which “in the mouths of foolish people, […] can lead to 
the wildest nonsense.”57  
Interestingly, it is only from the late 1870s onwards, that Helmholtz explicitly 
emphasized this inherently problematic nature of his notion of Reality. In trying to 
pinpoint the event that urged Helmholtz to clearly articulate his epistemological 
position towards being-in-itself, the criticism he received in 1877 of the Kantian 
philosopher J.P.N. Land, seems to have played a pivotal role. In the latter‖s article in 
Mind from May 1877, he accuses Helmholtz of defending an uncritical account of the 
Real, and, more precisely, of identifying the experienced object with the idea of a real 
thing.58 In Helmholtz‖s April 1878 response to Land, the first clear statement can be 
found of his critical standpoint towards the metaphysical status of Reality.59 Helmholtz 
acknowledges that he takes the reduction of phenomena to “a variety of Real conditions 
[reellen Bedingungen]” to be a condition of comprehensibility. But, he adds:60 
We do not know anything about these very conditions, about the actual Real 
[eigentlich Reelle], that underlies appearances; all opinions [Meinungen] that we 
entertain in this respect are to be considered as […] probable hypotheses. The 
preceding presumption [i.e. of the causal structure of understanding], however, is a 
fundamental law of our thought [Grundgesetz unseres Denkens]; if we were to 
give it up, we would thereby repudiate our very capacity to think conceptually 
about these relations [diese Verhältnisse denkend begreifen zu können]. I 
emphasize that we do not make any assumptions about the nature of the 
conditions under which our representations arise. The hypothesis of subjective 
idealism […] could be just as admissible as the realistic perspective. We could 
assume all our perceiving to be but a dream […].  
In other words, the Real is merely thought of as being the ultimate ground of the 
whole of Actuality. We act and think, Helmholtz states elsewhere, “as if the world of 
 
                                                     
57
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 406.  
58
 Land (1877) wrote his article in response to Helmholtz‖s 1870 refutation of Kant‖s a priori conception of 
space. In it he writes that Helmholtz conflates – as any other scientist, in his view – the real and the objective, 
and that his refutation is therefore invalid. On Helmholtz‖s criticism with regard to space, see chapter 4.  
59
 Helmholtz (1883 [1878a]). For other articulations of this critical view, see for example Helmholtz (1995 
[1878b], 1995 [1892], 1894).  
60
 Helmholtz (1883 [1878a]), p. 656 [my translation]. 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
20 
 
material things assumed by the realistic hypothesis may really exist. However, we do 
not overcome this ―as if‖ […].”61 
Notwithstanding Helmholtz‖s quite straightforward articulation of his philosophical 
position in this respect, his attitude towards the metaphysical status of the Real has 
been interpreted in a number of different ways. Most scholars agree that there was an 
evolution in Helmholtz‖s epistemological stance on this matter, for which his 1878 
lecture The Facts of Perception marked a turning point.62 Based on textual evidence, 
however, it seems more reasonable to assume that the ―turning point‖ should be dated 
back to his response to Land‖s criticism, published a few months before the 
aforementioned lecture. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Helmholtz himself 
considered his exposition of the Real in his response to Land to be a clarification, and 
not a correction of his former views.63 That is to say, he maintained that although he 
might have expressed much of his theorizing in a ―realistic language‖, he had actually 
always considered realism to be no more than a problematic hypothesis, although it was 
only in reaction to Land‖s criticism that he felt compelled to clearly articulate his 
position in this respect.64 In any case, it is clear from the statements above that the 
―mature‖ Helmholtz explicitly distanced himself from robust metaphysical realism. Some 
interpreters have gone so far as to characterize the evolution in his thought as a 
growing tendency towards anti-realism or scepticism.65 It can be questioned, however, 
that the principled decision to refrain from making any positive statements with regard 
to the metaphysical status of being-in-itself (whether to affirm its existence or non-
existence) should suffice to call one a sceptic. Therefore, it seems preferable to 
characterize Helmholtz‖s position as hypothetical realism or critical realism.66  
1.2.2 The Symbolic Relation to the World: Chorus Mysticus 
Helmholtz‖s most fundamental epistemological assumption, as sketched in the previous 
section, can be said to epitomize what Foucault once called modernity‖s ―most radical 
epistemological event‖, i.e. the assumption of a radical discontinuity between “things, 
with their own organic structures, their hidden veins, the space that articulates them, 
the time that produces them” on the one hand, and “representation, […] in which those 
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things address themselves […] to a subjectivity, a consciousness, a singular effort of 
cognition, to the psychological individual […] who is trying to know” on the other.67 In 
contrast to classical philosophy, modern man lost his inherent connection to the divine, 
subject and object are alienated from one another and conceived of as two radically 
different spheres. It is exactly in this sense that Faust has been described as ―the first 
modern philosopher‖, and the impersonation of the modern insight into the finite and 
conditioned nature of human knowledge.68 According to Brown, for example, the 
tragedy incorporates the central tenets of “German philosophy in Goethe‖s day […] 
preoccupied with the gap between the subject, the self in its capacity as perceiver, and 
the object or non-self.”69 
In Helmholtz‖s work, this ―radical event‖ is implied in his firm rejection of the 
(Leibnizian) idea of a pre-established harmony between subject and object: 70 
[R]epresentation and that which is represented […] belong to […] entirely different 
worlds, which have as little in common as the letter of a book with the sound of 
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the words which they signify. […] Our representations of things cannot be 
anything other than symbols, […] signs for things that we have learned to use.  
Likewise, concerning the level of sensibility, Helmholtz states:71 
I have thus believed it necessary so to formulate the relationship between the 
sensation and its object such that I would interpret the sensation only as a sign 
[…]. […] [N]o type of similarity is necessary between it and its object, just as little 
as that between the spoken word and the object that we designate thereby. 
The radical fissure between subject and object thus amounts to a conception of their 
epistemological relation as a semiotic one: the affirmation of objective existence is the 
result of a process of signification by an interpreting subject. Consequently, the problem 
of the object in epistemology and perceptual theory is established as correlative with 
that of the interpreting subject. More specifically, the foundational problem of 
perception, for Helmholtz, is that of unraveling the “mental function” or the “acts of 
apprehension” that underlie the genesis of the awareness of the thing as a spatially 
extended entity, dynamically distinct from, and opposed to the perceiving subject.72  
Here again, Helmholtz states, “we find Goethe along with us on the same road.” More 
particularly, in the context of his semiotic understanding of the subject-object relation, 
he quotes the very last verse of the last scene of Goethe‖s tragedy, the Chorus Mysticus, 
approvingly:73 
Alles Vergängliche   All things transitory 
Ist nur ein Gleichnis;   but as symbols are felt 
Das Unzulängliche,   the insufficiency 
Hier wird‖s Ereignis   here grows to event 
It is true, Helmholtz affirms, that all that “happens in space and time, […] we know 
only as a symbol [Gleichnis].”74 To be sure, the German notion of Gleichnis has a much 
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broader meaning than that of the English ―likeness‖, and can be used to denote 
metaphors, parables and symbols. But it seems that Gleichnis in this context must indeed 
be translated as symbol, as Helmholtz vehemently opposed the idea of sensation and 
knowledge as an image [bild], i.e. a copy-like picture of reality (see chapter 2).  
The last two lines of the verse quoted above, Helmholtz reads as a poetic articulation 
of the differentiation between the Real – in the face of which we feel our insufficiency – 
and the Actual, here denoted as ―event‖ [Ereignis], or that which affects through sensible 
stimulation [Erregung].75 To be more precise, given that the object is the result of an 
ongoing process of signification, it follows that it is never completed, and, as such, is 
fundamentally ―insufficient‖ [Unzulänglich], viable to correction and reinterpretation.76 
As human beings, we are restricted to the total of ―all things transitory‖, never to grasp 
the essence of the thing-in-itself (or, in Goethe‖s terms: never to enter the realm of the 
Mothers), and as such, “earthly thought is first justified by the occurring event 
[Ereignis].”77  
As some commentators have noted, the isolated and estranged nature of Faust can be 
seen as an allegorical representation of what Foucault denoted as modernity‖s ―radical 
event‖. In the description of the physical spaces in which Faust finds himself, the reader 
is easily overcome by a sense of claustrophobia. The tormented scholar‖s quest for 
knowledge takes place successively in the darkness of the night, the confined space of 
his study room (described as a “cell,” a cold and desolate “dungeon”), a cellar, and a 
cave.78 Maleuvre, for example, interpreted this claustrophobic staging of Goethe‖s 
tragedy as a metaphorical depiction of the drama of modern subjectivity, which unfolds 
from the realization that “the mind never sees farther than its own nose.”79 As such, the 
tragedy can be said to unfold from the modern insight into the relativity of knowledge, 
i.e. the assumption that every being is a being for consciousness, that does not 
necessarily correlate with an object or event in a mind-independent world, but is 
constructed within the limited sphere of finite subjectivity. “That mind is yours and it 
reveals only its own reflection, […] [is this] what they call knowing?” Faust complains, 
thus echoing the general epistemic anxiety – to borrow Daston and Galison‖s term – that 
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taunted his era.80 Although Faust desperately seeks to unravel “never-ending nature,” 
he complains that he is “nothing like the gods,” but rather like “the worm, that works 
the dust. And living in dust and by dust fed.”81 “Here I am, […] poor fool as I ever was,” 
the main character laments in the opening scene.82 Faust‖s longing for the infinite, the 
divine and the absolute, correlates with (and is frustrated by) the tragic insight in his 
own finite nature, and one could thus read Goethe‖s tragedy as lending a voice to what 
Hegel once called modern man‖s unhappy consciousness.83 Faust expresses his hope to 
escape “into a wider land,” “rise to the surface in this sea of error” to which he is 
condemned by his human condition, but finds he “has no wings to lift [him] up.”84 
Although Helmholtz‖s work incorporates this negative Faustian theme, he does not, 
however, accept its catastrophic conclusion with regard to the possibility of knowledge. 
Although there is indeed no pre-established harmony between subject and object for 
Helmholtz, his theorizing is not an affirmation of that gap, but rather an attempt at 
bridging it, or at least, at determining the constructive and constitutive conditions 
underlying the genesis of the notion of thinghood, and, more generally, the possibility 
of objective representation. This brings us to a discussion of Helmholtz‖s interpretation 
of the first study room scene in Faust I, that describes the main character‖s attempt to 
address the question of What was there in the beginning? 
1.2.3 What was There in the Beginning? The First Study Room Scene 
From Helmholtz‖s semiotic understanding of the subject-object relation, it follows that 
his psychological approach to the object can be considered as an attempt to address the 
question of the origin of meaning. In the context of his interrogation of the conditions 
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underlying the genesis of the meaning-object, Helmholtz appeals to the first study room 
scene of Faust.85  
In the first study room scene, Goethe‖s main character ponders the translation of the 
opening line of the gospel of St. John, namely ―In the Beginning was the Word‖. The 
scene contains an interesting reflection on What was there in the beginning, and is a 
testimony of Faust‖s struggle with the riddle of the creation of the world [act der 
Weltschöpfung].86 According to Helmholtz, in this passage in Faust the main character 
seeks to save himself “from the unsatisfactory condition of the knowledge and brooding 
going on inside himself [in sich selbst gewendeten Wissens und Grübelns].”87 In other 
words, from Helmholtz‖s perspective, Faust‖s struggle with the first line of the gospel 
metaphorizes his search for a way out of the dungeons, narrow cells and caves of his 
epistemic insulation. In accordance with his general perspective, Helmholtz interprets 
the scene as an attempt to answer the question of how we first escape the world of 
symbols [Gleichnisse] and enter the world of Actuality, or, in short, as an allegorical 
expression of the philosophical question of the origin of the object in experience.88 
The relevant scene goes as follows:89 
Geschrieben steht: “Im Anfang war das Wort!”  It is written: “In the  
         beginning was the Word.” 
Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?  Here I am already at fault. 
         Who’ll help me on? 
Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,  I cannot possibly value the 
         Word so highly, 
Ich muss es anders übersetzen,    I must translate it differently 
Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erlechtet bin   If I am truly inspired by the 
         spirit. 
Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn.  It is written: ‘In the   
         beginning was the Sense’. 
Bedanke wohl die erste Zeile,     Consider well the first line 
Dass deine Feder sich nich übereile!   That your pen be not over  
         hasty 
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Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?  It is the Sense that   
         influences and produces  
         everything? 
Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft!   It should stand thus: ‘In the 
         beginning was the Power!’ 
Doch auch indem ich dieses niederscheibe,   Yet, in the very act of  
         writing it down, 
Son warnt mich was, dass ich dabei nicht bleibe. Something warns me not to 
         keep to it 
Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal seh ich Rat  The spirit comes to my aid! 
         At once I see my way,  
Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!    and write confidently: ‘In the 
         beginning was the Act’. 
In 1892, Helmholtz indicates the way in which this scene resonates with his theory of 
perception, and analyzes it as follows:90 
He [Faust] runs up against the much-discussed concept of the Logos: “In the 
beginning was the word.” The word is only a sign of its meaning; this must be 
meant; the meaning of a word is a concept, or, if it refers to something that 
happens, a natural law, which, as we saw, when it is conceived as continuous and 
effective is designated as force [Kraft]. There thus lies in this transition from word 
to meaning, and then to force, which Faust makes in his attempt at translation, […] 
a continuous, further development of the concept. However even force does not 
satisfy him. He now makes a decisive intellectual leap [einen entschiedenen 
Gedankensprung].  
In accordance with this interpretation, with every attempt Faust makes at a 
translation (successively word/ meaning/ force/ act), he comes one step closer to 
solving the riddle of the object. As “the word is only a sign of its meaning [Sinn],” 
Helmholtz writes, Faust is right in dismissing it as the point of origin. Within his theory 
of perception, sensation is nothing but a sign that is not inherently related to the object. 
Meaning [Sinn], in turn, has to be meant, i.e. implies a transition from signs to meaning. 
In other words, the meaning-object is the product of signification, not its origin. The 
transition from word to meaning, Helmholtz continues, is only possible through 
subsumption under a general concept or law, which is designated as Kraft [force]. That 
is to say, the meaning-object arises from the moment that a sensible effect [Wirkung] is 
related to a hypothesized cause [Wirksamkeit]. But then again, the question remains 
how this subsumption is possible in the first place. In order to account for the origin of 
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the meaning-object, Helmholtz finally agrees with Faust, viz. we have to make a 
“decisive intellectual leap,” and turn to the act.91 Helmholtz concludes:92 
The epistemological counterpart to this scene lies in the efforts of the 
philosophical schools to establish belief in the existence of reality, efforts that 
must remain unsuccessful so long as they proceed only from passive observations 
of the external world. […] [T]hey did not recognize that human actions, which are 
posited by the will, form an indispensable part of our sources of knowledge. […] 
[I]n order to become sure of reality, even an epistemology based on […] physiology 
[…] has to instruct humans how to proceed to act. 
As will become clear in the next chapters of this dissertation, the Helmholtzian 
interpretation of Goethe‖s intellectual leap can be interpreted in a narrow sense and in a 
more general one. In the narrow interpretation, the ―act‖ refers to Helmholtz‖s 
conception of voluntary action, or active experimentation as a ―generalized 
epistemological strategy‖.93 The possibility of objectivity in general and the appearance 
of a perceptual object in particular, in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, require active 
experimental interaction with the world, as it is only in this way that an encounter can 
take place with “a power equivalent to our will, […] a power opposing us.”94 The act in 
this sense refers to what Heidelberger has called Helmholtz‖s ―experimental 
interactionism‖ with regard to the possibility of object construction.95  
More generally, however, the scene indicates Helmholtz‖s insistence on the 
constructive activity and constitutive spontaneity required to progress from mere 
sensation-signs, to object-meanings. To be more precise, the object, for Helmholtz, is 
the result of an a posteriori constructive process based on past experience, a process that 
is, however, crucially dependent upon a priori conditions of possibility. Helmholtz‖s 
intellectual leap in the context of his psychology of the object, is thus a leap to the 
active subject, conceptualized as such on different levels of analysis that can be 
associated respectively with British and Scottish empiricism, Kant and Fichte. 
 
The discussion of Helmholtz‖s reading of Faust has provided us with the opportunity 
to sketch the broad outlines of Helmholtz‖s epistemological position and theory of 
perception, and to create a ―poetic presentiment‖, to use Helmholtz‖s words, for the 
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chapters to come. With Helmholtz‖s leap, we have reached the end of the preliminary 
―helicopter view‖ that provides us with a compass for the chapters to follow, in which all 
the elements discussed here will be treated in more detail, and placed in their relevant 
contexts. The guiding research question in this investigation pertains to the motives 
that lead Helmholtz to his intellectual leap, i.e. his progressive problematization of 
epistemic subjectivity in the course of his psychological analysis of the object. To that 
end, a general historical-systematic framework is introduced that serves as a heuristic 
tool for systematizing the inquiry to follow.  
1.3 General Aim and Strategy 
1.3.1 Main Research Question 
As already mentioned in section 1.1.2, Helmholtz‖s psychological treatment of the object 
has been described as a ―dovetailing‖, or an attempt to ―reconcile‖ empiricism and 
transcendentalism.96 In this respect, Helmholtz‖s idiosyncratic allegiance to Kant‖s 
critical philosophy has raised particular interest ever since the nineteenth century.97 
Helmholtz‖s indebtedness to Johann Gottlieb Fichte‖s thought has likewise received 
some scholarly attention, but this dimension of Helmholtz‖s thinking remains gravely 
underappreciated up to this day.98 Furthermore, there are major differences of opinion 
regarding the correct interpretation of Helmholtz‖s peculiar combination of these 
philosophical perspectives. The general aim of this dissertation is to address these 
interpretative problems, by presenting an analysis of the way in which empiricism, 
Kantianism and Fichteanism can be considered as different levels of analysis in 
Helmholtz‖s attempt to account for the origin and ground of the perceptual object. The 
leading hypothesis in this endeavor is that the progression from one level of analysis to 
another correlates with an increasing problematization of the experiencing subject. To 
that end, a historical-systematic discussion will be presented of the empiricist, Kantian 
and Fichtean analysis of experience, in order to grasp not only the doctrinal content of 
their theorizing and the way in which these inspired Helmholtz, but likewise to gain 
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insight into the aporetic corners of their respective systems, which in turn provide a 
motive for a shift from one level of analysis to another. When considered from this 
perspective, the three seemingly antagonistic perspectives united in Helmholtz‖s work 
soon appear to be systematically related as complementary ways of interrogating the 
problem of the object. As such, this dissertation aims at constructing a historical 
framework that enables a systematic insight into Helmholtz‖s empirico-
transcendentalist approach to the perceptual object, and into the internal dynamics of 
his proto-psychology. 
1.3.2 The Problem of the Object: Interpretive Framework 
“We use sensations,” Helmholtz writes in the introduction to the third part of his 
Treatise, “to form representations [Vorstellungen] about the existence, the form and 
position of external objects.”99 Hence, he adds, the psychological part of perceptual 
theory investigates “the genesis and coming into consciousness of representations 
[Vorstellung],” and the “laws and nature of the mental acts” that underlie the 
perceptual process.100 The appearance of an object, Helmholtz further explains, is “an 
act of our power of realization” and therefore a “mental function.”101 Helmholtz‖s 
psychology thus starts from the assumption that in order to progress from mere 
subjective sensation to objective perception, an interpretive act is required on the part 
of the subject: “We can never escape from the world of our sensations to the idea of an 
external world [Vorstellung von einer Aussenwelt], except by an inference.”102 Within 
the semiotic framework of Helmholtz‖s theorizing, the problem at stake is reformulated 
as follows:103 
A peculiar intellectual activity is required to pass from a nervous sensation to the 
conception of an external object, which the sensation has aroused. The sensations 
of our nerves of sense are mere symbols indicating certain external objects, and it 
is usually only after considerable practice that we acquire the power of drawing 
correct conclusions from our sensations respecting the corresponding objects. 
Helmholtz‖s psychology, that is the focal point of this investigation, aims at grasping 
the exact nature and structure of the ―intellectual activity‖ involved in perceptual 
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objectification. In a most general sense, the levels of analysis in this endeavor can be 
clarified by means of the following basic questions with regard to the structure and 
ground of perceptual understanding, that will be discussed subsequently in chapters 3 
to 5: 
(i) Empiricism or the problem of psychological construction: What is the nature 
of the psychological process guiding the construction of meaning-objects 
from (the combination of) sign-sensations? Or in other words: what is the 
structure of a posteriori perceptual apprehension? 
(ii) Critique or the problem of the subject (I): What should the mind or subject be like 
in order to explain the ability of semiotic construction? Or in Kantian terms: 
In which way is the perceptual apprehension of sensitive matter necessarily 
determined by the a priori form of understanding? 
(iii) Metacritique or the (radicalized) problem of the subject (II): What is the 
subjective ground of the experienced duality between the apprehension of the 
object and the apprehending subject? What grounds this theoretical 
distinction and the capacity for differential consciousness? Whereas this 
duality is assumed at the critical level, it is the point of departure of the 
metacritical level. 
 
As already mentioned, these levels of analysis are linked historically to eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century empiricist theories of the object, Kant‖s critical analysis, and 
Fichte‖s metacritical expansion of the Kantian project. Furthermore, as each of these 
levels (except for the first one) takes as its point of departure the problems inherent to 
the previous one, they are not only related historically, but also systematically. To 
clarify this general framework, the three levels of analysis, including the way in which 
they relate to each other, as well as Helmholtz‖s theorizing, are captured in the 
following sketch. 
1.3.2.1 Helmholtz and Empiricism: The Problem of Psychological Construction 
As will be discussed in detail in chapter 3, the first level of analysis of Helmholtz‖s 
psychology of the object resonates with J.S. Mill‖s psychological account of the belief in 
the external world.104 This theory can in turn be linked systematically to Hume‖s 
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empirical treatment of the belief in external bodies as presented in his Treatise of Human 
Nature, which compels us to include the Scottish sceptic in the discussion.105 Most 
generally, the problem of the object in Mill‖s and Hume‖s theorizing, is approached as a 
question pertaining to the genesis of an informational mental content, or belief. Both 
argue that the psychological affirmation of external existence is identical to the 
acquiring of a belief, constructed by means of associative processes and previous 
experience. Accordingly, their methodology has been described as methodological 
naturalism, i.e. an approach of mental phenomena based upon (a) the decomposition of 
complex mental contents into more primitive parts (sensations) and (b) their 
theoretical reconstruction by means of general laws (the laws of association).106 Indeed, 
Helmholtz‖s psychology can partially be understood against the background of these 
theories, as Hatfield, Boring and Hochberg, among others, have claimed.107 More 
particularly, Helmholtz does conceive of perception as a constructive, associative 
process, based upon learning and experience.108  
 However, in both Hume‖s and Mill‖s theoretical accounts, the psychological problem 
of the object is completely dissociated from the correlative problem of the representing 
subject. Hence, both their theories face serious problems when it comes to articulating 
one of the founding assumptions of their associationist psychology, i.e. the active and 
unitary subject that is implied in their accounts, but cannot itself be accounted for in 
terms of the associative construction. Strikingly enough, both Hume and Mill explicitly 
distanced themselves from what we may call the problem of epistemic subjectivity; the 
former by stating that “this difficulty is too hard for my understanding,” the latter by 
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describing it as an “inexplicable mystery.”109 As will be argued in detail in chapter 3, 
strict empiricism‖s lack of reflective space with regard to the question of how the subject 
has to be thought so that it may be endowed with the capacity to associate its way into 
the notion of an external world, has been heavily criticized, as it leaves the empiricist 
account of the object lacking a foundation. Within the scope of our investigation, it is 
this fundamental weakness of psychological associationism that prompts us to shift the 
scope to another level of analysis.  
1.3.2.2 Helmholtz and Kant: The A priori Structure of Understanding 
The problem of epistemic subjectivity in empiricism requires us to take an ―intellectual 
leap‖ – to borrow Helmholtz‖s terms – to another perspective; a leap that was taken by 
Kant in his critical analysis of experience and knowledge. As Brook has summarized it, 
the Prussian philosopher‖s project can be said to unfold most generally from the insight 
that “experience needs a subject.”110 Kant never opposed what he called the ―physiology 
of understanding‖ and the associationist account.111 Rather, he argued that the genetic 
decomposition and reconstruction of the perceptual object simply does not (and 
cannot) answer the question as to what makes experience possible in the first place.112 
Without a subject there simply is no experience, and no representation; a subject, that 
is, conceived of as:113 
[T]he aspect of a system of representations that does the judging (interpreting) 
and recognizing […] that can take representations up, let representations go, 
transform representations into new representations without itself changing […]. It 
is able to refer to itself, indeed to itself as itself, […] is aware of multiple objects as 
one object […] and of itself as […] aware of them all […].  
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In the A-edition of the transcendental deduction, Kant is very clear that associative 
processes (i.e. empirical conjunction) presuppose a ground of associability in the subject, 
i.e. an a priori rule that guides a posteriori construction, and cannot be derived from 
experience itself, but functions as its very condition of possibility.114 The laws of 
association, or the laws of reproduction, as Kant calls them, therefore presuppose the 
original productivity or spontaneity of understanding:115 
[T]he combination (conjunctio) of a manifold […] can never come to us through the 
senses […] it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation […] all 
combination […] is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with 
the general title synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact 
that we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having 
previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination 
is the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the 
subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity.  
With regard to this second level of analysis, Helmholtz‖s appropriation of the causal 
law has been discussed extensively in secondary literature.116 Helmholtz maintained 
that the psychological construction of the object or the external world by means of the 
lawful connection of underdetermined sign-sensations is regulated by, and grounded in, 
the a priori causal structure of understanding. Nonetheless, Helmholtz‖s interpretation 
of Kant in this respect has been a topic of debate since the nineteenth century.117 It is 
clear, however, that the possibility of psychological construction in Helmholtz‖s 
theorizing is grounded in a presupposition with regard to the necessary a priori 
structure of understanding, although his precise interpretation of this a priori is not 
always straightforwardly Kantian. Most generally, Helmholtz derives from Kant the 
necessary motive for empirical construction, i.e. the a priori rule that “every effect has a 
cause,” as the driving force or constitutive condition of the constructive process.118  
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Before we move to the third level of analysis, we should consider yet another aspect 
of Kant‖s system, which Fichte was later to establish as the basic starting point of his 
System of Knowledge, namely:119 
[P]ure apperception […] or primitive apperception, […]. [I]t is that self-
consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, must be able 
to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, [and] 
cannot be accompanied by any further representation. 
In other words, for Kant, the possibility of objective representation, as the necessary 
synthesis of forms of understanding and the matter of receptivity, is in turn grounded 
in the ultimate postulate of unity, the I think, which denotes the necessity of the 
numerical identity of the Self as related to, but distinguished from, representation. 
Without the I think, the object is unthinkable, as the act of representing would lack a 
unitary point to relate the manifold to, and distinguish it from the self. Or, in Kant‖s 
words:120  
[T]his thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition 
contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the 
consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness that accompanies 
different representations is by itself dispersed, and without relation to the 
identity of the subject. […] Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a 
priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a 
priori all my determinate thinking. 
As such, one could say that the I think is the ultimate deductive principle from which 
the entire critical system is derived. This is, at least, what Fichte thought it to be. 
“Which ―I‖ is being spoken of here? [Von welchem Ich ist hier die Rede]?,” Fichte 
wonders, and with those words, he launches the transcendental analysis of the I as the 
be-all and end-all of the critical system.121 
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1.3.2.3 Helmholtz and Fichte: The Problem of Differentiation 
Kant‖s pure apperception, according to Fichte, is the ultimate deductive principle from 
which the entire critical system is derived.122 However, he adds, it remains a principle 
that Kant had “simply asserted,” and by no means “proved,” although it is, in Kant‖s 
conception, the unitary principle from which all critical distinctions are to be 
deduced.123 “The condition of possibility of all thought is dependent upon another 
thought,” Fichte echoes Kant, namely the “I think […], i.e. I am what thinks in this 
thinking [Ich bin das denkende in diesem denken].”124 The uniting principle, according 
to Fichte, is the I, thought of as “a thinking [Ein denken]” and not “a thinking thing [ein 
Denkendes],” or, in short, as a self-relating act.125 Fichte‖s project thus sets out to 
demonstrate the Kantian postulate of the highest principle of critical philosophy, the I 
think, and in doing so, his project has been described as presenting a metacritical 
expansion and completion of the Kantian project.126 The I that should be able to 
accompany all representations is conceptualized in Fichte‖s work as an act of self-
positing that relates to itself as activity through ―intellectual intuition‖, defined as:127 
[T]he immediate consciousness; that I act [ich handle] […]. […] I cannot take a step, 
move hand or foot, without an intellectual intuition of my self-consciousness in 
these acts; only so do I know that I do it, only so do I distinguish my action […] 
from the object of action […]. 
In other words, the intellectual intuition denotes the pre-reflective grasp that the 
subject has of itself as agentive, and as such, it is a constitutive act of self-relation with 
respect to the possibility of consciousness. Fichte concludes: “Intellectual intuition is 
the only firm standpoint for all philosophy. From thence we can explain everything in 
consciousness […]. Without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness whatsoever.”128 
It is no wonder that Fichte has been credited with being the ultimate philosopher of 
subjectivity and self-consciousness, but perhaps more importantly, as the philosopher 
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of difference.129 Pinkard, for example, summarizes the important message of Fichtean 
philosophy as follows:130 
The core insight at the root of Fichte‖s attempt to complete the Kantian system […] 
had to do with what he saw as the basic dichotomy at the root of the Kantian 
system. […] Fichte concluded, that dichotomy itself – that core distinction 
between subjects and objects – was itself subjectively established; it was a 
normative distinction that subjects themselves institute. 
In short, whereas Kant had pointed out the constitutive role of subjective spontaneity 
in the synthetic activity involved in object construction, Fichte emphasized the subject‖s 
self-relating activity as the ground of subject-object difference. In comparison with the 
Kantian project, this entails a shift in the philosophical scope from the a priori formal 
features of representation to the necessary structure of the I that does the representing. 
This historically third, metacritical level of analysis of experience resonates with 
what Heidelberger denoted as Helmholtz‖s (Fichtean inspired) experimental 
interactionism, i.e. Helmholtz‖s insistence on voluntary action as the ultimate 
constitutive principle of scientific and perceptual objectivity.131 Heidelberger even goes 
so far as to claim that Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine is “the essential key to understanding 
Helmholtz”: 132 
[T]he inner core of Helmholtz‖s philosophy of science had its roots in Fichte‖s 
philosophy. […] From Fichte Helmholtz appropriated the view that our 
consciousness comes to shape its conception of the outer world through the 
limitations we experience in our practical actions. Only by actively interfering 
with the world of external objects can we interpret our sensations as due to 
external causes and thereby distinguish them from the free acts of thinking inside 
our consciousness. 
Contrary to currently ongoing debates on Helmholtz‖s indebtedness to Kant‖s critical 
philosophy, especially with regard to the latter‖s appropriation of Kant‖s a priori view of 
causality, the continuity of important aspects of his thought with Fichte‖s metacritical 
project has received minimal scholarly attention. However, there are strong arguments 
in favor of the hypothesis that Helmholtz‖s adopted certain central elements of Fichte‖s 
system as the cornerstone of his answer to what it is to see. To overcome this crucial gap 
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in Helmholtz interpretation, Heidelberger‖s analysis will be further expanded in chapter 
5. 
 
To summarize, the historical progression from Hume‖s naturalized theory of the 
object to Fichte‖s metacritical account of experience forms the systematic framework, 
and, as such, the spine of the following analysis of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. 
More particularly, it not only enables us to relate Helmholtz‖s theorizing to the 
historical traditions that have shaped philosophical discussion concerning the object, 
but moreover, to investigate it from different levels of analysis (empirical construction, 
constitutive synthesis, and ideal action), which together can be seen as a progressive 
problematization of the epistemic subject that is the necessary foundation of the ability 
of objectification. It should be made clear from the very start, however, that this 
framework is a heuristic tool that will allow us to create some order in the massive 
historical background from which Helmholtz‖s theorizing can be read, and to isolate his 
progressive modes of interrogating the object in experience. As such, the framework 
here proposed is meant to guide the investigation and glue its consecutive components 
together into one systematic whole, but not to serve as a restrictive straightjacket. For 
one thing, Helmholtz‖s appropriation of philosophical concepts and appeal to 
philosophical traditions is notoriously idiosyncratic. In the end, Helmholtz was indeed 
“an independent thinker with his own agenda.”133 Hence, it will be clear from the very 
start of this inquiry, that studying Helmholtz requires not only knowledge of the 
philosophical traditions and systems that form our point of departure, but more 
importantly, some willingness to go along with his peculiar interpretation and 
appropriation of their main insights and concepts. This willingness will allow some 
insight into the systematic significance of Helmholtz‖s ―dovetailing‖ in his perceptual 
theory, and, of course, it does not preclude a critical assessment of his appropriation of 
all these different perspectives in the context of theory of the object.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation will be organized as follows. In chapters 3 to 5, the 
respective levels of analysis of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object will be discussed 
against the background of the historical accounts of the objects as sketched in this 
section. chapter 3 presents an analysis of Helmholtz‖s empiricism, by investigating its 
continuity with Hume‖s and Mill‖s psychological accounts of the object. A large part of 
this chapter, however, is dedicated to empiricism‖s inherent inability to account for the 
subject or self. Subsequently, we proceed to Helmholtz‖s Kantianism in chapter 4, and 
examine the way in which Helmholtz‖s adoption of a critical level of analysis can be said 
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to be necessitated by the problems of empiricist psychology. Finally, we go into the 
metacritical dimension of Helmholtz‖s thought, linked historically to Fichte‖s Ego-
doctrine. In this last chapter, Helmholtz‖s emphasis on the constitutive role of voluntary 
action in perception is interpreted against the background of Fichte‖s analysis of the 
necessary self-reflexive structure of the subject as a constitutive condition for 
experience. First and foremost, however, it is important to get a firm grasp of the 
foundations and structure of our central problem: the psychological problem of the 
object. To that end, the next chapter will present an in-depth analysis of the 
physiological and philosophical arguments that prompted Helmholtz to consider 
perception as an irreducible psychological process. 
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Chapter 2  
Helmholtz‖s Physiological Epistemology and the 
Genesis of the Psychological Problem of the Object 
The inaccuracies and imperfections of the eye […] appear 
insignificant in comparison with the incongruities which 
we have met in the field of sensation.  
 
One might almost believe that Nature had here 
contradicted herself on purpose, in order to destroy any 
dream of a pre-existing harmony between the outer and 
the inner world.  
 
- Hermann von Helmholtz (1995 [1868]), p. 173. 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in the introductory chapter, a determining factor in the genesis of 
Helmholtz‖s psychological perspective on perception pertained to the assumption of a 
radical gap or discontinuity between the physical/physiological structure of the sensory 
apparatus and mental representation. In order to get a firm grasp of the foundation of 
Helmholtz‖s psychology, we therefore have to consider the arguments he invoked in 
favour of this epistemological fissure, and against what he denoted (in Leibnizian terms) 
as a pre-established harmony between subject and object.    
First, this involves a consideration of Helmholtz‖s adoption and expansion of his 
teacher Johannes Müller‖s epochal Law of Specific Nerve Energies [Gesetz der Spezifischen 
Sinnesenergien], a physiological law that posits a fundamental incongruity between 
internal states of excitation and external objects and affairs. On the other hand, it will 
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be argued that Helmholtz‖s anti-metaphysical attitude played a crucial role in 
determining his psychological view on perceptual objectification.  
In order to gain insight into the physiological and philosophical background of 
Helmholtz‖s psychological perspective, this chapter will subsequently address the 
following topics: 
 
(1) Helmholtz‖s relation to his teacher in physiology Johannes Müller (section 2.2), 
and more particularly (i) his criticism of Müller‖s vitalism (section 2.3), and (ii) his 
adoption and expansion of Müller‖s Law of Specific Nerve energies (section 2.4 
and 2.5). 
(2) The epistemological consequences of Müller‖s Law for the theory of perception in 
general, and Helmholtz‖s conception of the subject-object relation in particular 
(section 2.6 and 2.7). 
(3) Helmholtz‖s philosophical (anti-metaphysical) arguments in favor of the 
autonomy of psychology vis-à-vis physics and physiology (section 2.8). 
2.2 Hermann von Helmholtz and Johannes Peter Müller 
As early as 1852, Helmholtz refers to Johannes Peter Müller, his teacher of physiology in 
Berlin and supervisor of his doctoral dissertation, as one of the “most astute thinkers 
and accurate observers” among the new generation of physiologists.134 When Helmholtz 
became his pupil at the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute in 1838, Müller (1801-1858) was a 
leading anatomist and physiologist in Europe.135 After studying medicine in the 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute in Bonn – “a bastion of Naturphilosophie or Romantic 
Science” according to Finger and Wade – Müller, only twenty three years old at the 
time, accepted a position as a Privatdocent in Bonn. Here he would later be appointed 
professor, after which he accepted the chair in physiology and anatomy in Berlin in 
1833.136 Although he performed some experiments during his lifetime, he never valued 
experimental science as high as he did theoretical physiology.137 Müller‖s research 
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interests were remarkably broad, pertaining to pretty much every study field that was 
related to organic life, and his scientific interest remained entangled with his 
inclinations toward romantic Naturphilosophie during his entire career.138  
Helmholtz‖s teacher became especially famous for his work on nervous and sensory 
systems, and for his much praised Elements of Physiology [Handbuch der Physiologie des 
Menschen] (1833/40). In the latter work, Müller gives a mature statement of his highly 
influential Law of Specific Nerve Energies (LoSNE), although he had already sketched the 
general outlines of his physiological approach to human vision as early as 1826 (at the 
age of 25), in his On the Comparative Physiology of Vision in Men and Animals [Zur 
vergleichenden Physiologie des Gesichtssinns]. Most generally, Müller‖s LoSNE 
established the fundamentally underdetermined nature of sensory stimulation with 
respect to its (internal or external) origin. As will be discussed in sections 2.6 and 2.7, 
the impact of LoSNE on Helmholtz‖s perception theory and epistemological position can 
hardly be overestimated. Unfortunately, Müller was also known for his poor mental 
health, and after at least five nervous breakdowns, the brilliant scientist deceased 
unexpectedly in his Berlin home at the age of fifty-five, in unknown circumstances.139 
His legacy was continued in the work of Helmholtz, however, who went so far as to state 
that Müller‖s LoSNE was “a scientific achievement […] equal to that of the discovery of 
the law of gravitation.”140 
Before we can move on to Müller‖s law, however, it is important that the reader gets 
a firm grasp of the quite complex intellectual relationship Helmholtz entertained with 
his teacher. Helmholtz‖s treatment of the problem of perception was determined just as 
much by his adherence to Müller‖s thought, as it was by his opposition to the vitalist and 
nativist tendencies in the latter‖s physiological work. To be more precise, Helmholtz not 
only departed from his teacher‖s views by defending a reductionist physiology, he also 
differed from the latter by defending a non-reductionist psychology. On the one hand, 
Helmholtz‖s anti-vitalism is telling with respect to his stance as a physiologist, while on 
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the other, his lifelong crusade against nativism defined his psychological position. In 
discussing Helmholtz‖s theory of science, it is of utmost importance to differentiate 
between his physiological and his psychological position, as failing to do so can be (and 
has been) a source of serious misunderstanding with regard to his philosophy of science. 
As will become clear, both theoretical positions were motivated by his anti-
metaphysical attitude, and they should be understood against that background. 
2.3 Helmholtz‖s Physiological Reductionism: Anti-Vitalism 
A metaphysical conclusion is either a false conclusion or 
a concealed experimental conclusion 
 
- Helmholtz (1995 [1877]), p. 326 
When Helmholtz arrived at the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute in Berlin to study medicine, 
he soon felt that his chosen discipline was facing a crisis with respect to the norms of 
scientific practice and scientific reasoning, and that it strove to reinvent itself. More 
particularly, the deductive method was gradually discredited, in favour of inductive 
inquiry and experimental research. Correlative with this shift, the metaphysical 
explanation of biological processes gave way to physical analysis and reduction. A 
definite fissure arose between the older generation of theoretical or intellectual 
physiologists and the newer generation that was to instigate ―the laboratory revolution‖ 
in medicine.  
Helmholtz describes the medical discipline as he found it upon his arrival in Berlin as 
unfolding from central dogma‖s –rationally construed fallible hypotheses, that were 
either presumed to be ―guaranteed by authority‖, or ―wished‖ to be true – from which the 
entire body of medical knowledge was deduced.141 Medical science, in short, was a 
predominantly intellectual affair, and as such, the enthusiasm with which theoretical 
systems were produced, contrasted sharply with the common disregard for 
experimental practice and inductive science. In a lecture from 1877, at the age of 56, 
Helmholtz looks back at the conditions under which he himself once studied medicine 
at the Friedrich-Wilhelm Institute:142  
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The medical education of that time was based mainly on the study of books; there 
were still lectures, which were restricted to mere dictation; […]; there were no 
physiological and physical laboratories. […] Microscopic demonstrations were 
isolated and infrequent in the lectures. Microscopic instruments were costly and 
scarce. […] Any of my fellow-students who wished to make experiments had to do 
so at the cost of his pocket-money. […] We had, it is true, an almost uncultivated 
field before us, in which almost every stroke of the spade might produce 
remunerative results. 
Helmholtz‖s description of the state of medical science resonates with the idea of 
romantic science or Naturphilosophie – as prototypically represented in Goethe‖s work – i.e. 
a science that was very close to philosophy and art, and aimed at unraveling the secrets 
of nature and at building all-encompassing deductive systems.143 As Knight describes, 
“the real division was between the realm of science, governed by reason, and that of 
practice, or rule of thumb.”144 
Helmholtz considered the deductive method in the science of medicine to be “a great 
hindrance to progress,” and the plea for a factually [Tatsächlich] based science remained 
the leitmotiv in his scientific perspective during his entire career.145 With respect to the 
development and popularization of the experimental method in science, Helmholtz is to 
be credited with more than one ―stroke of a spade‖. He actively sought to establish and 
improve experimental practice, by setting up carefully controlled experiments, and 
introducing a number of new instruments and methods that allowed for the objective 
measurement of physiological states and physical structures.146 Moreover, through 
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numerous popular lectures, Helmholtz actively sought to propagate a new scientific 
worldview. 
The general academic climate Helmholtz describes in his 1877 and 1891 lectures was 
struggling between metaphysical reasoning and physical experimentation, and 
Helmholtz‖s teacher, Johannes Müller, by all means represented a transitional figure.147 
As already mentioned, Müller, who‖s work covered a staggering variety of research 
topics, became especially famous for his work on sensory and nervous systems in 
animals (mostly frogs) and studies in comparative anatomy.148 When it came to his 
philosophy of science, however, Müller remained a man who “struggled between the 
older – essentially the metaphysical – view and the naturalistic one […]” as Helmholtz 
describes. 149 
 On the one hand, Müller‖s medical education in Bonn, at the time a celebrated 
intellectual center of romantic science, had been completely determined by this 
romantic ideal, with a focus on reason and observation, and weary of experimental 
practice.150 Although Müller never succeeded in shaking off the romantic and rationalist 
tendencies in his thought, most scholars agree that in the course of his lifetime there 
was a gradual shift in his philosophical position, and that he increasingly endorsed a 
more moderate position towards inductivism and experimentalism.151 It is likely that 
this happened at least partially under the influence of Karl Asmund Rudolphi, with 
whom Müller studied after obtaining his degree in Bonn, and who tempered Müller‖s 
metaphysical inclinations.152 Müller became steadily convinced of the value of 
observation and experiment, and the principles of inductive science in general, and 
although he can hardly be called an experimental physiologist – for one thing, Müller 
never had a laboratory – he actively stimulated his students in this direction.153  
Although he himself still stood with one foot in the old (metaphysical) tradition, 
Müller deserves to be called a ―catalyst‖ with respect to the development of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
For some interesting accounts of Helmholtz‖s lifelong concern with the significance of exact measurement, see 
Olesko & Holmes (1993); Finger & Wade (2001, 2002a, 2002b); Darrigol (2003).  
147
 Lenoir (1997); Holmes (1994); Robinson (1986); Finger & Wade (2002a). 
148
 Finger & Wade (2002a); Otis (2007). 
149
 Helmholtz (1995 [1891]), p. 385. 
150
 In the introduction to his 1826 work on comparative anatomy, Müller is a quite outspoken sceptic with 
respect to experimental science. Furthermore, his romantic view of physiology transpired in his lifelong 
insistence on the importance of a “unified science of life” and a “synthetic philosophical understanding of the 
nature of life,” and the construction of a “sensible [verständige] physiology” (Lenoir, 1997, p. 104).  
151
 See among others Hagner & Währig-Schmidt (1992), Holmes (1994), Meulders (2010) and Finger & Wade 
(2002a). 
152
 Finger & Wade (2002a); Meulders (2010). 
153
 Otis (2007).  
 Helmholtz’s Physiological Epistemology and the Genesis of the Psychological Problem of the 
Object 
 
45 
 
experimental science in nineteenth-century Germany, guiding his pupils towards 
innovative lines of physiological research, and thus setting the stage for modern 
physiology.154 Some of his most notable students, i.e. Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil du 
Bois-Reymond, Ernst Brücke, later played a very important role in spreading and 
propagating the empiricist and experimental method as the basis of natural science in 
Germany, for example through their instauration of the Berlin Physical Society [Berliner 
Physikalische Gesellschaft] (see below). Müller‖s students allegedly “did science 
anywhere and everywhere they could: in tiny rooms […], in the window nooks of the 
Anatomical Museum, […] in a run-down guest house, […].”155 In one way or another, 
Müller‖s qualities as a mentor and his open mindedness towards investigative topics 
that did not stroke with or even opposed his own research interests, has given rise to a 
generation of scientists who have all left an important mark on the history of 
physiology and medicine.156 “It may be,” Helmholtz suggested, “that his [Müller‖s] 
influence over his students was the greater because he still so struggled.”157 
Notwithstanding the lifelong loyalty these students exhibited towards their teacher, 
they have also been described as rebellious, not in the least for actively opposing 
Müller‖s vitalism, i.e. his appeal to the metaphysical concept of life force [Lebenskraft] 
in his physiological work.158 Emil du Bois-Reymond, Brücke and Helmholtz especially, 
spend a lot of effort clearing the way for and defining the aim and scope of a physical 
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physiology properly so called: an account of the biological processes taking place in the 
living organism that proceeds from physico-chemical modes of explanation and is 
emptied of metaphysical concepts.159 In his Autobiographical Sketch, Helmholtz recalls his 
aspiration as a young man, to free the life sciences of this mystic ―force‖ presumed to be 
at the basis of all organic life, at least since the time of Aristotle:160 
Young people are ready at once to attack the deepest problems, and thus I 
attacked the perplexing question of the vital force. Most physiologists had at that 
time adopted G.E. Stahl‖s way out of the difficulty, that while it is the physical and 
chemical forces of the organs and substances of the living body which act on it, 
there is an indwelling vital soul or vital force which could bind and loose the 
activity of these forces; that after death the free action of these forces produces 
decomposition, while during life their action is continually being controlled by 
the soul of life. I had a misgiving that there was something against nature in this 
explanation […]. 
Although Helmholtz opposed Georg Ernst Stahl‖s doctrine in particular, whose 
vitalism took the form of the assumption of a vis vitalis as the underlying teleological 
principle for all biological life (and death) processes, it is clear that his anti-vitalism 
likewise flies in the face of Müller‖s assertions regarding the irreducibility of vital 
processes to the physical level.161  
After finishing his studies in medicine, Helmholtz occupied himself with designing 
experiments and developing new theoretical frameworks that aimed at providing 
experimental proof that both animate and inanimate matter could be analyzed in terms 
of physico-chemical force transformations, and that hence, the concept of life force was 
utterly redundant. During a time span of roughly a decade, Helmholtz conducted 
research on fermentation and putrefaction, muscular contraction and heat production 
in frogs, the velocity of the nerve impulse, and finished his paper on the Conservation of 
Force. In the course of this research, Helmholtz‖s experimental abilities thrived. For one 
thing, he developed remarkably refined instruments like the myograph, to measure the 
velocity of nerve impulses, and other devices that would allow him to objectively 
measure the chemical and electrical transformations taking place in the muscle during 
contraction.162 Furthermore, he carefully staged his experiments so as to exclude 
unknown variables, and repeated his experiments to correct for fluctuations in 
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individual research results.163 In short, during this period, which preceded his work in 
the field of optics, Helmholtz was credited as one of “the most innovative 
experimentalists of his day.”164 
More importantly, however, the research results obtained gradually built up to form 
a convincing body of evidence against the vitalist hypothesis. Firstly, Helmholtz‖s 1843 
research on putrefaction proved that this process was caused by purely chemical 
processes (caused by the breakdown of proteins and glutes), and not by the 
disappearance of life force from the organism, like Stahl and Müller had presumed.165 
Secondly, in the course of the second half of the 1840s, Helmholtz proved that metabolic 
changes and heat production in the muscle during contraction could likewise be 
ascribed to physico-chemical processes, and that hence, there was no need to invoke the 
concept of life force to account for both.166 Furthermore, the young scientist was able to 
disprove Müller‖s hypothesis of the immeasurableness of the velocity of nerve 
impulses.167 Through his myographic experiments on frogs, he not only established that 
nerve impulse is in fact measurable, but more importantly, that the velocity of nerve 
transmission is remarkably slow (some 26 meters per second). This experimental 
evidence refuted the hypothesis of an immeasurable, indwelling life force, and instead, 
pointed out that the “nerve impulse emerged as neither metaphysical nor mysterious, 
but as yet another physico-chemical event.”168 Helmholtz‖s work culminated in his 1847 
paper on the Conservation of Force, in which he gave a mathematical exposition of the 
conservation principle, stating that “the quantity of force which can be brought into 
action in the whole of Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be increased nor 
diminished.”169 The author presented the principle as a ―theoretical, practical and 
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heuristic‖ tool, enabling an understanding of both organic and inorganic matter in terms 
of mechanical force transformations.170 Besides rendering the hypothesis of life force 
redundant, the principle likewise refuted the possibility of a perpetuum mobile, i.e. “a 
machine which was to work continuously without the aid of any external driving force,” 
as it implies that “force cannot be produced from nothing, something must be 
consumed.”171 The programmatic significance of Helmholtz‖s work is not easily 
overestimated. Basically, it inserted the human body into the mechanical worldview, 
and as such, put it within the purview of Newtonian physics, and out of the sphere of 
speculative metaphysics.  
It is clear from Helmholtz‖s opposition to vitalism that he defended mechanical 
reductionism with respect to the scientific study of the nature and functioning of the 
human body, and as such, he was one of the founders of physical physiology. Thanks to 
his epoch-making formulation of the conservation principle, Helmholtz became a 
renowned member of the (still extant) Berlin Physical Society (BPS), founded in 1845 by 
Brücke, du Bois-Reymond and Ludwig. The general program endorsed by this 
association was based in the alleged oath of its members to do everything possible to 
scientifically demonstrate that there are “no other forces than the common physical-
chemical ones […] within the organism.”172  
Helmholtz‖s membership of the BPS and his strong anti-vitalist attitude, have led 
some to conclude that he endorsed a full-fledged materialism or physicalism.173 In its 
most extreme formulation, Helmholtz‖s work in general is described as radically 
materialist, aiming at “the reduction of both the vital function and of sensory 
perception to material processes.”174 Although it can hardly be denied that Helmholtz‖s 
physically based scientific physiology entails a form of reductionism, i.e. a mode of 
explanation that reduces physiological processes to physico-chemical interactions, the 
reception of his work as a defense of materialism is flawed for a number of reasons.  
Most importantly, Helmholtz‖s anti-metaphysical stance led him to explicitly reject 
both absolute idealism and materialism. In a letter to his father, he explicitly distanced 
himself from the ―vulgar‖ materialism of Karl Vogt and Jacob Moleschott, claiming that 
their works came down to nothing more than ―trivial tirades‖, not representative for the 
general views of the scientific community.175 In a lecture later on in his career, 
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Helmholtz warns his audience that “materialism is a metaphysical hypothesis” and as 
such, a dogma, that “can hence hinder the progress of science and lead to […] 
intolerance, just like any other dogma would.”176 Helmholtz furthermore adds that 
whereas his “generation has had to suffer under the tyranny of spiritualistic 
metaphysics,” the “newer generation will probably have to guard against that of the 
materialistic hypotheses.”177 In short, Helmholtz was a principled opponent of all sorts 
of metaphysical explanation, including materialism. 
Additionally, Helmholtz‖s anti-metaphysical perspective not only led him to assert a 
reductionist position in physiology, but also to emphasize the non-reducible nature of 
the mental to the physical-physiological realm (see section 2.8). More specifically, 
Helmholtz‖s psychology starts from a rejection of nativism, or what he called naturalism 
with regard to the mental in general, and from the non-reducible nature of the mental 
processes involved in perception, in particular.178 This is why Drobisch, among others, 
actually considered Helmholtz‖s psychological project as an attempt to refute 
materialism with regard to the mind.179 As Hatfield observes, Helmholtz “considered 
psychology to provide a distinct type of explanation, with its own evidential basis 
independent of physiology.”180 The interpretation of Helmholtz―s work as a defense of 
metaphysical materialism is therefore founded in a misunderstanding of his 
physiological reductionism, as well as a disregard for his insistence on the autonomy of 
psychological investigation. 
In this respect, it is also important to make clear that the BPS arose as a consequence 
of the joint efforts of its members to actively exterminate metaphysical concepts from 
physiological explanation, in favor of what one might call methodological reductionism 
or naturalism with regard to the study of organic processes.181 Their pledge, however, 
pertained to a method of scientific explanation (metaphysical versus natural), whereas 
the metaphysical question regarding the essence of life (or the organic) was put aside. 
As such, the society did not endorse a metaphysical position per se, but was exclusively 
concerned with the appropriate method to be used in physiological science. Hence, 
Helmholtz‖s membership does not allow for any conclusions with respect to his 
psychological position, or with his take on what the mind is, or how it should be studied.  
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As already mentioned, Johannes Müller, notwithstanding his vitalism, did influence 
Helmholtz‖s theory of perception to a significant degree; an indebtedness that affected 
the latter‖s epistemological stance in its core. In what follows, this indebtedness and the 
relevant sections of Müller‖s work in this respect will be discussed, starting with a 
general overview of the philosophical and physiological tradition that culminated in 
Müller‖s formulation of LoSNE. 
2.4 Goethe, Purkinje, Müller and the Primacy of Subjective 
Perception.  
Müller‖s work on sense perception, as discussed in detail in the next section, was the 
culmination point of a philosophical and physiological tradition that has been referred 
to by Crary as the tradition of subjective vision.182 More particularly, all the authors 
discussed below, (i) were fascinated with subjective phenomena of perception, i.e. 
perceptual phenomena without an external correlate, (ii) used their respective studies 
on that topic as counterevidence for mere physical theories of perception, and (iii) 
argued for a paradigm shift in the study of perception from the inquiry into external 
conditions, to that of internal (physiological and psychological) determining factors.183 
For the purposes of this investigation, a selective discussion of this tradition will suffice, 
as it contains the seeds of what Helmholtz was later to call his physiological epistemology, 
which took the specific reactivity of the sensory apparatus as the explanatory 
foundation of human perception.184  
In his 1826 work on comparative physiology, Müller placed himself in the tradition of 
Goethe and the Czech physiologist Jan Evangelista Purkinje, the son-in-law of the 
former‖s teacher in Berlin, Karl Asmund Rudolphi.185 More particularly, Müller mentions 
 
                                                     
182
 Crary (1992). In this respect, also see for example Lang (1987) and Wade & Brožek (2001).  
183
 Lang (1987); Crary (1992). Müller (1843 [1833/40], p. 740-744) refers for example to the following 
phenomena as examples of subjective vision: appearances produced by pressure on the retina (the so-called 
pressure phosphene), luminous appearances produced by the arterial pulse, appearances produced in the eye 
by electricity, spontaneous appearances of light in the darkened eye, and so on. This particular section of his 
opus magnum is replete with references to Purkinje.  
184
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 409. 
185
 Finger & Wade (2002a); Müller places himself in the tradition of Goethe and Purkinje in 1826, p. XIX and 
1843 [1833/40], p. 712, among others.  
 Helmholtz’s Physiological Epistemology and the Genesis of the Psychological Problem of the 
Object 
 
51 
 
Goethe‖s 1810 Theory of Colors [Zur Farbenlehre] and Purkinje‖s 1819 doctoral dissertation 
Observations and Experiments on the Physiology of the Sense, Contributions to the Knowledge of 
Vision in its Subjective Aspect [Beobachtungen und Versuche zur Physiologie der Sinne. 
Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Sehens in subjectiver Hinsicht], which was translated into 
English only recently, as intellectual precursors to his own work on the nature of 
human sense perception.186 What united these three authors especially, was their 
emphasis on the insufficiency or inadequacy of a one-sided focus on the physical 
properties of light and light refraction, with regard to the question of what it is to 
perceive.187 In support of their view, all three pointed to the fact that “the body itself 
produces phenomena that have no external correlate,” i.e. the so-called subjective 
phenomena of perception, and that hence, these internal conditions are foundational 
with respect to the study of perception.188 
Goethe, Purkinje and Müller all identified Newton‖s Optics as their main antagonist. 
As Wade & Brožek noted, Newton did accept a subjective dimension in human vision, 
but differed from the authors here discussed, by subordinating these subjective 
determining factors to the ―physics of light‖.189 Goethe was especially fierce in his radical, 
and misguided, as Helmholtz and others would later point out, denunciation of 
Newton‖s theory of color, and his physical approach to vision in general.190 In the Preface 
to the first edition of his Theory of Colors, the romantic philosopher did not hesitate to 
ventilate his discontent with the “intolerable arrogance” of the Newtonian school, and 
goes on to present his own work as an attempt to overcome the ―old castle‖ of 
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Newtonianism.191 Although Goethe‖s Farbenlehre was received by many as an arrogant 
and scientifically inadequate work, its underlying rationale inspired a whole generation 
of thinkers.192 In the first chapter of his 1810 dissertation, Goethe introduced the 
concept of physiological colors, defined as phenomena of color sensation that lack an 
external correlate, and therefore “belong altogether […] to the subject.”193 As an 
example hereof, Goethe‖s describes the after-image (also invoked by both Müller and 
Purkinje as examples of subjective vision):194  
Let a room be made as dark as possible; let there be a circular opening in the 
window-shutter about three inches in diameter, which may be closed or not at 
pleasure. […] [L]et the spectator from some little distance fix his eyes on the bright 
circle thus admitted. The hole being then closed, let him look towards the darkest 
part of the room; a circular image will now be seen to float before him. 
These physiological colors, according to Goethe, are not aberrations or pathological 
phenomena, but quite the contrary, they point out the foundational dynamics of 
perception itself.195  
In contrast to Goethe‖s 1810 bold endeavor to refute Newton‖s Optics altogether, 
Müller and Purkinje, who both acknowledged the influence of the latter on their work, 
stressed the complementary nature of their research on the subjective determinants of 
perception with physical investigation. Purkinje, for example, put forward his inquiry as 
a necessary completion of what he calls the ―objective sciences‖. He added that with 
respect to the problem of perception, both sciences, subjective and objective, are 
equally important, although he regretted that the ―subjective‖ sphere had been 
neglected for so long.196 Unjustly so, according to the Czech physiologist. He defined 
subjective perceptual phenomena as “sensations that do not correspond to anything 
outside the body,” and “illusion, phantoms, or appearance with no corresponding 
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reality” that, as such, involve “only the sensory organs,” and according to him, it is only 
by studying these that one can gain insight into the basic dynamics of the perceptual 
process, i.e. physiological reactivity and psychological determining factors.197 Purkinje 
went to great lengths to describe his – sometimes drug-induced – subjective visual 
experiences, for example, through peculiar self-drawn images (see figure 1). Much like 
Müller, the Czech physiologist based his research on careful introspection, self-
experimentation and self-observation; or on the heautognostic method, as he would call 
it.198 
 
 
Figure 1 Purkinje's drawings of subjective visual phenomena. Source: Purkinje (1823 [1819]), 
p. 57. 
At first sight, this tradition of subjective vision seems to be nothing more than a 
radicalization and expansion of Locke‖s work on secondary qualities. This is, in fact, 
what Helmholtz thought it to be.199 It should be noted, however, that this expansion 
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correlated with an overturning of the Lockean model of perception, that subordinated 
secondary (subjective) qualities to primary (objective) qualities. In arguing that all 
perceptual phenomena are fundamentally conditioned by the structure and function of 
the sensory apparatus, Goethe, Purkinje and Müller, by contrast, rendered the mere 
notion of ―primary qualities‖ utterly redundant. To be more precise, all three argued for 
the primacy of the subjective in the study of perception, and they didn‖t consider 
subjective sensations to be mere aberrations or side effects of the sensory function, but 
on the contrary, to quote Goethe, as its “the necessary condition.”200 In the same vein, 
Purkinje concluded from his research that sensory experience is fundamentally 
underdetermined with respect to its origin, and that hence, it is only slowly that “we 
become oriented in the circle of existence.”201 In other words, the experience of external 
existence is not given, but generated somehow from undifferentiated states of internal 
affection. 
 
In sharp contrast to Locke, Müller too maintained that “the subjective sensations of 
vision form the epistemological foundation” of the study of perception. Hence, the 
tradition of subjective vision did not so much strive to include the subjective dimension 
of sensibility into the study of perception, as Locke did, but rather to establish 
subjective reactivity as its very foundation. This epistemological paradigm shift became 
especially apparent in Müller‖s epochal Law of Specific Nerve Energies.  
2.5 Müller‖s ―Epistemological Scandal‖: The Law of Specific 
Nerve Energies 
With his Law of Specific Nerve Energies, Müller is credited by many for laying the 
foundation of modern sensory physiology.202 For the purposes of this investigation, a 
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discussion of LoSNE is indispensible with regard to the foundations of Helmholtz‖s 
epistemological position. 
The mature statement of the law can be found in the second volume of Müller‖s 
Elements of Physiology [1833/40], where the general idea is captured as follows:203 
That which through the medium of our senses is actually perceived by the 
sensorium, is indeed merely a property or change of condition of our nerves; but 
the imagination and reason are ready to interpret the modifications in the state of 
the nerves produced […] as properties of […] external bodies […].  
Put differently, the law asserts a discontinuity between sensation and its external cause, 
as the former is defined as a mere underdetermined (internal) state of nervous 
excitation, that is determined by the modes of reactivity of the physiological system as 
far as its quality is concerned. LoSNE thus states that:204 
All sensations may be excited by internal causes independent of external stimuli. 
One and the same cause, internal or external, may excite different sensations by 
acting on different senses. The sensations peculiar to each sense may be excited 
by several different causes, internal and external. […] The nerves of each sense are 
capable of one determinate kind of sensation only. 
In his Elements of Physiology, Müller systematically lays out his law by means of ten basic 
principles that form the basis of the theory of perception. The evidence invoked in favor 
of these principles is mostly based upon introspection, self-experimentation, and 
experimental work done by others:205 
 
I. External agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be 
produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves. 
  e.g.: “ whenever the auditory nerve is in a state of excitement, the sensations peculiar 
  to it, as the sounds of ringing, humming, etc. are perceived.” 
II. The same internal cause excites in the different senses different sensations; - 
in each sense the sensations peculiar to it. 
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  e.g.: “the accumulation of blood in the capillary vessels of the nerve, as in congestion 
  and inflammation […] excites in the retina, while the eyes are closed, the sensation of 
  light and luminous flashes.” 
III. The same external cause also gives rise to different sensations in each sense, 
according to the special endowments of its nerve. 
  e.g.: “the mechanical influence of a blow, concussion, or pressure excites, for example, 
  in the eye the sensation of light and colours.” 
IV. The peculiar sensations of each nerve of sense can be excited by several 
distinct causes internal and external. 
  e.g.: “the sensations of taste may be produced: 1. By chemical substances […] 2. By 
  electricity […] 3. By mechanical influences.” 
V. Sensation consists in the sensorium receiving through the medium of the 
nerves, and as the result of the action of an external cause, a knowledge of 
certain qualities or conditions, not of external bodies, but of the nerves of 
sense themselves; and these qualities of the nerves of sense are in all 
different, the nerve of each sense having its own peculiar quality or energy. 
  e.g.: “the vibrations of a tuning-fork, which to the ear give the impression of sound, 
  produce in a nerve of feeling or touch the sensation of tickling.” 
VI. The nerve of each sense seems to be capable of one determinate kind of 
sensation only, and not of those proper to the other organs of sense; hence 
one nerve of sense cannot take the place and perform the function of the 
nerve of another sense. 
  e.g.: “the nerves of touch are capable of no other sensation than that of touch or 
  feeling. Hence, also, no sounds can be heard except by the auditory nerve.” 
VII. It is not known whether the essential cause of the peculiar ―energy‖ of each 
nerve of sense is seated in the nerve itself, or in the parts of the brain and 
spinal cord with which it is connected; but it is certain that the central 
portions of the nerves included in the encephalon are susceptible of their 
peculiar sensations, independently of the more peripheral portion of the 
nervous cords which form the means of communication with the external 
organs of sense. 
  e.g.: “a patient who had lost one eye […] produced […] luminous appearance on the 
  blind side. […] These sensations (which are analogous to those referred to a limb lost 
  by amputation) continued for several days.” 
VIII. The immediate objects of the perception of our senses are merely particular 
states induced in the nerves, and felt as sensations either by the nerves 
themselves or by the sensorium; but inasmuch as the nerves of the senses are 
material bodies, and therefore participate in the properties of matter 
generally, occupying space, being susceptible of vibratory motion, and 
capable of being changed chemically as well as by the action of heat and 
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electricity, they make known to the sensorium, by virtue of the changes thus 
produced in them by external causes, not merely their own condition, but 
also properties and changes of condition of external bodies. The information 
thus obtained by the senses concerning external nature, varies in each sense, 
having a relation to the qualities or energies of the nerve. 
  e.g.: “Fluid bodies, applied to the organs of touch and taste, produce chemical  
  disturbances in their nerves, which excite in each a different sensation; mustard, 
  alkalies, acids, and salts, produce upon the skin, and upon the tongue, totally different 
  effects. Their chemical action must primarily be the same; but the reaction excited 
  differs according to the property of the nerves.” 
IX. That sensations are referred from their proper seat towards the exterior, is 
owing, not to anything in the nature of the nerves themselves, but to the 
accompanying idea derived from experience. 
  e.g.: “if we lay our hand upon a table, we become conscious, on a little reflection, that 
  we do not feel the table, but merely that part of our skin which the table touches; but, 
  without this reflection, we confound the sensation on the part of the skin […] with the 
  idea of resistance.” 
X. The mind not only perceives the sensations and interprets them according to 
ideas previously obtained, but it has a direct influence upon them, imparting 
to them intensity. This influence of the mind, in the case of the senses which 
have the power of distinguishing the property of extension in objects, may be 
confined to definite parts of the sentient organ; in the sense gifted with the 
power of distinguishing with delicacy intervals of time, it may be confined to 
particular acts of sensation. It also has the power of giving to one sense a 
predominant activity. 
  e.g.: “attention cannot be directed to many impressions at the same time: in  
  proportion as coetaneous impressions on the senses become numerous, the  
  sensations diminish in  intensity, or the mind receives one only with   
  distinctness; while the others are only obscurely, or not at all perceived.” 
 
Overall, these ten principles can be reduced to four foundational, interdependent 
―truths‖ with regard to the basic structure of sense perception, which will be discussed in 
what follows.  
 
(1) Sensations are underdetermined with respect to their cause (internal or 
external) (Principle I to IV). 
 
Indeed, as Crary describes, Müller‖s law – an epistemological scandal, according to 
him – led to a complete blurring of the external-internal distinction in perception, or a 
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dismantling of the ―referential illusion‖.206 That is to say, the first four principles of the 
law build the case for what we might call sensory underdetermination, i.e. the lack of an 
inherent link between internal sensations and external causes. All that is given by the 
sensory apparatus, is a world of underdetermined nervous energies, i.e. qualities 
determined by the specific sense organ involved, that are not inherently related to an 
object. 
 
(2) Sensation is to be defined only in reference to the nervous system, not to the 
external object exciting it (Principle V). 
 
LoSNE implies a bankruptcy of the conception of sensation as a (copy-like) image of 
external objects or states of affairs, as sensation, according to Müller, is merely “a 
condition of the nerves, not a property of things.”207 Again, to follow Crary‖s analysis, 
the epistemological shift involved an “overturning of the camera obscura model” as a 
structuring metaphor for the epistemology of human perception, and a bankruptcy of 
the idea of the subject as a passive receptor of copy-like images of the external world.208  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Camera Obscura, drawn by Gemma Frisius (1545). 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that this changed conception of the notion of 
―sensation‖ correlated with a modified understanding of the concept of ―stimulus‖, which 
now becomes a mere generic term referring to, as Cassedy describes, “any agent, 
external or internal, capable of producing an effect on a nerve,” so that “sensation can 
arise in the absence of ―truth‖” and “can be produced by events other than our 
encounters with external objects or states of affairs.”209  
 
(3) The information conveyed to us by the senses is completely dependent upon the 
properties of the stimulated sensory nerve (Principle VI-VIII), i.e. upon the 
specific nerve ―energy‖ (or better: nerve ―quality‖).  
 
In Principles VI to VIII, Müller elaborates on the principle of the specificity of 
sensation. Following his argumentation for sensory underdetermination and his 
physiological definition of sensation, he sets further limits to sensibility by stressing 
that (i) every one of the five senses is capable of producing only one particular quality 
(for example sound), and (ii) the particular qualities produced by the different senses 
are incommensurable (for example sound and smell). Müller is, however, unsure about 
the specific location of the principle of nerve energies (Principle VII). Helmholtz later 
described these two foundational assumptions as respectively referring to (i) the 
particular circle of qualities [Qualitätenkreis] of one sense organ, and (ii) the difference 
in modality of sensation [Modalität der Empfindung] that “excludes any transition from 
one to the other.”210  
 
(4) Mental processes play a pivotal role in the perceptual processes, the perception 
of external objects is a necessary synthesis of sensations and ideas (Principles IV 
and X). 
 
Given that Müller‖s law implies that the matter of experience (sensation) is 
completely underdetermined with respect to its origin, the question then becomes how 
the transition between mere states of nervous excitation and the external world is 
made, or, in other words, how objective experience arises from ―neutral‖ states of 
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excitation. Schmitz describes the problem launched by LoSNE as one of how we can 
explain that211 
 […] from the event […] of neutral stimulation, as a mere subjective […] condition 
of affection, one concludes to the existence of an objective reality external to our 
own subjectivity […]. How is it possible that a consistent stream of consciousness 
arises from these neutral […] stimulations?  
“How they [our minds] manage this construction,” Rachlin adds, “became the business 
of all of psychology for the next hundred years.”212 Consequently, the latter credits 
Müller for establishing the basic problem of perceptual psychology.213 From his 
conception of sensation as an underdetermined state of the nervous system, it follows 
that perception requires an act of judgment or interpretation.214  
 
Müller‖s nativism, however, prevented him from developing a full-blown 
psychological approach to the perceptual process. To begin with, Müller argued that the 
dynamical opposition between the I and the Not-I, that is determining for perceptual 
consciousness, is acquired prenatally as an ―obscure‖ representation:215 
The first obscure idea excited could be no other than that of a sentient passive 
―self‖ in contradistinction to something acting upon it. The uterus, which compels 
the child to assume a determined position, […] is also the means of exciting in the 
sensorium of the child the consciousness of something thus distinct from itself 
and external to it. In this way is gained the idea of an external world as the cause 
of sensations. 
In other words, the differential awareness of an I and a Not-I, according to Müller, is 
acquired in utero, through the sensible awareness of a contrast between the unmediated 
feeling of the spatially extended, bodily self, and that which lies outside of it. As such, 
 
                                                     
211
 Schmitz (1996), p. 49. 
212
 Rachlin (2005), p. 43. 
213
 Rachlin (2005). 
214
 As Lenoir (1993) points out, Müller‖s distinction between the role of ideas [Vorstellungen] and sensations 
[Empfindungen] is analogous to the difference Kant made between the form and the matter of experience, 
where the former is a condition of possibility for the determination of the latter. In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that Müller began his 1826 work by quoting Goethe‖s Kantian-inspired credo, that “Content 
without method leads to fantasy; method without content to empty sophistry; matter without form to 
cumbersome knowledge, form without matter to hollow speculation [Gehalt ohne Methode führt zur 
Schwärmerei, Methode ohne Gehalt zum leeren Klügeln, Stoff ohne Form zum beschwerlichen Wissen, Form 
ohne Stoff zum hohlen Wähnen].”(Goethe as quoted in Müller (1826, p. ii).” Compare with Kant, CPR [A51/B75]: 
“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” 
215
 Müller (1843 [1833/40]), p. 717; Also see Lenoir (1993).  
 Helmholtz’s Physiological Epistemology and the Genesis of the Psychological Problem of the 
Object 
 
61 
 
Müller‖s theory ultimately relied on the assumption of immediate bodily awareness to 
explain the genesis of differential consciousness. As Heidelberger aptly describes, “the 
certainty of the cogito, for Müller, is the certainty of the body sensing itself [sich selbst 
empfindenden Körpers].”216 Likewise, Helmholtz‖s teacher also considered the spatial 
features of external perception to be due to an inborn mechanism. In vision, Müller 
stated, spatiality is given in the immediate sensation that the retina has of its own 
extension. But also more generally, “every point in which a nerve ends, is represented 
in the sensorium as a spatial particle.” The general idea of space in Müller‖s theorizing 
thus equally emerged from the immediate awareness of one‖s own bodily extension.217 
As a consequence, the spatial form of external perception is determined from birth by 
the spatial distribution of the nerve endings in the sensory system itself. Indeed, as 
Müller confirmed, his theory of perception amounts to the peculiar conclusion that the 
direct object of perception is actually the retina itself, or to borrow Lenoir‖s expression, 
for Müller, “the retina is the external world.”218  
However, Müller‖s identification of the idea of space with the retina‖s self-sensed 
extensity, raised the problem of how a single visual field is constructed from two 
retina‖s. To address this problem, Müller developed his theory of corresponding retinal 
points, or the identity theory of spatial perception, which claimed that each point on 
the left retina corresponds to a point on the right retina, and that both (identical) points 
arise from a ―common root‖:219 
The accordance of the identical points of the two retinae is, therefore, an innate 
property, and never undergoes any change. The eyes may be compared to two 
branches with a single root, of which every minute portion bifurcates so as to 
send a twig to each eye. 
According to this theory, a single spatial visual field is thus guaranteed by the innate 
properties of the visual system. In the end, Müller escaped the problems created by his 
LoSNE with regard to the subject-object transition in perception, by resorting to innate 
mechanisms by virtue of which a dynamical and geometrical opposition between the I 
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and the Not-I are given prior to experience.220 Indeed, we are prompted to draw the 
following conclusion, suggested by Post after he had read Müller‖s work:221 
As the doctrine of specific nerve energies establishes the essential subjectivity of 
all sensations, one could believe, that the question now becomes where these 
mere subjective experiences derive their objective [gegenständlich-objectiver] 
nature from. Only, this question does not at all exist for Müller. According to him, 
sensations are originally [von Haus aus] endowed with a certain degree of 
objectivity, notwithstanding their complete subjectivity.  
It is only by presupposing a primal state of differentiation and an inborn intuition of 
space, i.e. an original dynamical and geometrical opposition between the bodily self and 
the world, that Müller can account for the possibility of perceptual experience.222 This 
differs significantly from Helmholtz‖s view, who combined the epistemological 
consequences of Müller‖s law, which he considered to lie at the very basis of his 
physiological epistemology, with a firm criticism of nativism or naturalism. He 
therefore arrived at a totally different, full-blown psychological account of perceptual 
objectification. 
2.6 Helmholtz‖s Physiological Epistemology 
The impact of Müller‖s LoSNE on Helmholtz‖s thought on perception can hardly be 
overestimated. Every lecture he ever gave on the topic of his theory of perception, 
starts, almost without exception, with an explanation of LoSNE.223 The basic insight of 
the underdetermined nature of sensation with respect to its origin formed the basis of 
Helmholtz‖s physiological epistemology. 224 In 1868, for example, Helmholtz writes:225 
Johannes Müller, as early as the year 1826, when writing that great work on the 
―Comparative Physiology of Vision‖, which marks an epoch in science, was able to 
lay down the most important principles of the theory of impressions derived from 
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the senses. These principles have not only been confirmed in all important points 
by subsequent investigation, but have proved of even more extensive application 
than this eminent physiologist could have suspected. 
What the law proves, according to Helmholtz, is basically that there is no “pre-
ordained harmony of the inner and the external world”: the states of excitation 
produced by the nervous system convey no information with respect to the cause of 
excitation.226 Consequently, as early as 1852, the young scientist formulated the crucial 
problem of the study of perception as that of explaining how sensation [Empfindung] 
comes to be related to external objects and events. In doing so, he once more credits his 
teacher for articulating the foundational structure of the perceptual relation:227  
We have already seen enough to answer the question whether it is possible to 
maintain the natural […] conviction that the quality of our sensations, […] gives us 
a true impression of corresponding qualities in the outer world. It is clear that 
they do not. The question was really decided by Johannes Müller‖s deduction from 
well ascertained facts of the law of specific nervous energy.  
The Müllerian assumption that “the quality of […] sensation is dependent principally 
on the condition of the nervous system, and only in the second place on the condition of 
the object perceived” determined Helmholtz‖s conception of sensation as a sign or 
symbol for external objects.228 More particularly, sensation in Helmholtz‖s theorizing is 
(i) no more than a “changed condition of the nervous fibers […] or functional activity,” 
and (ii) devoid of any resemblance with “the agent inducing it.”229 Based on LoSNE, 
Helmholtz states:230 
Our sensations are […] effects produced by external causes in our organs, and the 
manner in which one such effect expresses itself depends, of course, essentially on 
the type of apparatus which is affected. Insofar as the quality of our sensation 
gives us information about the peculiarity of the external influence stimulating it, 
it can pass for a sign – but not for an image. For one requires from an image some 
sort of similarity with the object […]. A sign, however, need not have any type of 
similarity with what it is a sign for. 
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In short, Helmholtz accepted the intrinsically underdetermined nature of sensory 
experience, and invoked LoSNE as an argument in support of the unknowability of his 
category of Reality (see chapter 1). 
 
Helmholtz‖s research on sensory physiology furthermore lead him to expand Müller‖s 
insights in two different ways. Firstly, during his work on color vision in the early 1850s, 
Helmholtz became convinced that his contemporary Thomas Young‖s trichromatic 
theory of color provided a “further extension of Johannes Müller‖s law.”231 In this 
theory, Young hypothesized that the specificity of color sensations must be ascribed to 
the specific reactivity of retinal receptors to different wavelengths of light. He 
distinguished three such receptors, respectively sensitive to the wavelength associated 
with red, green and violet.232 Through his experimental work on color mixing and his 
observation of subjects suffering from color blindness, Helmholtz provided further 
empirical evidence for Young‖s theory.233 In contrast to Young, however, Helmholtz did 
not speak of different ―receptors‖, but rather of different nerve fibers, and additionally 
hypothesized that while each of these fibers has its own wavelength specificity, they 
would still react faintly when stimulated by the other two.234 This theory of color, which 
assumes that color vision emerges from three different (although partially overlapping) 
nerve sensitivities in the retina, would later become known as the Young-Helmholtz 
theory, and besides providing a good explanation for color blindness and anticipating 
the modern cone theory of vision, Helmholtz construed it as a further extension of 
Müller‖s law in the following manner: 235 
Just as the difference of sensation of light and warmth depends demonstrably 
upon whether the rays of the sun fall upon nerves of sight or nerves of feeling, so 
it is supposed in Young‖s hypothesis that the difference of sensation of colours 
depends simply upon whether one or the other kind of nervous fibers are more 
strongly affected. 
Secondly, Helmholtz developed an analogous hypothesis in the field of acoustics, by 
means of his experimental investigation of the origin of tonal specificity, published in 
his 1863 On the Sensations of Tone. In this work, the scientist outlines the results of his 
experimental research on the sensation of tones, which convincingly demonstrates that 
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individual frequencies are associated with the specific receptivity of the nerve fibers in 
the cochlea.236 These sensory elements, which Helmholtz identified to most likely be the 
arches of Corti, would behave much like piano strings, with each particular element 
resonating in response to a specific tone.237 From this research, Helmholtz concluded 
that:238 
The sensation of different pitch would […] be a sensation in different nerve fibers. 
The sensation of a quality of tone would depend upon the power of a given 
compound tone to set in vibration […] different groups of nerve fibres. […] This is a 
step similar to that taken in a wider field by Johannes Müller. […] The qualitative 
difference of pitch and quality of tone is reduced to a difference in the fibres of 
the nerves receiving the sensation.  
In contrast to his teacher, who relied heavily on rudimentary self-experimentation 
and self-observation, Helmholtz took LoSNE into the lab, so to speak, and in doing so, 
succeeded in extending Müller‖s case for sensory specificity, by showing that there is 
not only a modal difference in sensory qualities, i.e. a difference across sensory systems, 
as Müller argued, but moreover a qualitative one, that applies to the sensations produced 
within a single sensory system.239  
Most importantly, Helmholtz claimed that LoSNE had far-reaching epistemological 
consequences, and he famously interpreted Müller‖s (extended) LoSNE as providing a 
physiological basis for Kant‖s a priori forms of intuition. In doing so, he set the stage for 
the (relatively unknown) movement of physiological neo-Kantianism in the nineteenth 
century.240 Just like Kant had argued that every possible experience is necessarily 
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conditioned by the a priori forms of intuition and the categories of thought, Müller had 
shown that the fundamental material of perception (sensation) is conditioned and 
determined by our physiological make-up.241 Therefore, LoSNE could be invoked in 
support of the unknowability of the Real, and to undermine the view of the perceptual 
process as a direct reflection of the thing-in-itself.242 In short, LoSNE, according to 
Helmholtz, provided strong evidence for an anti-objectivist epistemology and restored 
the intrinsical unknowability of the thing-in-itself.243 In 1855, Helmholtz states that 
Müller‖s insights signified244 
[…] one of the most significant advances in sense physiology in recent times. 
According to it, the quality of our sensations […] does not depend upon the 
perceived external objects, but on the sensory nerves which mediate sensation. 
[…] Just the same what the physiology of the senses has proven in recent times, 
Kant sought to prove earlier […], by pointing out the share that our […] mental 
organization [Organisation des Geistes] has in the formation of ideas 
[Vorstellungen]. 
Later on in his career, Helmholtz maintained that Müller‖s law is “an empirical 
statement of Kant‖s theoretical exposition with regard to the nature of the human 
faculty of knowledge,” and “presented and made evident the nature and meaning of […] 
the subjective form of sensation.”245 In the first as well as the second version of the 
Treatise, Helmholtz credited Müller with providing a scientific basis for Kant‖s “so called 
transcendental forms of intuition and thought, given a priori to any experience, in which 
every content of our representation is necessarily taken up.”246 In short, according to 
Helmholtz, the epistemological consequence of LoSNE was that any investigation into 
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the origin and ground of the object necessarily proceeded from the conditioning role of 
subjective organization, which hence meant a return to Kant‖s critical analysis of 
experience.  
In the wake of Helmholtz‖s and Müller‖s work, or more generally the tradition of 
subjective vision in philosophy and physiology, thus arose an early “back to Kant” 
movement, that invoked results of natural science in support of a critical anti-
objectivism, and called for a renewed appreciation of the “impossibility to liberate 
oneself of the ―magical circle‖ of the relation between the subject and the object.”247  
Although the discussion of Helmholtz‖s relation to Kant is reserved in the fourth 
chapter, his Kantian interpretation of LoSNE, i.e. the foundation of his physiological 
epistemology, calls for some further explanation and critical reflection. Helmholtz has 
often been described as the one to naturalize Kantian epistemology, but for the sake of 
clarity, it is useful to distinguish between his physiological interpretation of the Kantian 
forms of intuition on the one hand, and his transformation of the category of causality 
(a form of understanding) in terms of a psychological urge [Trieb] or instinct.248 Hence, 
Helmholtz‖s naturalized Kantianism has a physiological as well as a psychological 
dimension. As such, the ―naturalization of Kant‖ within the framework of Helmholtz‖s 
theorizing is to be understood in terms of his identification of Kant‖s formal forms of 
intuition and understanding with the perceiver‖s physiological organization and 
psychological ―hardware‖ respectively. In chapter 4, the latter will be considered, but for 
now, let us restrict ourselves to the former. 
2.7 (The Sense and Nonsense of) Physiological Neo-
Kantianism 
The movement of physiological neo-Kantianism originated in Helmholtz‖s Kantian 
interpretation of Müller, and culminated in Friedrich Albert Lange‖s 1866 History of 
Materialism. Lange had attended Helmholtz‖s lectures as a student and credited him for 
having pointed out the congruence of the facts of physiology with Kant‖s transcendental 
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aesthetics, and his restoration of the thing-in-itself in face of objectivism.249 According 
to Lange, Helmholtz‖s sign theory of sensation prompts us to conclude to “the existence 
of a transcendental order of things.”250 This early neo-Kantian movement primarily 
aimed at countering objectivism, by emphasizing the mediating role of subjective 
organization in the perceptual process, and, by extension, in the attainment of objective 
knowledge.251 Because of its physiological interpretation, however, the meaning of the 
Kantian a priori was expanded so dramatically, that according to some, it lost its very 
meaning.252 Therefore, the idea of a physiological neo-Kantianism soon encountered 
resistance for a number of reasons.  
One obvious objection to Helmholtz‖s Kantian interpretation of LoSNE is that Kant 
himself explicitly denied that the quality of sensation is an a priori form of intuition, and 
that hence, it makes no sense to align Müller‖s theorizing with the critical philosopher‖s 
thesis concerning the a priori forms of intuition.253 It would thus be correct to state that 
Helmholtz‖s physiological interpretation contradicts the letter of Kantianism. However, 
a far more detrimental criticism would be that it is not even in accordance with the 
spirit of Kant‖s Critiques. And indeed, in the wake of Helmholtz‖s work, numerous 
criticisms arose that pertained to the way in which his reinterpretation of the Kantian a 
priori diverged from the general rationale of Kant‖s critical analysis of experience and 
knowledge.  
For starters, the Prussian philosopher famously set his transcendental approach 
apart from what he called the ―physiology of understanding‖, i.e. the attempt to grasp 
the ground of objective experience and knowledge by analyzing its genetic origin and 
formative history in the empirical subject.254 Whereas Kant aimed at determining the 
necessary subjective conditions of knowledge through a transcendental regression to its 
formal constitutive elements, Helmholtz (and Müller) arrive at the primacy of 
underdetermined sensation by decomposing experience to its most basic elements, i.e. 
physiological states of the body. This not only alters the meaning of the a priori, by more 
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importantly, its systematic place in the theory of knowledge. To be more precise, 
Helmholtz‖s physiological a priori does not denote a formal feature of experience, but a 
fact about the physiological functioning of the sensitive apparatus, thus dissolving a 
Kantian necessity into the contingency of the empirical subject.255 More important, 
however, is the transformation of the systematic place of the physiologized a priori in 
the theory of knowledge, when we compare it with Kant‖s formal principle of 
aprioricity.  
If we take the specificity of the Kantian analysis of experience to be the way in which 
it unites a positive and a negative claim with regard to the conditioning function of the 
subject, i.e. subjective organization as the condition of possibility for, as well as the limit of 
experience and knowledge, LoSNE is aspecific with regard to it, as it incorporates only 
the negative thesis. To be sure, one could argue that LoSNE in a way produced a radical 
change of perspective in the physiology of sense perception, which can be understood 
in analogy with Kant‖s Copernican turn in epistemology.256 However, the a priori 
determination of possible experience through LoSNE hardly entails the positive thesis of 
Kantian philosophy, quite the contrary. What Müller‖s law intends to prove, is, first and 
foremost, that the body (as the locus of subjective organization) is capable of producing 
experience that has no external correlate whatsoever. Or, in other words, it provides a 
subjectivist argument against objectivism, by showing that the body has, in Crary‖s words, 
“an innate capacity, one might even say a transcendental faculty, to misperceive.”257 If 
anything, the physiological a priori, which founds sensory underdetermination, and not 
the determinability of sensory experience, expresses the a priori predisposition for 
hallucination. In the end, the physiological interpretation of the a priori is thus more of 
an articulation of the ―enigma of knowledge‖ than its solution.258 As such, the Kantian 
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forms of intuition as preconditions to knowledge are transformed into empirical facts 
about the structure of the physiological body, which function as conditions of impossibility 
for direct knowledge about the Real.  
As a consequence of this dramatic shift in the systematic place of the a priori, Kant‖s 
transcendental philosophy and pre-Kantian subjectivism become almost 
indistinguishable. As Rowlands puts it, if one understands by neo-Kantianism “the view 
that there are activities […] whose function it is to structure experience,” the category is 
excessively broad – actually including thinkers that predate the Prussian philosopher – 
and one will be lead to the awkward conclusion that “Locke, Berkeley and Hume were 
all neo-Kantians.”259 The ―slippery slope‖ that is set in motion by the concept of a 
physiological a priori, is aptly described by Skidelsky:260 
The first generation of neo-Kantians interpreted Kant‖s principle of aprioricity in 
a strictly naturalistic sense. They understood it in light of Müller‖s law […] – the 
law, […] that sensation […] is molded by our physiological organization. […] An 
originally purely experimental project thus acquired broader philosophical 
significance. […] ―Matter in general,‖ wrote Lange, ―may just as well be merely a 
product of my organisation […]‖ From here […] it was only a short step to the 
phenomenalism of Mach. What had begun as a revision of Kantianism ended up as 
its dissolution. 
The core problem with regard to the physiological interpretation of the a priori thus 
seems to pertain mainly to its inherent tendency towards (pre-Kantian) subjectivism.261 It 
is no wonder, then, that the movement of physiological neo-Kantianism soon faced 
serious criticism, as for example by Cohen in his 1871 Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung, who 
famously called for a return to the historical Kant in the backlash of these early 
reuptakes of Kant‖s critical analysis.  
We are thus prompted to conclude that the epistemological implications of LoSNE 
alone do not specifically call for a Kantian interpretation. The anti-objectivist 
epistemology that is derived from it can not only be recuperated in a Kantian 
framework, but could likewise be invoked in support of phenomenalism, scepticism and 
fictionalism, or in short, all forms of subjectivism.  
However, one could say that the positive thesis of Kantianism is incorporated in 
Helmholtz‖s psychologized adoption of the category of causality. This will lead us to 
reconsider the case of Helmholtz‖s Kantianism in chapter 4. But it remains that 
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Helmholtz‖s interpretation of LoSNE was more philosophically neutral than he thought 
it to be, and that LoSNE provides a good argument for an anti-objectivist stance, but 
does not in and by itself call for a Kantian interpretation. 
In what follows, we return to our discussion of the physiological roots of Helmholtz‖s 
epistemology, in which we need to take one last step. A step that at once concludes this 
chapter and provides an introduction to the next ones, which deal with the 
psychological dimension of Helmholtz‖s work. The final matter at stake in this chapter is 
that of his rejection of nativism or psychological reductionism, which paved the way for 
his psychology of the object as an autonomous field of inquiry.  
2.8 Helmholtz‖s Anti-Reductionism: The Autonomy of 
Psychology 
As suggested in the beginning of this chapter (see sections 2.2 and 2.3), Helmholtz‖s 
physiological reductionism contrasts sharply with his non-reductionist view of 
psychology, i.e. his emphasis on the irreducibility of psychological processes to physical 
or physiological mechanisms. With regard to the question of reductionism in both 
disciplines, Helmholtz‖s stance is the perfect mirror image of his teacher‖s, who argued 
for “the autonomy of life over and against the physical realm,” but likewise defended a 
form of biological reductionism with respect to the psychological realm, through his 
nativism.262  
 
In contrast to Johannes Müller, Helmholtz stressed the complete autonomy of 
psychology vis-à-vis physical research on the one hand, and that of physiological 
investigation on the other. This is reflected for example in his multi-layered theory of 
perception, which passes through three distinct levels of analysis:263  
[T]he physical characters of the eye as an optical instrument; next the physiological 
processes of excitation and conduction in the parts of the nervous system which 
belong to it; and lastly […] the psychological question, how mental apprehensions 
are produced by the changes which take place in the optic nerve 
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Helmholtz‖s psychological project is articulated first and foremost as an attempt to 
overcome the nativist endeavor to turn psychology into the ―stepdaughter‖ of 
physiology, and as such, to establish psychological research as an independent field of 
inquiry.264 In Helmholtz‖s time, the nativist hypothesis was defended not only by Müller, 
but more importantly by Ewald Hering – Purkinje‖s successor at the university of Prague 
– who was strongly influenced by Müller‖s views, and likewise defended the identity 
theory of spatial perception.265 Hering was without doubt Helmholtz‖s greatest 
opponent. The exceptional intensity of the controversy between both scientists is 
testified in Turner‖s remarkable 1994 monograph on the matter, but, in the context of 
this exposition, the details of this controversy will be left aside. Rather, we will focus on 
the argumentative strategies employed by Helmholtz in order to establish the 
autonomy of psychological research over and against the nativist hypothesis that 
“complete ideas of objects are produced by the organic mechanisms.”266 In contrast to 
nativism, Helmholtz argued, his theory “does not assume any peculiar modes of 
physiological action in the nervous system, nor any hypothetical anatomical 
structures,” but instead considers the idea of the external in perception to be the result 
of an “act of our power of realization [Vorstellungsvermögen].”267 To delineate his 
theory from nativism, Helmholtz used the term ―empiricism‖, although his theorizing 
goes well beyond the strict empiricist framework.268 Still, the “dramatic juxtaposition” 
between both schools seemed to be one of Helmholtz‖s most salient rhetorical 
strategies, as Turner notes.269  
The greatest bone of contention between both schools pertained to the way in which 
spatial representation originates from non-spatial subjective states of excitation: 270 
[I]t may often be rather hard to say how much of our apperceptions 
[Anschauungen] […] is due directly to sensation, and how much of them […] is due 
to experience and training. The main point of controversy between various 
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investigators […] is connected with this difficulty. Some are disposed to concede to 
the influence of experience as much scope as possible, and to derive from it 
especially all notion of space. This view may be called the empirical theory 
[empiristische Theorie]. Others […] believe it is necessary to assume a system of 
innate apperceptions […] especially with respect to space-relations. In 
contradistinction to the former view, this may perhaps be called the intuition 
theory [nativistische Theorie] […]. 
Helmholtz, however, acknowledged that the choice between the two opposing 
theories is a matter of disposition [Neigung], and reluctantly admits that, for the time 
being “a refutation of the nativist theory is not possible.”271  
Time and again, Helmholtz invoked three arguments against the nativist theory, 
namely (i) its low explanatory power, (ii) its metaphysical audacity, and (iii) its 
redundancy: 272 
[T]he nativistic hypotheses explain, […] nothing. […] [T]hey only assume the very 
fact to be explained, in that they simultaneously reject the possible reduction of 
the fact to the safely established mental processes […]. Second, the assumption of 
all nativistic theories that complete ideas of objects are produced by the organic 
mechanism seems much more audacious and dubious than the assumption of the 
empiricist theory, that only the uncomprehended material of sensations derives 
from external influences, while all ideas are formed out of it according to the laws 
of thought. Third, the nativist assumptions are unnecessary. 
So, firstly, Helmholtz maintained that if it is possible to analyze representations as 
the result of a mental act, this is to be preferred above explanations that remain “the 
slave of the factum” as Liebmann once formulated it.273 Secondly (but the third point in 
the quote), Helmholtz appealed to the principle of parsimony. Nativism, according to 
him, invokes the ―unnecessary hypothesis‖ of inborn mechanisms, thereby violating the 
“general […] rule of scientific examination, not to build new hypotheses as long as the 
known facts suffice for the explanation.”274 In 1868, Helmholtz specified these ―known 
facts‖, i.e. the laws of thought, as the “well known association between the impressions 
we receive and the conclusions we draw from them […],.” However, as will become clear 
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later on, the laws Helmholtz invoked to account for the origin of external perception 
exceed the empiricist, associationist framework by far.275  
Yet the final and most intriguing argument Helmholtz articulated against nativism is 
its metaphysical audacity (the second point in the quote). More particularly, in several 
occasions, Helmholtz contended that the nativist approach is based on the metaphysical 
assumption of a pre-established harmony between mind and matter, and consequently 
presents a naturalized version of absolute idealism.276 The doctrine of pre-established 
harmony was first articulated as a solution to the mind-body problem by Leibniz in his 
New System of Nature in 1695. In this work, the philosopher famously stated that mind 
and body are like “two clocks or watches which perfectly agree.”277 Helmholtz, however, 
never mentioned Leibniz‖s philosophy in this respect, and it seems that he used the 
term ―pre-established harmony‖ quite broadly, to denote any theory which, according to 
him, supposed a representative similarity between subject and object.278 Both absolute 
idealism and nativism, Helmholtz argued, answer the question as to what “the extent 
[is] to which our representations correspond to objects” by assuming279 
[…] a pre-established harmony between nature and mind [Natur und Geiste], or 
[…] an identity between Nature and mind, as Nature was viewed as the product of 
the activity of a general mind, from which the human mind emanates. The nativist 
theory of spatial perception is related to these perspectives [i.e. absolute 
idealism], as it accounts for the genesis of percepts which […] correspond to 
actuality […] through innate mechanisms and a […] pre-established harmony. 
Consequently, Helmholtz rejected the nativist identity theory of spatial perception, 
which assimilates spatial representation to the physiological structure of the body, 
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without the guidance of external experience, to think over again the thoughts of the Creator, and to 
rediscover them by its own inner activity.”  
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because of its metaphysical superstructure, i.e. the pre-established harmony between 
the physiological structure of the body and the external object.  
It should be mentioned that Helmholtz used the same arguments to refute 
“materialistic opinions” in the study of perception, which assimilate (or even identify) 
mental representations to brain processes. Although Helmholtz spent quite some time 
refuting psychological reductionism or nativism, he also clearly conceived of 
psychological materialism, i.e., the reduction of the mind to the brain, as utterly absurd. 
In 1867, he ironically asks280  
[…] what similarity can be imagined between the process in the brain that is 
concomitant with the representation [Vorstellung] of a table and the table itself? 
[…] Perspective projections of the external world in the brain hemispheres […] are 
obviously not enough to represent a bodily object. […] [A]n electrical reproduction 
of the table in the brain would be simply another bodily object to be perceived, 
but not the representation of a table. 
Through his rejection of physiological and physical reductionism, the concept of 
representation [Vorstellung] slowly emerges as a complex, irreducible psychological 
phenomenon, that has its ground and formative history in the mind. Helmholtz thus 
paved the way for psychology as an autonomous discipline, by freeing it from the grip of 
physiological determinism, and claiming the mental realm as a level of analysis in its 
own right.  
2.9 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reconstructed the physiological and philosophical background of 
Helmholtz‖s psychological problematization of the object. A returning topic in this 
investigation was the assumption of pre-established harmony between subject and 
object, and more importantly, the way in which the lack thereof necessitates a 
psychology of perceptual experience, according to Helmholtz.  
It is clear from this investigation, that what Foucault called modernity‖s most radical 
epistemological event (see section 1.2.2), i.e. the gradual crumbling of the unity between 
subject and object, found its ultimate physiological expression in Müllers LoSNE. In 
LoSNE, Helmholtz found a solid scientific argument against naïve realism and 
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 Helmholtz (1925 [1856/66], III), p. 20; Helmholtz (1867 [1856/1866], III), p. 443. 
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objectivism, and a motive for a thorough problematization of the perceptual process. 
Furthermore, we have discussed the sense and nonsense of the physiological strand of 
neo-Kantianism that arose in the wake of Müller‖s ―epistemological scandal‖ in general, 
and Helmholtz‖s Kantian interpretation of Müller‖s law in particular. In that context, we 
argued that LoSNE in itself does not call for a Kantian interpretation, but can be 
recuperated by all forms of subjectivism, thus casting a shadow of doubt over the term 
―physiological neo-Kantianism‖.   
 Subsequently, we analysed Helmholtz‖s philosophical arguments against 
psychological reductionism or nativism, and in favour of the autonomy of psychology as 
a level of analysis in its own right. Again, we were confronted with Helmholtz‖s anti-
metaphysical attitude, and more specifically, with his criticism of the metaphysical 
audacity of the nativist hypothesis, that allegedly assumes a pre-representative 
similarity between the anatomico-physiological structure of the body, and the external 
object. According to Helmholtz, it is not the body, but a ―peculiar mental activity‖ that 
mediates the transition from pure states of excitation to the representation of an 
object.281 In the end, we are lead to conclude that it was the particular combination of (i) 
the epistemological consequences of LoSNE, and (ii) the rejection of nativism or 
psychological reductionism, that prompted Helmholtz‖s to consider the perceptual 
object as the result of an irreducible mental process.        
After thus establishing the motives for Helmholtz‖s psychological approach to the 
object, we can now proceed to analyse the different levels of analysis in his psychology, 
along the lines of interpretation as outlined in chapter 1 (section 1.3). As a first step in 
this analysis, we will consider Helmholtz‖s empiricism. 
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77 
 
Chapter 3  
Empiricism and the Object: From Hume to 
Helmholtz 
Nothing is more curiously enquir'd after by the mind of 
man, than the causes of every phaenomenon [...].And 
how must we be disappointed, when we learn that this 
connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is 
nothing but that determination of the mind [...]?  
 
- David Hume (1969 [1739/40]), p. 313-314. 
3.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, Helmholtz‖s psychological perspective on 
perception was determined in part by his non-reductionism with regard to the mind, or, 
as some would say, his epistemological dualism with regard to the mind-body relation.282 
Helmholtz‖s non-reductionist stance provides a first important route for understanding 
his general take on the psychological problem of the object, i.e. as a problem that is not 
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 ―Epistemological dualism‖, in this context, refers to the philosophical stance that refuses to explain states of 
the mind in terms of states of the body; as such, it is opposed to Müller‖s monistic epistemology that is implied 
in his reduction of the psychological problem of the object to inborn physiological mechanisms. There has 
been considerable wrangling over the possible metaphysical stakes of the empiricism-nativism debate, and, 
more particularly, over the way in which Helmholtz‖s psychological non-reductionism amounts to a 
metaphysical dualist position with regard to the relation of mind and matter (as described in Hatfield, 1990, p. 
182). These discussions will be left aside, however, given the lack of textual evidence in support of that claim, 
and Helmholtz‖s explicitly anti-metaphysical stance.  
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reducible to biological modes of explanation. Apart from the question concerning the 
autonomy of psychological investigation, however, there is also the issue of its 
appropriate methodology, which will be addressed in this chapter. Most generally, it 
will be argued that although Helmholtz opens up the domain of psychology as an 
autonomous area of investigation through his rejection of biological reductionism (or 
nativism), the specificity and nature of the empiricist dimension of his work should be 
understood against the background of British and Scottish empiricist philosophy.283  
The discussion of the empirical dimension of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object, 
however, provides only a partial insight into his theorizing, which has to be 
complemented with an analysis of his indebtedness to Kant and Fichte. In accordance 
with the systematic-historical viewpoint of this dissertation, this third chapter 
therefore aims to answer two interrelated questions, namely (i) what are the historical 
precedents to the empirical dimension in Helmholtz‖s work, and (ii) in what way does 
the empiricist framework itself provide ―the seed and motive‖, as Cassirer put it, for the 
critical account of experience in general, and for Helmholtz‖s shift towards the 
transcendental theories of Kant and Fichte in particular.284 Before we delve into these 
questions, however, some preliminary clarifications are in order. 
3.1.1 Preliminary Clarifications: Empiricism and the Mind 
The term empiricism in this chapter refers to methodological naturalism with regard to 
the mind, as distinguished from metaphysical naturalism, defined by Hatfield as follows:285 
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 This take on the matter opposes that presented by Boring (1950) and Singh (1991), among others, who both 
portray Helmholtz as a strict empiricist opposing German idealism in general, and Kant in particular. As 
illustrated by the statements of Helmholtz himself on that matter, as well as by the vast amount of secondary 
literature on Helmholtz‖s relation to German idealism, this interpretation can only be the result of a very 
partial reading of Helmholtz‖s work.  
284
 Cassirer (1922), p. 387. 
285
 Hatfield (1990), p. 17 [boldface added]. The term ―methodological naturalism‖ was allegedly coined by Paul 
de Vries, in an article from 1986, although it was not meant to denote the naturalization of the mind that is at 
stake in this chapter, but referred to natural scientific explanations of the world, i.e. those based on natural 
processes and events, as opposed to supernatural ones. As such, the idea of ―methodological naturalism‖ is still 
at the centre of debates pertaining to natural versus supernatural explanation in general, and evolutionism 
versus creationism in particular (see for example Poe & Mytyk, 2007 and Mahner, 2011). One of the apples of 
discord in these debates is the question of whether methodological naturalism automatically implies a 
commitment to metaphysical naturalism. Although the discussion of the manner in which methodological 
naturalism in for example Mill‖s and Helmholtz‖s theories of mind is paired with an explicit anti-metaphysical 
and anti-materialist stance might be relevant to those debates, the selective analysis of the history of 
methodological naturalism with regard to the mind in this chapter has little, if anything, to do with these 
current discussions, for two reasons. First of all, our research object is that of the mind and not the natural 
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Throughout the modern period and into the twentieth century, the major 
attempts to ―naturalize‖ the mind can be divided into materialistic and 
nonmaterialistic variants. Both share the goal of investigating and explaining 
mental processes with the methods of the natural sciences and, in particular, with 
methods and modes of explanation modeled after physics. Materialists propose 
that the naturalization requires that the mind be reduced to a material or physical 
system; I shall call their position ―metaphysical naturalism‖. Nonmaterialist 
versions of naturalism are defined by the attempt to discover ―natural‖ laws of the 
mind, where ―natural‖ is cashed out through an analogy with the methods and 
modes of explanation in natural science, instead of by an appeal to ontology. I 
shall call this version ―methodological naturalism‖. Associative accounts of the 
mind, which reduce mental processes to simple elements governed by a few laws – 
where these elements and laws are described as mental phenomena and are not 
identified with physical processes – have provided the typical example of what I 
term methodological naturalism. […] Both Hume and Helmholtz pursued 
methodological naturalistic projects. 
In other words, while the methodological foundation of empiricism with regard to 
the mind is determined in accordance with the method of the natural sciences, this does 
not in the least amount to a metaphysical assimilation of mental and natural 
phenomena and processes, or materialism.286 It is an approach to the mind that 
understands itself “by analogy to the natural sciences,” without, however, being 
founded in a metaphysical reductionism of mind and matter.287 In short: in this chapter, 
the term empiricism is used to denote those approaches that treat the mind as if it were 
a natural entity, without metaphysically assimilating the mental and the natural realm. 
In light of Helmholtz‖s non-reductionist stance with regard to the mind, it is of utmost 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
world. Hence, the main question to be answered is that of the extent to which the mind can be treated as if it 
were a natural entity, governed by (and reducible to) its very own set of empirical laws. Secondly, 
methodologically naturalist explanations, in this context, are not opposed to supernatural modes of 
explanation, but to normative ones, as Hatfield (1990, p. 17-18) suggests: “Advocates of […] naturalism have 
held differing opinions about whether naturalistic description is consistent with […] normativity.” Again, 
Hatfield (ibid., p. 17) distinguishes between a metaphysical and a methodological version of normativity with 
regard to the mind: “Among authors who conceived thought as irreducibly normative,” he writes, “some hold 
that the mind is normative in its essence […]. Others who held that thought is essentially normative eschewed 
metaphysics. […] They insist that thought must be investigated ―philosophically,‖ through the analysis, 
interpretation and criticism of our cognitive practices and of the concepts through which we describe such 
practices.”  
286
 For a recent discussion of the way in which methodological and metaphysical naturalism did not mutually 
implicate each other in early psychological theories, see McDonald (2008).  
287
 Gadamer (2006 [1975]), p. 3.  
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importance to clearly define the limits and scope of his psychological empiricism or 
methodological naturalism, and distinguish it from metaphysical naturalism.288  
 
First and foremost, methodological naturalism refers to a specific mode of psychological 
explanation, that envisions an a posteriori, constructive account of mental phenomena, or, 
as Kant would have it, a physiology of understanding.289 More particularly, empiricism, 
in this sense, strives for an atomistic and associationist explanation of mental phenomena, 
i.e. (i) a reduction of complex mental phenomena to basic elements or indivisibles, and 
(ii) a subsequent reconstruction of mental contents as the associative compounds of 
these basic indivisibles.290 With regard to the psychological problem of the object, this 
entails an analysis of the notion of ―the thing‖ as a de facto complex mental construct, 
with a formative history in the mind that can be fully accounted for in terms of the 
lawful associative combination of elementary sensations.  
Additionally, the naturalistic projects that we will discuss in this chapter accept the 
basic scientific precept of experimentation and observation as the most important 
instrument of knowledge production. However, it will soon become clear that in the 
context of their psychological investigation, this allegiance to empirical practice is 
merely an allegiance in principle. That is to say, none of the proto-psychological projects 
discussed below even come close to an experimental psychology properly so called, but 
instead they rely heavily on introspection and self-observation as a consequence of the 
intrinsic difficulties related to their research object (the mind).291 Therefore, the term 
―empiricism‖ in the following chapters refers mainly to an explanatory framework for 
mental phenomena. 
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 The significance of this distinction is illustrated by Helmholtz‖s firm rejection of metaphysical materialism, 
and psychological reductionism, as discussed extensively in the previous chapter.  
289
 See Rorty (1979), p. 126: “The idea was to offer a para-mechanical account of mental processes which, 
somehow, would underwrite some claims to knowledge and disallow other claims. The paradigm of the 
―epistemological turn‖ taken by philosophy in the seventeenth century was what Kant called ―the physiology of 
the human understanding‖.” Although John Locke‖s 1690 Essay concerning Human Understanding can be rightly 
identified as one of the founding fathers of this ―epistemological turn‖, its full-blown articulation is found in 
the work of David Hume. The latter‖s radicalization of Lockean philosophy of mind therefore provides one of 
the most epochal and intriguing testimonies of the reconfiguration of the philosophical landscape throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
290
 Deleuze (1991 [1953]).  
291
 Helmholtz noted that the psychological part of this physiology necessarily has to take recourse mainly to 
self-observation, given the generic differences between natural (external) and mental (internal) phenomena. 
See for example Helmholtz (1995 [1862], 1896). In contrast to his physical and physiological investigations, the 
psychological part of Helmholtz‖s physiology is not embedded in an elaborate experimental practice. One 
could point to Fechner as the real founder of experimental psychology, who introduced the idea of mental 
measurement in his psychophysical research on sensation (see for example Boring, 1950).  
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One of the first clear articulations of the ―science‖ of man thus conceived, is to be 
found in David Hume‖s Treatise of Human Nature, due to which Hume can be considered 
as the ―arch psychological philosopher‖, to use Robinson‖s terms.292 This early 
methodological naturalism was then further elaborated in the sixth book of John Stuart 
Mill‖s A System of Logic, entitled On the Logic of the Moral Sciences.293 As such, this chapter 
will devote considerable attention to the work of both authors, specifically with regard 
to the psychological problem of the object, as they can be considered as precursors to 
the empiricist dimension of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object.  
3.1.2 Helmholtz, Empiricism and Pure Psychology 
Based on this general description of empiricism, Hatfield (1990) was quite right in 
putting Helmholtz on a par with Hume and Mill. As early as 1862, Helmholtz stated that 
the Geisteswissenschaften [moral sciences] “have something to learn” from the natural 
and physical sciences “in point of method.”294 In what he calls the ―psychological part of 
his physiology‖, a psychological, genetic account of the object is put forward, in which 
the latter is conceived of as a complex mental phenomenon, produced by the learned 
association between underdetermined sensation-signs and their meaning-objects. The 
empirical theory, Helmholtz specifies, considers “memory, experience and custom” as 
“facts, whose laws are to be sought, and which are not to be explained away because 
they cannot be […] referred to the known laws of nervous excitation.”295 In describing 
his empirical position, Helmholtz thus again seizes the opportunity to reassert the 
autonomy of psychological investigation vis-à-vis physiology. 
Some interpretative difficulties arise, however, from Helmholtz‖s denial that 
methodological naturalism can ever be helpful in producing a pure psychology, i.e. a 
meta-theoretical framework with regard to the nature and structure of psychological 
activity, considered in abstraction of its empirical content. In the introduction to his 
Treatise, he writes that296 
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 Robinson (1986), p. 234; Hume (1969 [1739/1740]); Mill (1882 [1843]).  
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 It is important to note that Mill did not explicitly refer to Hume in constructing his psychology of the 
object. However, the programmatic similarity between both is striking, as will be discussed further on in this 
chapter.  
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 Helmholtz (1995 [1862]), p. 90. 
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 Helmholtz (1896 [1877a]), p. 187. 
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The discovery and description of […] psychological activity will not be […] an 
essential part of the present investigation, as in this area of study, we cannot rely 
on […] ascertained facts and methods founded in clear, generally accepted 
principles. Thus […] I think the psychological domain of physiology [….] should be 
kept separate from pure psychology, whose task it is to establish […] the laws and 
nature of psychological activity [Seelenthätigkeiten]. Still, one cannot avoid 
altogether talking of mental processes […], in attempting to establish a clear 
connection between phenomena, instead of summing up the unconnected facts 
[…]. And yet we know […] that people very rarely agree upon these abstract 
questions, and that the keenest thinkers, such as Kant, have long ago analyzed and 
demonstrated these relations correctly, without thereby producing a permanent 
and general agreement about them […]. I shall endeavor to avoid all reference to 
opinions as to mental activity, as involving questions that always have been, and 
perhaps always will be, subjects of debate between the various philosophical 
schools. 
Although this paragraph confronts us with a number of difficulties with regard to 
Helmholtz‖s psychological position, it raises two questions in particular, namely (1) the 
question as to what ―pure psychology‖ means exactly, and (2) the apparent contradiction 
between Helmholtz‖s self-proclaimed attempt to avoid pure psychological matters, and 
his assertion that they are at the same time unavoidable in the context of his theorizing. 
From both these issues some important clues can be derived with regard to the scope 
and limits of Helmholtz‖s empiricism.  
 
First, what is meant by ―pure psychology‖, in contradistinction to ―the psychological 
part of physiology‖? Helmholtz‖s reference to Kant is very telling in this respect, as it is 
indicative for the entanglement of (pure) psychology, philosophy and (critical) 
epistemology in his work. From other passages it is clear that pure psychology, for 
Helmholtz, does not simply refer to theoretical (as opposed to applied) psychology, but 
to a philosophical project that Helmholtz finds represented prototypically in Kant‖s 
Critiques. “Philosophy, if it gives up metaphysics,” Helmholtz writes in 1877, “still 
possesses a wide and important field, the knowledge of mental and spiritual processes 
and their laws.”297 In a lecture the following year, Helmholtz adds that philosophy, in 
contrast to natural science, which concentrates on the material content of knowledge, 
considers “the intellectual side” of knowledge, i.e. “that which belongs to the mind‖s 
own activity.”298 In short, the task of pure philosophy is to investigate mental processes, 
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 Helmholtz (1995 [1878b]), p. 344: “Philosophy […] considers the intellectual side, seeks to exclude from our 
knowledge and ideas that which originates from the influences of the corporeal world in order to be able to 
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which are the beginning and basis of knowledge and action.299 As such, it aligns with 
“Kantian philosophy, that aimed at […] investigating the sources of knowledge and the 
degree of their justification.”300 The distinction between pure psychology and the 
psychological part of the physiology of sense perception, with the former belonging to 
philosophy and the latter to the natural sciences, thus suggests that Helmholtz‖s 
methodological naturalism does not necessarily imply a full-blown empiricist 
metatheory with regard to the mind as a tabula rasa, i.e. a generalized perspective on 
mental phenomena as entirely reducible to associative complexes of sensations, with 
the exclusion of ―the form of representation‖.301  
 
Secondly, in the paragraph quoted above, Helmholtz expresses his (quite troubling) 
aspiration of avoiding the unavoidable: reference to principles of pure psychology in the 
psychological part of his physiology. With regard to the central problem of this 
dissertation, this means that while Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object cannot avoid 
reference to metatheoretical principles, he refuses to commit to one single position in 
this respect. We might hypothesize that this is precisely the point where Helmholtz will 
take the liberty to ―waver‖ between empiricism and critical philosophy.302 This difficulty 
has led some to read Helmholtz as a bad and/or inconsequent philosopher, while others 
maintain that he is dovetailing or wavering between philosophical positions, while still 
others attempt to pin him down to one definite position (either empiricism or 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
state that which belongs to the mind‖s own activity. Natural science, by contrast, […] seeks to divide off that 
which is definition, designation, form of representation, and hypothesis in order to retain as pure residue 
that which belongs to the world of reality, whose laws its seeks.”  
299
 Helmholtz (1995 [1868]): “[A]pprehension by the senses supplies after all, […] the material of all human 
knowledge, […]. It supplies the basis for the whole of action of man upon the outer world; and if this stage of 
mental processes is admitted to be the simplest and lowest of its kind, it is none the less important and 
interesting. For there is little hope that he who does not begin at the beginning of knowledge will ever arrive 
at its end.” 
300
 Helmholtz (1896 [1855]), p. 88 [my translation]; also see Helmholtz (1896 [1874]), p. 433. 
301
 This contradicts Singh‖s 1991 reading of Helmholtz‖s psychology as being a product of the Lockean tabula 
rasa view of the mind. Although this chapter aims to demonstrate that Helmholtz indeed attempted to account 
for the genesis of the notion of thinghood in terms of an empirical construction based on learning and 
experience as much as possible, it will become clear that this does not at all imply a rejection of Kant‖s 
philosophy, as Singh claims. As will be demonstrated, the limits of methodological naturalism do not at all 
coincide with the boundaries of Helmholtz‖s perception theory, which also includes other levels of analysis in 
line with Kantian and Fichtean epistemology. Hence, it is quite problematic to a ascribe to Helmholtz a 
metatheoretical view of the mind as a tabula rasa.  
302
 That is, critical philosophy as Helmholtz understands it, i.e. as a pure psychology. With regard to the 
problem of the object, the metatheoretical view implied in the latter can be articulated as the thesis that the 
idea of thinghood is not just an a posteriori construct, but a function of a priori synthetic principles of the mind. 
In this respect (see chapters 4 and 5). 
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transcendentalism).303 This is, however, not the perspective taken in this dissertation, 
that argues for the systematic relation of all these different metatheoretical 
perspectives with regard to the psychological problem of the object.  
3.1.3 Overview of the chapter 
To address the questions sketched in this introduction, this chapter will go into:  
 
(1) David Hume‖s naturalist project with regard to the mind in general (section 3.2), 
and his empiricist account of the perceptual object in particular, as presented in 
his A Treatise of Human Nature (sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). 
(2)  Hume‖s difficulties with constructing a satisfactory account of the self or subject 
based on his empiricist framework (section 3.3). 
(3) The common-sense opposition to Hume‖s ―New Scene of Thought‖ with regard to 
the mind and experience (section 3.4). 
(4) John Stuart Mill‖s reuptake of the Humean perspective on objectification (section 
3.5 and 3.5.1), and the way in which this reuptake lead to a revival of the 
empiricist problem of the self (section 3.5.2). 
(5) The empirical dimension of Helmholtz‖s theory of the object, and the way in 
which it can be understood against the background of Hume‖s and Mill‖s 
psychological project (section 3.6 and 3.6.1). 
(6)  The problem of subjectivity, and the way in which it provides Helmholtz with a 
motive for shifting towards the German transcendental tradition in his 
psychology of the object (section 3.6.2).  
3.2 Hume‖s New Scene of Thought 
The rise of methodological naturalism with regard to the mind should be understood 
against the intellectual background of a philosophy “intent on showing that whereas 
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 Coffa (1991) mentions Hermann Cohen as one of the people who regarded Helmholtz‖s work to be bad 
philosophy. Also Lenin (1971 [1925]), for example, was not so sympathetic towards Helmholtz as a 
philosopher. As already mentioned, the ―dovetailing‖ view can be found in a number of authors. One-sided 
readings of Helmholtz as an empiricist are presented by Boring (1950), Hochberg (2007), Singh (1991). 
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Newton had shown that there could be a natural philosophy of the external world, […] 
there could be a natural philosophy of the internal world.”304 In the endeavor to 
naturalize the mind, the publication of Hume‖s Treatise constituted an epochal event. 
Hume‖s methodology was groundbreaking. The analysis he envisioned was by all means 
a scientific one (as opposed to mere speculation). More particularly, Hume aimed at an 
account of human nature that aligned with the Newtonian ideal of the natural sciences, 
and hence took as its first principle the latter‖s credo “Hypotheses non fingo [I feign no 
hypotheses].”305 
In a 1734 pre-Treatise ―Letter to a Physician‖, David Hume, at the time a young 
philosopher in his early twenties, famously declared that “a new scene of thought” had 
opened up for him, or a “new medium, by which truth might be established.”306 This so-
called new scene pertained to the science of human nature, for which Hume was to lay 
the foundations a few years later in his Treatise of Human Nature.307 From Hume‖s work, it 
is clear that he considered this study to be not only the philosophia prima of all 
philosophy, but more importantly, of all the sciences, as he was strongly convinced that 
“all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature […] since they lie 
under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties.”308 
Consequently, the Scottish philosopher conceived of the science of human nature – 
which subsequently analyzes the faculty of understanding (book I), the human passions 
(book II), and morality (book III) – as an indispensible component of the inquiry into the 
nature of human knowledge. In the context of this discussion, we are exclusively 
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 Martin & Barresi (2006), p. 141. 
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 Johnson (1995), p. 22. The exact manner in which Hume was indebted to Newton‖s ideal of science is a topic 
of ongoing debate. In his seminal analysis of Hume‖s work, Kemp Smith claims that “Newton‖s conception of 
method […] is precisely the method which Hume claims to be following in his own thinking.” (Kemp Smith, 
1966, p. 57). To illustrate this point, Kemp Smith refers to the following passage in Newton‖s Opticks: 
“Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of 
Composition. This analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general 
Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are 
taken from Experiments of other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental 
Philosophy.” (Newton, 1704, as quoted in Kemp Smith, 1966, p. 56). Martin & Barresi‖s (2006) and Demeter‖s 
(2012) work illustrates that this is still a fashionable interpretation of Hume‖s work. Other scholars, such as 
Jones (1982) and McIntyre (1994), for example, have doubted Hume‖s explicit allegiance to Newton on the basis 
of a lack of textual evidence. In itself this discussion is beyond the scope of the present analysis, although it 
might provide a clearer insight into the first steps that were undertaken to establish a scientific approach to 
the mind, and the way in which this new approach drew inspiration from the methodology used in the natural 
sciences. For some accounts of the way in which Hume was indebted to Newton in constructing his Science of 
Human Nature, see among others Johnson (1995), Biro (1993) and Demeter (2012).  
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interested in the first book of Hume‖s Treatise, entitled Of the Understanding, which 
presents an in-depth analysis of the cognitive faculty. 
In the introduction to his Treatise, the Scottish philosopher summarized his 
methodological point of departure as follows:309 
[A]s the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the 
only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience 
and observation. […] And tho‖ we must endeavor to render all our principles as 
universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining 
all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ―tis still certain we cannot go 
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate 
original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous 
and chimerical. 
In accordance with this general methodological starting point, Hume gave his Treatise 
the subtitle An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral 
Subjects.310 The author‖s ambition in his book Of the Understanding can be described most 
generally as an attempt to “anatomize” the mind, i.e. to decompose mental phenomena 
into more primitive elements (impressions and ideas), and reconstruct their formative 
history in the mind by means of a minimal amount of mental laws.311 With the latter, 
Hume had in mind the laws of association, more specifically those of resemblance, 
contiguity and causality, which, not unlike Newton‖s laws of motion, would provide a 
sufficient explanation for the way in which our most fundamental beliefs about the 
world are generated from basic impressions.312 Hume, however, was well aware of the 
opaque nature of his main research interest, the human mind, and the insurmountable 
difficulties this created with regard to the method of experiment and observation, 
which, in the case of the human mind, could amount to no more than “the cautious 
observation of human life.”313 He was quite optimistic, however, that from this ―cautious 
observation‖ an empirically informed system of the mind could be derived.  
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In its attempts to construct a science of man, and more particularly a science of mind, 
continuous with the natural sciences, the Treatise actually provides the prototypical 
example of what we have called in the introduction to this chapter ―methodological 
naturalism with regard to the mind‖. More importantly, the Scottish philosopher‖s work 
provides a primal example of how the psychological problem of the object is treated in a 
strictly empiricist framework.314 In what follows, Hume‖s general project of a science of 
human nature will therefore be further explored, by focusing specifically on the way in 
which he addresses the problem of the object and objectification. To that end, we will 
focus on the section Of scepticism with regard to the senses in the Treatise (§ I.4.ii), which 
investigates the nature and origin of the belief in the object as a continued and distinct 
existence.315 In accordance with Kemp Smith‖s and Barry Stroud‖s influential 
interpretations of Hume‖s work, the following discussion distinguishes between a 
positive, naturalistic moment in Hume‖s philosophical analysis (pertaining to the origin 
of the belief in externality) and a negative, sceptical one (pertaining to the justification 
or ground of the latter).316 As the discussion of Hume in this context ultimately aims to 
provide a historically informed insight in Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object, we will 
especially focus on Hume‖s work as presenting a naturalized account of our most basic 
beliefs.317  
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3.2.1 Hume‖s Conception of the Problem of the Object in the Treatise 
In the opening paragraph of Of scepticism with regard to the senses, Hume introduces the 
central question of this particular section of the Treatise as follows: “We may well ask, 
What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But ―tis in vain to ask, Whether there 
be body or not? “318 The foundational question of Hume‖s psychology of the object is thus 
formulated as the problem of accounting for the causal origin and the formative history 
of the idea of thinghood in the mind, or the problem of accounting for the belief in a 
mind-independent object, that transcends the perceptual act as such.  
Moreover, the metaphysical question concerning the reality of objects as such, is 
dismissed from the very onset. The motive for this dismissal can be traced back to the 
section Of the idea of existence and of external existence (§ I.2.vi)in the Treatise, which 
unlocks the foundation of Hume‖s philosophical position, and gives the clearest 
articulation of the radical subjectivism that founds his entire project:319 
[S]ince nothing is ever present to the mind but perception, and since all ideas are 
deriv‖d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ―tis 
impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically 
different from ideas and impressions. […] We never really advance a step beyond 
ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which 
have appear‖d in that narrow compass […]. 
Hume‖s psychological analysis thus takes for granted the radical fissure between 
knowing subjects and mind-independent reality, and even goes so far as to condemn the 
former to the realm of private experience and subjective feelings. For the Scottish 
philosopher, there is no hope of ever “advancing a step beyond” ourselves, and from 
this perspective, the interrogation of being-in-itself is utterly redundant.320 The 
metaphysical question is consequently set aside in favor of an inquiry into the genesis of 
the belief in existence, and the attempt to establish “the principles that force that opinion 
upon us.”321 As such, Hume‖s inquiry entails a suspension of what he calls the viewpoint 
of ―vulgar‖, everyday consciousness, that is naturally inclined “to consider objects 
strongly […].”322 The belief in existence, Hume adds, surely is a necessary, unavoidable 
part of experience, as “nature, by an absolute uncontrollable necessity has determin‖d 
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us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.”323 Or, as he states in his Enquiries: a belief is 
“as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love […] which no reasoning or process of 
thought and understanding is able either to produce or prevent.”324 The philosophical 
problem of the belief in external existence, Hume therefore adds, does not concern the 
belief in existence as “a matter of fact” and neither pertains to “whether the mind forms 
such a conclusion […] but to […] the manner in which the conclusion is form‖d, and the 
principles from which it is deriv‖d […].”325 
The first step to be taken in order to examine the origin of the belief in external 
existence within a Humean framework, is hence the emancipation of the (unavoidable 
and necessary) self-evidence in which one is immersed in everyday life. Contrary to the 
vulgar point of view, which commonly confounds objects and percepts, philosophical 
reflection starts with recognizing the fundamental difference between the (interrupted, 
transient) character of perception on the one hand, and, on the other, the continued, 
permanent nature of what we conceive of as a thing.326 This latter conception, Hume 
goes on to explain, can be further analyzed as implying (1) a belief in continued 
existence, and (2) a belief in distinct existence, with the latter being further specified as 
pertaining to (2a) external position or location, and (2b) mind-independency. The 
property of continuity, he adds, “is prior to that of its distinct existence and produces 
the latter principle”, meaning that once the belief in continued existence is established, 
the correlative notion of distinctness automatically and spontaneously follows.327 After 
suspending the vulgar viewpoint, Hume proceeds to present the various possible 
sources of the belief in externality (the senses, reason or imagination) and discusses 
them one by one to determine which gives rise to the idea of the object.  
3.2.2 The Associative Genesis of the Belief in Thinghood  
In his analysis of the psychological origin of the notion of (continued and distinct) 
existence, Hume spends by far the most attention to the hypothesis that it is given 
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immediately with sensation, and is hence a product of sensibility.328 The assumption 
that a belief in continued existence is given on the level of the senses, however, is quickly 
dismissed by him as absurd, as it would imply a contradictio in terminis. After all, how can 
the belief that the thing exists independently from sensibility be itself a product of 
sensibility?329 But does this also apply to the notion of ―distinctness‖?  
The sensible presentation of thinghood as distinct existence, Hume goes on to explain, 
would imply that sensory information is received immediately as ―being distinct from 
the self‖. Hence, this hypothesis would only be a viable one, if the notion of the self is 
given at an equally primitive level of sensory experience:330 
[I]f the senses presented our impressions as external to, and independent of 
ourselves, both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise 
they cou‖d not be compar‖d by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how far we 
are ourselves the objects of our senses. 
In other words, Hume argues that the thing cannot present itself directly in a relation 
of the form “to be independent of …” or “to be external to …” if there was not already a 
self there, that it could possibly be independent of.331 In accordance with his empirical 
point of view, that prescribes that every mental content is somehow derived from 
sensibility, Hume is forced to assume that the presentation of the self to itself, would 
likewise have a sensible origin. Already at this point in his discussion, Hume stumbles 
on the problem of the subject in trying to address the problem of the object. We will 
come back to this point in section 3.3. For now, it suffices to point out that the (origin 
of) the notion of a self for Hume is at least as problematic as that of thinghood, and, 
consequently, he denies that it could provide a sufficiently stable basis for an immediate 
sensible presentation of things as distinct existences. 
As a further argument against the direct sensible presentation of things as distinct 
(external and independent) existences, Hume argues that there is no inherent difference 
between impressions generated internally and those with an external origin. With 
regard to the manner in which they appear in sensible experience: “[E]very impression, 
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external and internal, is originally on the same footing,”332 and they are all conditioned 
in a like manner by “our organs, and the disposition of our nerves.”333 Hume thus denies 
(contra Locke) that there is any inherent difference between the three classes of 
perceptions, i.e. primary (“figure, bulk, motion, and solidity”), secondary qualities of 
impressions (“colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold”), and internal impressions 
such as pain and pleasure as regards their mode of existence:334  
[C]olours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the 
same manner with motion and solidity [….]. Colours, sounds etc. are originally on 
the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds 
from a fire; […] For as they are confess to be […] nothing but perceptions arising 
from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein 
possibly can their difference consist? […] [W]e may conclude […] all perceptions 
are the same in the manner of their existence.  
In conclusion, Hume decides that “the opinion of a continu‖d and of a distinct 
existence never arises from the senses.”335  
The remaining candidates to be considered as the source of the belief are then those 
of (logical) reason and imagination. The former hypothesis, i.e. that the belief in 
thinghood in everyday life is somehow generated by reason, is refuted by Hume in one 
single paragraph. While one could argue that a philosopher would possess the 
intellectual skills needed to reason himself into the external world, Hume argues, it 
would be absurd to presume that “children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind” 
would derive their most ordinary beliefs through complex forms of logical reasoning.336 
Therefore, He concludes, the belief in external existence, is as “unreasonable” as it is 
necessary and unavoidable.337 It is not sensibility, nor reason, but imagination that “is 
seduc‖d into such an opinion.”338  
Hume‖s demonstration of the imaginative origin of the belief of thinghood starts 
from the following hypothesis:339 
Since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such, 
the notion of their distinct and continu‖d existence must arise from a concurrence 
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of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination. […] ―Twill therefore 
be easy for us to discover these qualities by a comparison of the impression, to 
which we attribute a distinct and continu‖d existence, with those, which we 
regard as internal and perishing. 
In other words, Hume hypothesizes that there is something qualitatively different 
about the manner in which impressions with an external origin succeed one another, in 
contrast to those that are internally generated. By virtue of this difference in 
appearance, essentially disparate impressions can be associatively linked in imagination 
as to give rise to the notion of a thing. In accordance with this basic hypothesis, the 
Scottish philosopher now has to find a quality (or qualities) that characterizes the 
succession of those impressions associated with external objects, and which cannot be 
found in those that are internally generated.  
Upon analysis, Hume argues, we find that impressions associated with the idea of 
thinghood, in contrast to those that are generated internally, are constant and coherent 
in their appearance. More particularly, some impressions succeed one another in a 
uniform manner, while others are prone to fluctuate under the influence of subjective 
modifications (e.g. mental state, interrupted perception, and so on). Consequently, 
imagination will bind only the uniform impressions together by means of the principle 
of constancy.340 However, this principle in itself does not suffice to give rise to the belief 
in continued existence, as there is a certain amount of variability possible. The object 
can move (change of place), its surroundings may alter, etc. Therefore, Hume adds a 
second principle, namely that of coherence, which states that impressions related to 
external objects present themselves in a coherent manner, notwithstanding their 
variability in space and time. This is illustrated as follows:341 
[W]hen I return to my chamber after an hour‖s absence, I find not my fire in the 
same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustom‖d in other instances to 
see a like alteration produc‖d in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near 
or remote.  
So the qualities of constancy and coherence of certain (groups of) impressions are 
said to give rise to the complex associative belief in continued existence. Given the 
primacy of the notion of continuity over distinctness (see section 3.2.1), this 
automatically evokes the idea of distinct existence. In conclusion, these two principles 
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and the mental mechanics of imagination by which they are united suffice to account 
for the origin of the belief in an enduring, permanent world of mind-independent 
objects.  
This is as far as the ―naturalistic‖, or positive moment in Hume‖s analysis is concerned. 
With respect to the possibility of ever rationally justifying the belief in external objects, 
Hume is less optimistic, and his psychologistic line of reason tilts into scepticism. The 
ascription of continued existence, he states, is “an error,” and he concludes his analysis 
by stating that he is more inclined to “repose no faith at all in my senses, or […] 
imagination,” and that the notion of the external is in fact nothing more than a “gross 
illusion.”342 It is indeed “a short way” from psychologism to scepticism in Humean 
philosophy: Hume‖s psychological analysis prompts him to conclude that the notion of 
the object is entirely imaginative, and hence, cannot be justified by reason.343 The notion 
of the object is nothing more than a projected figment of the subject‖s imagination; a 
subject that remains forever condemned to the confined universe of imagination, and 
cannot ―advance a step‖ beyond itself.344 Hume‖s sceptical conclusion, however, by no 
means prevents him from maintaining that the strength of vulgar beliefs is in fact 
indestructible. Hume maintains that even those who are convinced by his 
argumentation will rapidly drop all sceptical doubt and return to the vulgar opinion 
that there is an internal and an external world.345 No sceptical argument is strong 
enough to destroy ―natural‖ beliefs, he argues, and even sceptics346 
[…] will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and […] can have no other 
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and 
reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to 
satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove 
the objections, which may be raised against them. 
The sceptic in Humean philosophy thus puts himself in the rather peculiar position 
to have to accept two independent and even conflicting systems of thought: that of the 
vulgar and that of philosophy.347 
Hume‖s naturalistic psychology of the object, however, faces serious, if not fatal, 
problems, which would soon come under the scrutiny of German philosophers like Kant 
but which would likewise provide an important motive for the rise of common-sense 
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philosophy. These problems are related to Hume‖s inability to account for the active, 
unitary subject that is implied in his associationist psychology of the object. 
3.3 Hume‖s Labyrinth: The Aporetic Corners of the Science of 
Human Nature 
Before concluding this discussion of Hume‖s account of the genesis of the belief in 
externality, we return to the manner in which the problem of the notion of the external 
is entangled with the problem of the self in the Treatise. As noted, Hume dismisses the 
idea of an unmediated sensible presentation of objects as continued and distinct 
existences, since this would require, according to him, that there is a similar direct 
presentation of the self at the level of sensibility:348 
[I]f the senses presented our impressions as external to, and independent of 
ourselves, both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise 
they cou‖d not be compar‖d by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how far we 
are ourselves the objects of our senses. ―Tis certain there is no question in 
philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the 
uniting principle, which constitutes a person. […] [W]e must have recourse to the 
most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it [...]. ―Tis absurd, 
therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and 
external objects. 
Although Hume touches only briefly upon the problem of the self in the context of 
his naturalized psychology of the object, it is the central question of the section Of 
personal identity (§ I.4.iv), which is a continuation of the discussion initiated in Of the 
immateriality of the soul (§ I.4.v).349 First and foremost, the paragraph on personal identity 
aims to discredit metaphysical, substantialist views of the self, by demonstrating that 
the idea of personal identity is nothing more than an imaginative, a posteriori (and thus 
illusory) construct, just like the idea of the external existence.350 Although he refers to 
the self as a uniting principle in the above quote, it is articulated as a mental content (a 
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belief) in the discussion on personal identity. This peculiar change of perspective, from 
the self as a uniting principle to a mental content, allows Hume to subject the problem 
to the same naturalistic procedure of decomposition employed in his analysis of the 
belief in existence, as we will see below. The most interesting thing about the section on 
personal identity, however, is that Hume later considered it an utter failure, and 
famously retracted it in an Appendix added in 1740. In this appendix, Hume stated that 
he is now convinced that his naturalized account of the self is “very defective.”351 
Furthermore, he desperately added that he found himself “involv‖d in such a labyrinth,” 
neither knowing “how to correct” his former opinions, “nor how to render them 
consistent.”352 So let us take a look at the Hume‖s ―labyrinth‖, and, more importantly, at 
the way in which it relates to (and affects) his psychological account of the object.  
 
First, let us consider the motive for the peculiar shift in discourse about the self, from 
mental principle to mental content, that takes place between sections I.4.ii and I.4.iv. As 
already noted, this allows Hume to assimilate the problem of the self to that of the 
object, and approach both by means of the same procedure. Just like he had reduced the 
belief in thinghood to an imaginative compound rooted in sensible impressions, he now 
sets out to do the same with the notion of the self. The main question thus becomes:353 
[F]rom what impression cou‖d this idea [i.e. of the self] be deriv‖d? This question 
―tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet 
―tis a question, which must necessarily be anwer‖d if we wou‖d have the idea of self 
pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to 
every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our 
several impressions and ideas are suppos‖d to have a reference.  
Hume‖s methodological framework prescribed that for an idea to be valid (or ―clear 
and intelligible‖), it has to be reduced to (a combination of) impressions. So to put it 
bluntly, Hume‖s naturalistic point of departure simply cannot handle the question of the 
self qua uniting principle. Yet, he immediately adds, to search for the origin of the idea 
of the self in sensibility, begs for contradiction and absurdity, as the self is not in 
sensibility, but that to which the whole of sensibility relates. Already at this point, one 
can hardly fail to notice the seeds of Hume‖s later puzzlement in the Appendix. But let us 
first take a brief look at what the sceptic‖s naturalistic analysis of the self amounts to.  
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Of personal identity begins with a suspension of the metaphysical question concerning 
the self-in-itself, in a like manner as Hume had introduced his analysis of the object by 
putting the object-in-itself beyond the horizon of possible knowledge.354 Subsequently, 
Hume goes on to explore the psychological origin of the belief in a self as continued and 
distinct existence. As the intelligibility of the notion of the self hinges on the extent to 
which the concept can be derived from sensible experience, Hume resorts to a quasi-
observational, introspective strategy in order to pinpoint the basic sensible elements 
from which this belief might emerge. But in entering “most intimately into what I call 
myself,” the philosopher goes on to explain355  
[…] I always stumble on some particular perception or other […] I never can catch 
myself at any time […] never can observe any thing but the perception […] The 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions […] make their appearance; 
pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle […] There is properly no simplicity in it at 
one time, nor identity […].  
Here Hume arrives at what is now known as his ―bundle theory‖, which states that the 
notion of the self refers to “a heap or collection of different perceptions […] falsely […] 
endow‖d with a perfect simplicity and identity.”356 Ultimately, Hume concludes that we 
call a ―self‖ is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed 
each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement.”357 In the end, Hume‖s introspective strategy thus compels him to accept a 
notion of the self that is, as William James would later remark, the perfect opposite of 
the substantialist view of the self (as “nothing but unity, […] abstract and absolute”), i.e. 
an infinite diversity.358 In itself, Hume‖s bundle theory is a systematic implementation of 
methodological naturalism on the problem of the origin of the notion of personal 
identity. Indeed, as Singer notes, “Hume might […] have stopped at that point, 
congratulating himself on his explosion of a non-naturalistic notion of the self.”359 This 
is, however, not what happened: as already mentioned, Hume retracted his bundle 
theory a year after publishing the Treatise.  
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In the supplement to his magnum opus, the Scottish philosopher admits that he now 
finds his account of personal identity to be “very defective” as it cannot account for 
“the principle of connection” that binds perceptions together.360 Furthermore, he adds, 
“All my hopes vanish […] when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive 
perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory.”361 So not 
only does Hume retract his former theory, but simply throws in the proverbial towel. He 
concludes: “For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this 
difficulty is too hard for my understanding.”362  
In attempting to gain insight into the labyrinth Hume finds himself in, his students 
today are faced with yet another inextricable maze: the proliferation of secondary 
literature on whether Hume actually did have a problem, and if so, what it was, and 
finally, how it might possibly affect other parts of his naturalized theory of human 
nature.363 Most generally, however, it is fairly safe to say that the section on personal 
identity, combined with its later retraction, are the point where the Achilles heel of 
Hume‖s project becomes apparent.364 In the context of this dissertation, we need not 
indulge in the painstaking task of grasping all of the particular details and dimensions of 
the problem of Hume‖s retraction, as it has occupied philosophers in the last centuries. 
It suffices to gain general insight into (i) the manner in which Hume‖s methodology 
failed him in Of Personal Identity, and (ii) whether his failure affects his associationist 
psychology of the object. 
3.3.1.1 Hume‖s Quasi-Observational Strategy 
In the section on personal identity, it is no longer the philosopher himself who imposes 
his naturalistic methodology on problems of mind, but the other way around: the 
specificity of Hume‖s interrogation of the self is fully determined (and restricted) by his 
self-imposed methodological framework, which (a) makes the mere question of the self 
qua connecting or unifying principle unintelligible, and (b) consequently leads Hume to 
produce an altogether quite trivial phenomenological description of the ―theatre of 
mind‖ as a bundle of transient and disparate perceptions and experiences.365 The basic 
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premise of Hume‖s research was therefore aptly described by Chisholm as follows: if we 
can conceive of ourselves, we must do so in the same way as that “in which we perceive 
or apprehend […] external things […].”366  
In a sense, Hume was of course right to conclude that upon introspection, what one 
finds (or ―stumbles upon‖) is never a perfect identity or unity, but always the 
consciousness of something else (i.e. a flux of perceptions). But then again, it has been 
contended that he might have progressed a bit further on this matter, if only he had 
somehow noticed that the self that he “professed to be unable to find, is the one that he 
finds to be stumbling – to be stumbling onto different perceptions.”367 The problem he 
stumbled upon concerns the very trivial fact of the non-observability of the subject qua 
connecting or uniting principle, or, in Russell‖s terms, the fact that the subject of 
experience is not “empirically discoverable.”368 As Zahavi puts it, Hume was simply 
“looking […] in the wrong place.”369 However, the point is not so much that Hume was 
looking in the wrong place, but rather that he had no other option but to attempt to 
derive the self from an inward glance. It was the only place he could look for it, given 
the restrictions imposed by the empiricist prescriptions of his investigation. But if 
Hume was simply looking in the wrong place, he would have looked somewhere else in 
his Appendix, instead of giving up on the entire matter. Why then did he retract his 
theory? 
In studying Hume‖s bundle account, one is immediately struck by an apparent 
reflexivity. More particularly, Hume‖s bundle theory simply does not work without 
presupposing a bundling self.370 The methodological perplexity with regard to the 
question of the self, which the empiricist inevitably faces, was accurately described by 
the associationist philosopher Johnson:371 
All states of consciousness […] imply and postulate a subject Ego, whose substance 
is unknown and unknowable, to which states of consciousness are referred as 
attributes, but which in the process of reference becomes objectified and becomes 
itself an attribute of a subject Ego which lies still beyond, and which ever eludes 
cognition though ever postulated for cognition.  
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As Frank noted, this apparent circle “arises from the fact that, in order to grasp itself 
reflexively, the Ego must always already have been acquainted” with itself.372 Yet, this 
necessary self-reflexivity cannot be found in experience, i.e., it is not a form of object-
consciousness. The conflation between the principle of the self as a uniting principle on 
the one hand, and as a dimension of sense experience on the other, inevitably leads to 
the infinite regress and circularity:373 
The supposition that every item of self-knowledge rests on identification […] leads 
to infinite regress […]. [I] would be unable to identify an introspected self as 
myself by the fact that it is introspectively observed by me, unless I know it is the 
object of my introspection, i.e., unless I know that it is in fact me who undertakes 
the introspection. Importantly, this knowledge cannot itself be based on 
identification, on pain of infinite regress […].  
In this passage, Legrand recapitulates the basic problem with empiricist accounts (or 
perceptual models) of the self, that has also lead Frank to reject what he calls ―objectal 
accounts of the self‖ altogether.374 From this perspective, the structure of Hume‖s 
Labyrinth can be schematized as follows: 
 
(i) empiricism prescribes that for something to be intelligible, it should be 
derived from experience.  
(ii) Hence, the very idea of a mind or self, should be derived from experience, and 
must itself be considered as an associative compound (a ―bundle‖). 
(iii) The possibility of association (associability), however, hinges on subjective 
principles that challenge the account of the mind as a mere ―bundle‖. 
(iv) Hence, the bundle theory of the self is either self-refuting, or hopelessly 
circular, i.e., it presupposes the very thing to be explained.  
 
Unfortunately, Hume‖s methodological framework simply did not allow him to avoid 
this circularity, and instead, he famously plead the privilege of the sceptic. 
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3.3.1.2 Hume‖s Labyrinth: Broader Implications 
Quite a few authors have pointed to the possible detrimental effects of Hume‖s aporia 
with regard to the self on the soundness of his psychological project. As early as 1885, 
Thomas Hill Green, for example, argued that: “[T]he more strongly Hume insists that 
the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, the more 
completely does his doctrine refute itself.”375 Cassirer, in his turn, claimed that what 
Hume experienced in his labyrinth, was nothing less than “the collapse of the 
sensualistic scheme of knowledge”:376 
He [Hume] dissolves external and internal experience in connections 
[Beziehungen], but he does not have the means to understand the objective 
validity [objektive Geltung] of these connections themselves, as he has asserted 
[…] impressions as the final standard of knowledge. […] [T]he conceptual function 
by virtue of which sensations are united in a lawful unity is […] without 
justification and ground, even though we cannot even consider to give it up or 
make it redundant.  
More recently, Roth, Stroud, Waxman, Singer, Strawson and Inukai, among others, 
have likewise argued, in one way or another, that the idea of the self as a bundle 
threatened the foundation of Hume‖s associationist psychology.377 Most generally, all of 
these criticisms unfold from a central paradox in Hume‖s system, namely that his 
naturalistic framework (a) presupposes a principle of subjectivity, i.e. an active, unitary 
subject, which (b) cannot, however, be accounted for within the naturalistic framework 
itself. As Strawson aptly describes:378 
 
                                                     
375
 Hill Green (1885, p. 297-299) focuses on the circularity in Hume‖s account, due to the fact that his whole 
naturalized conception seems to be based upon the non-naturalizable, and thus non-accountable,-- mind or 
self as a principle of unity and synthesis: “Having learnt, through the discipline which Hume himself 
furnishes, that the recognition of a system of nature logically carries with it that of a self-conscious subject, in 
relation to which alone ―different perceptions‖ become a system [...] we know that we cannot naturalise the 
―human mind‖ without presupposing that which is neither nature or natural […].” 
376
 Cassirer (1922), p. 387. 
377
 While Waxman (1992, p. 234) argues that without a unifying principle Hume could not account for “the 
consciousness of perceptual succession […] presupposed for the imagination to associate perceptions,” Roth 
(2000) contends that Hume‖s bundle theory was highly problematic with regard to his theory of the object (see 
below). Stroud (2006, p. 344) in his turn argues that the principles of imagination are simply too meagre to 
account for the genesis of beliefs and thoughts, and that Hume, on account of his own methodology, can 
simply not assume that “there are such things as active, thinking human beings with experiences and 
thoughts.” As will be explained below, Inukai (2007) takes issue with the ―bundling problem‖, i.e. the problem 
that the possibility of association depends somehow upon the ordered manner in which impressions present 
themselves, prior to any associative activity.  
378
 Strawson (2011), p. 134. 
 Empiricism and the Object: From Hume to Helmholtz 
 
101 
 
Hume‖s empiricist project can‖t be completed because it fails to account for the 
mind itself. His theory is fundamentally flawed: it works explicitly with something 
that it officially holds to be unintelligible. That is the kind of thing that makes a 
person‖s hopes vanish.  
In other words, although Hume‖s methodology allows for no conception of the 
subject other than a “place […] not different from what takes place in it,” to borrow 
Deleuze‖s description, his associationist account implicitly relies on a subject that is a 
function of unity and synthesis.379 Only by means of the latter presupposition would 
Hume be able to account for (a) the principles that determine the psychological 
tendency to associate impressions into determined bundles, which furthermore (b) are 
experienced by, and refer to, an experiencing subject.380  
As Hume acknowledges, his theory needs an account of the necessary ―connecting 
principle‖ that underlies the very possibility of association.381 As such, one of the 
problems he faces pertains to the necessary foundation of associative construction, or 
associability. If there is no order whatsoever to be found in the manner in which 
impressions appear and succeed one another, it is hard to see how the associative 
principles could in and by themselves produce the belief in identity over time, without 
presupposing that they already present themselves in some kind of ordered manner. 
This is what Inukai, in a recent article, referred to as ―the bundling problem‖:382 
Hume realizes in the Appendix that he finds himself unable to explain a crucial 
psychological fact not only presupposed, but also required by his account of the 
psychological mechanism […] His account […] is in jeopardy […]. This essential 
presupposition is that perceptions initially occur as already bundled together such 
that they come as members of a particular bundle or sequence prior to the 
associating activity of imagination. 
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To understand this problem it suffices to reflect, for example, on the intelligibility of 
the notion of ―succession‖. More particularly, one cannot sensibly talk about the flux of 
sensations in terms of succession prior to any associative activity, without presupposing 
that the flux has already been constituted as, or is by in and by itself, a coherent series. 
Given that Hume vehemently denies the idea of real connections on the one hand, and 
cannot take up (non-naturalizable) functions of subjectivity in his empiricist reflection 
on the other, this remains an insurmountable problem in his theory.383 The problem at 
stake was later formulated by Kant as follows:384 
It is […] a merely empirical law in accordance with which representations that 
have often followed or accompanied one another are finally associated with each 
other and thereby placed in a connection […]. This law of reproduction, however, 
presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule, 
and that in the manifold of their representations an accompaniment or succession 
takes place according to certain rules; for without that our empirical imagination 
would never get to do anything […] and would thus remain hidden in the interior 
of the mind, like a dead […] faculty. 
The problem at stake has likewise been described in more psychologistic terms. From 
this perspective, Hume‖s ―bundling problem‖ appears as the problem of the motive for the 
psychological tendency to associate:385  
Hume believes that a succession of perceptions is related in a certain way such 
that they tend as a matter of psychological fact to be run together […]. Hume is 
worried that he cannot figure out how such perceptions might be related for this 
psychological tendency to be triggered.  
In addition to the problem of associability, or what Kant would call synthesis, however, 
Hume faced the related problem of the unity of experience. To grasp the problem at 
stake, one can start with pinpointing that his bundle theory of the self implies that the 
idea of the self, as well as that of external existence, are derived from exactly the same 
series of impressions:386  
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There is a problem within Hume‖s introspective psychology: his accounts of object 
and personal identity are fundamentally at odds. A temporary way out is to 
retract the account of personal identity […]. Hume characterized psychological 
forces in terms of association in the imagination which leads to running 
perceptions together and treating them as if they had an identity over time. Given 
such an understanding of the psychological forces at work, it is hard to see how 
one might derive from the very same succession of subjectively accessible 
perception on the one hand the idea of personal identity – a single self unified 
over time – and on the other hand a plurality of worldly objects.  
In other words, Hume‖s bundle theory gravely affects his psychology of the object, 
and even makes it unintelligible. If he retains his bundle view, object and self would 
have to be constructed within the same series, without there being any means available 
whatsoever to differentiate between the two. Hence, there would be no self, no object, 
no experience; only a chaotic universe of data with no subject to experience them. 
Hume‖s retraction, however, does not solve the problem either, but rather conceals it.387 
The question remains: how can there be experience, without a subject that somehow 
relates to itself as the one experiencing, and therefore, without a subject in a position to 
differentiate between itself as experiencing and the things experienced? Lloyd aptly 
formulates the problem as follows:388 
Even if Hume thought there were only one self in existence – although of course 
as a good sceptic he could not claim to know that – the problem which reduces 
him to dismay in the appendix would remain. His real problem lies in getting a 
workable distinction between the intellectual world […] and that other world, 
supposedly there as independent object of knowledge. […] In telling Humean 
stories of the origin of beliefs, we must presuppose […] a unifying subject, as we 
might now say. And this is what Hume cannot presuppose. […] [D]oes not the 
whole picture fall apart? […] The possibility of making connections within a 
mental world presupposes that there is already a kind of unity of consciousness. 
And it is in accounting for this unity that Hume has difficulty. 
As Patten, Lloyd, Waxman, and Strawson noted, the problem at stake was likewise 
attended to in Kant‖s first Critique. Patten even went so far as to claim that Kant‖s 
analysis of experience was at least partially meant as a direct attack on Hume‖s bundle 
theory.389 In his CPR, the Prussian philosopher famously stated that:390 
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The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at 
least would be nothing for me. […] Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary 
relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is encountered. 
In other words, Kant determines experience to be a necessary function of the self-
referential structure of the I, and, according to him, it is only by virtue of this 
transcendental principle that we could ever encounter a something that is differentiated 
from, and related to, the unity of self-consciousness. The possibility of experience itself, 
in this sense, depends on the ability of the subject to determine itself as the unitary and 
identical point to which all mental contents relate.  
 
To summarize, the questions raised by the bundle theory and Hume‖s later retraction 
of it by far exceed the framework of methodological naturalism, and indeed provide a 
compelling argument for a different treatment, or a shift in perspective, as Patten 
observed.391 In the first instance, however, (the problems of) Hume‖s science of man did 
not inspire a transcendental shift, but rather what one might call a regression to the 
―vulgar standpoint‖. To be more specific, in the wake of his philosophy, the common-
sense movement (originating in the works of Thomas Reid) arose, in an attempt to 
circumvent the apparent absurdities to which the vigorous implementation of the 
naturalistic framework with regard to the study of mind seemed to lead. For the sake of 
historical continuity, we will briefly discuss the common-sense treatment of the 
psychological problem of the object. Furthermore, this discussion provides the 
necessary rhetorical background against which to understand John Stuart Mill‖s 
nineteenth-century resurrection of the neo-Humean approach to the object, which in 
its turn signifies an important point of reference for an analysis of the empirical 
dimension in Helmholtz‖s work. 
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3.4 The Genesis of the Object: Empiricism versus Common-
Sense 
It seemed very natural to think, that the ‘Treatise of 
Human Nature’ required an author, and a very ingenious 
one too; but now we learn that it is only a set of ideas 
which came together and arranged themselves by certain 
associations and attractions. 
 
- Thomas Reid (1852 [1764]), p. 110 
Hume‖s “new scene of thought” stirred up the philosophical landscape considerably, 
and as a response to his naturalistic, sceptical program, a generation of philosophers 
stood up to defend the rights of common sense against the “melancholy gloom” of 
scepticism.392 “It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour,” Thomas Reid, the founder of 
the common-sense tradition, writes about Hume‖s Treatise, “to set out […] by promising 
[…] a complete system of the sciences upon a foundation entirely new […] when the 
intention of the whole work is to shew, that there is neither human nature nor 
science.”393 The most general characteristic of the common-sense movement is the 
undoing of Hume‖s first philosophical gesture, i.e. the bracketing or suspension of 
vulgar consciousness, and the restoration of the vulgar attitude as the first principle of 
philosophy. In the “remarkable conflict […] between the vulgar […] and […] the 
philosopher,” Reid states, “I find myself classed with the vulgar.”394 As such, common-
sense philosophy unfolded from the acceptance of the authority of the ―testimony of 
consciousness‖as the first and last reference point for philosophical reflection.395 With 
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respect to the psychological problem of the object, this methodological shift 
automatically lead to straightforward intuitionism:396 
When […] consciousness assures us that, in perception, we are immediately 
cognizant of an external and extended non-ego; […] how shall we repel the doubt? 
We can do this only in one way. […] [T]he deliverances of consciousness must be 
philosophically accepted […] [T]he testimony of consciousness must be viewed as 
high above suspicion, and its declarations entitled to demand prompt and 
unconditional assent.  
Based on the absolute authority of the testimony of consciousness, Reid concluded 
that the idea of ―thinghood‖ is an unanalyzable, immediate, and natural ingredient of 
consciousness. Subsequently, Reid employed the same strategy in accounting for the 
notion of the self, and arrived at the conclusion that the self is a primitive concept, 
“suggested by our constitution.”397 The common-sense philosopher furthermore argued 
that his intuitionist account is the only sound alternative to Hume‖s ―metaphysically 
absurd‖ assumption “that sensation and thought may be without a thinking being 
[…].”398  
Despite his rather unsophisticated refutation of Hume‖s account of the object and the 
mind, Reid is to be credited as the first to make a clear distinction between sensation 
and perception in his theorizing, with the former being defined as “something which 
can have no existence but in a sentient mind,” and the latter as that which “hath an 
object distinct from the act by which it is perceived.”399 Furthermore, he defined the 
relation of sensation to the thing perceived in terms of denotation (and not 
resemblance): sensation is to the perceived object what a sign is to a thing signified. In 
accordance with this general assumption, the perceptual process is conceived of as 
being essentially a process of signification.400  
Contrary to Hume‖s naturalized theory of belief however, Reid maintained that the 
“belief in present existence, […] is the immediate effect of […] constitution.”401 So 
although Reid accepted the difference between the act of perceiving and the thing to 
which it relates, the sensation-sign nevertheless suggests its object by virtue of what he 
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calls a ―natural kind of magic‖, and his semiotic theory, i.e. his ―theory of natural 
suggestion‖, thus amounted to a form of natural realism or presentationism: “nature 
hath established a real connection between the signs and the things signified, […] so 
that the sign suggests the thing signified, and creates the belief of it.”402 In perception, 
we pass immediately from the sign to the thing signified by virtue of the ―real 
connection‖ between sign and signification. The belief in external existence, Reid added, 
is the “effect of instinct,” an “original principle of our constitution.”403  
A quite similar approach to the problem of the object was developed by Sir William 
Hamilton, a commentator and critic, but also an undeniable disciple of Thomas Reid.404 
First and foremost, Hamilton systematized the various systems with regard to the 
relation between the internal and the external in perception. Although he may not be 
considered a figure of great importance today, he undoubtedly was one of the most 
influential thinkers of his time.405 Hamilton conceived of philosophy as quasi identical to 
philosophy of mind, and, accordingly, matters pertaining to the mental were high on his 
philosophical agenda. With regard to the problem of the origin of the object in 
perception, Hamilton put forward his theory of ―the natural duality of consciousness‖, 
which was likewise the product of a philosophizing that took the authority of the 
testimony of consciousness as its point of departure: “We must look to consciousness 
and to consciousness alone for the materials and rules of philosophy,” he writes in 
1859.406 Interestingly enough, the issue that his predecessors had formulated as the 
problem of the belief in existence or externality, is transformed by Hamilton into a 
matter of the structure of consciousness. His treatment of the problem starts from a 
phenomenological description of consciousness as a dual structure:407  
 
                                                     
402
 Reid (1852 [1764]), p. 122, 195.  
403
 Reid (1852 [1764]), p. 162, 185.  
404
 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that Hamilton, although firmly anchored in the 
empirical tradition, had also undergone a significant influence of Kant, which is revealed, for example, by his 
distinction between noumena and phenomena, which formed the foundation of his own ―theory of the 
conditioned‖, which states that “the conditionally limited […] is thus the only possible object of knowledge […]. 
To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. For as 
the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, nor […] the eagle outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats, and 
by which alone he is supported; so the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation” (Hamilton, 1861, p. 
525). Hamilton‖s attempt to reconcile Kantianism with common-sense philosophy has been criticized 
considerably, for example by Stirling (1865). Although the issue of Hamilton‖s Kantianism complicates the 
overall interpretation of his work to a great extent, it can be put aside within the scope of our discussion of his 
account of external reference, which in the first place shows his allegiance to common-sense principles.  
405 This is attested, for example, in the works of J.S. Mill (1878 [1865]), Fraser (1856), and Stirling (1865). 
406
 Hamilton (1859), p. 288.  
407
 Hamilton (1859), p. 203. 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
108 
 
[C]onsciousness […] supposes a contrast, - a discrimination; for we can be 
conscious only inasmuch as we are conscious of something. […] We are conscious 
of self only in and by its contradistinction from not-self; and are conscious of non-
self only in and by its contradistinction from self.  
This implies an interesting change in perspective: the question for Hamilton did not 
pertain as much to the origin of a mental content, but rather to the differential form of 
(perceptual) consciousness. In this formulation of the problem, the question concerning 
the genesis of a Not-I is intrinsically related to that of the self, as both are part of one 
and the same structure. However, owing to his use of the introspective method, 
Hamilton‖s theorizing was hardly able to move beyond the point of a phenomenological 
description:408 
[W]e are immediately conscious in perception of an ego and a non-ego, known 
together, and known in contrast to each other. This is the fact of the duality of 
consciousness. It is clear and manifest. When I concentrate my attention in the 
simplest act of perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible 
conviction of two facts [….]; - that I am, - and that something different from me 
exists. In this act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an 
external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in 
the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not 
precede, nor follow, the knowledge of the object, - neither determines, neither is 
determined by, the other. Such is the fact of perception revealed in consciousness 
[…].  
As Hamilton accepts the immediate testimony of consciousness as the first principle 
of philosophy, and as the proper method to determine the primitive facts of a theory of 
mind, he thus concludes from this introspective observation that409 
[…] we may […] lay it down as an undisputed truth, that consciousness gives, as an 
ultimate fact, a primitive duality; - a knowledge of the ego in relation and contrast 
to the non-ego […] The ego and non-ego are, thus given in an original synthesis. 
Hamilton‖s take on the matter likewise amounts to the assumption of the category of 
the Not-I as a primitive, unanalyzable element of (perceptual) experience.  
In conclusion, Reid‖s and Hamilton‖s theorizing attempted to counter the problems 
inherent to Hume‖s approach, by denying that the concepts of the object and the self 
can be analyzed, and by assigning an intuitive status to them instead. From the 
perspective of the historical development of empirical psychology, this temporary 
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departure from the Humean scene of thought meant somewhat of a setback. Bluntly 
put, by reinstating the authority of vulgar consciousness, common sense has eliminated 
the very motive one could have for indulging in an analysis of mental phenomena.  
Although Sir William Hamilton was one of the most eminent philosophers of his time, 
one of the reasons he soon fell into historical oblivion was the devastating attack on his 
philosophical system presented in J.S. Mill‖s 1865 An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s 
philosophy.410 Mill‖s view on the matter can be characterized most generally as a return 
to Hume‖s psychology of the object, which would set the stage for the dawn of empirical 
psychology in the nineteenth century and inspired Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object 
considerably. 
3.5 John Stuart Mill‖s Return to Hume‖s Perspective 
In his voluminous An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865), John Stuart 
Mill refuted Hamilton‖s intuitionist theory of consciousness (chapter X), outlined his 
own psychological theory of the object (chapter XI), and that of the self or Ego (chapter 
XII). The stakes of this polemic pertained especially to the appropriate method to be 
used when studying the mind, so as to enable the philosophy of mind to progress from 
the level of mere speculation and description to that of an analytical science, properly 
so called. With the discussion of Mill‖s work, we are thus engaging in what can be 
considered a prologue to the rise of psychology as an autonomous science, which is 
commonly said to have been officially inaugurated with the instauration of Wilhelm 
Wundt‖s Psychological Institute in Leipzig in 1879.411  
Mill‖s discussion of what he considered to be one of the most central questions of the 
philosophy of consciousness, i.e. the “distinction between myself – the Ego – and a 
world […] external to me,” is an instance of his more general attempt to articulate a 
program for a science of man, for which he had laid the foundation in the sixth book of 
his A System of Logic (1843), entitled On the logic of Moral Sciences.412 Soon after Jacob 
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Schiel‖s 1849 translation of this work appeared in Germany, it had an enormous 
influence.413 The general outline of Mill‖s Logic suggested a view on scientific 
methodology and reasoning that fundamentally departed from the so-called a priori 
view of human knowledge. Instead, it proposed a methodology for the natural sciences 
based on experimentation and experience, founded in the inductive method. It is 
important to specify that Mill‖s conception of ―the a priori school‖ is very (even 
excessively) broad, and denotes not only German idealism, but likewise all forms of 
nativism and intuitionism with regard to mental contents. From this perspective, Mill 
puts Hamilton‖s intuitionism on a par not only with Reid, but also with Kant, stating that 
“the test by which they all decide a belief to be a part of our primitive consciousness – 
an original intuition of the mind – is the necessity of thinking it.”414  
Mill‖s Logic – “not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence415” – soon 
found an audience among German scientists and philosophers, who were trying to get 
out from under the grip of metaphysical speculation (see chapters 1 and 2). Correlative 
with the gradual crumbling of the hegemony of absolute idealism, inductive empiricism 
became increasingly dominant, not in the least with respect to the study of mental 
phenomena.416 From his Treatise, it is clear that Helmholtz had read and appreciated 
Mill‖s Logic, and based certain elements of his own theory on Mill‖s account of induction 
(see section 3.6).417 Moreover, one cannot fail to notice a programmatic similarity 
between Helmholtz‖s project of a psychology of perception and Mill‖s (neo-Humean) 
general plea for the a posteriori method of philosophical reasoning.418  
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In the sixth volume of A System of Logic, Mill set out to show that “There is, or may be 
a science of human nature,” a science, that is, which takes the physical sciences as its 
example as far as its method is concerned.419 Similar to Hume‖s Newtonian-inspired 
analysis, Mill‖s conception of the science of man envisioned (i) a genetic study of mental 
phenomena (as distinguished from metaphysical speculation on the nature of the mind-
in-itself)420, which (ii) takes as its point of departure invariable laws that “have been 
ascertained by the ordinary methods of experimental inquiry,” i.e. the laws of 
association, and (iii) is to be distinguished not only from metaphysics, but likewise from 
physicalist approaches to the mind or ―biologized psychology‖. 421 Consequently, Mill‖s 
defense of methodological naturalism goes hand in hand with a firm rejection of 
ontological reductionism. Mill argued for the autonomy of the psychological level of 
analysis, and consequently rejected the hypothesis of mental phenomena as “generated 
through the intervention of material mechanisms.”422 As such, Mill‖s science of man was 
rightfully credited by Albert Lange as an attempt to “assert the rights of psychology,” 
“against the strictly materialistic view.”423 Mill‖s non-reductionist stance is illustrated 
for example by the following passage taken from his A System of Logic:424 
Whether […] mental states are […] dependent on physical conditions, is one of the 
vexatae questiones in the science of human nature. […] Many eminent 
physiologists hold the affirmative. These contend […] that some particular state of 
our nervous system, […] in particular […] the brain, invariably precedes, and is 
presupposed by, every state of our consciousness. According to this theory, one 
state of mind is never really produced by another: all are produced by states of the 
body. […] [T]hat every mental state has a nervous state for its immediate 
antecedent and proximate cause, […] can not […] be said to be proved, […] and 
even were it certain, yet everyone must admit that we are wholly ignorant of the 
characteristics of these nervous states […] [T]he successions therefore, which 
obtain among mental phenomena, do not admit of being deduced from the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
his Treatise. Human science too is concerned with establishing similarities, regularities, and conformities to 
law,” as Gadamer (2006 [1975], p. 3) noted.  
419
 Mill (1882 [1843]), p. 586. 
420
 Mill (1878 [1865], p. 14) dismissed the mind-in-itself as an “unknown something” and “a supposition 
without evidence.” 
421
 Mill (1882 [1843]), p. 592. Mill referred to the laws as they are articulated in the works of Hume, his father 
James Mill, and Alexander Bain, and seemed to have in mind especially the laws of contiguity and 
resemblance. Also see Robinson (1986). 
422
 Mill (1882 [1843]), p. 590. 
423
 Lange (1881), p. 189. 
424
 Mill (1882 [1843]), p. 590-591. 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
112 
 
physiological laws of our nervous organization. […] [T]herefore […] there is a 
distinct and separate Science of Mind.  
Mill‖s criticism of ontological reductionism in psychology is of utmost importance, as 
it is only by taking Mill‖s anti-materialist stance into account that one can make sense of 
his pivotal role in the development of psychology as an empirical science.  
As suggested by the title of this section, Mill‖s work can be considered as a neo-
Humean defense of empiricism or methodological naturalism, against what Snyder 
called the “looming danger” of intuitionism.425 Indeed, Mill seemed to be engaged in “a 
Manichean struggle between two schools of thought […].”426 As the author of A System of 
Logic described it himself, with regard to questions pertaining to the mind, he found 
himself to be entering into the “arena of initial conflict” between “the two modes of 
philosophizing”:427  
[T]he a priori philosophers cataloguing some things as facts, which the others 
contend are inferences. The fundamental difference relates, however, not to the 
facts themselves, but to their origin. […] [T]he one theory considers the more 
complex phenomena of the mind to be products of experience, the other believes 
them to be original. 
Consequently, Mill defined the task of a science of man as the description of “the 
uniformities of succession, the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which 
one mental state succeeds another; is caused by, or at least, is caused to follow, 
another.”428 In what follows, the particulars of Mill‖s project for an empirical psychology 
will be made more tangible through a systematic sketch of his psychology of the object, 
as presented in his Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World, i.e. chapter XI of 
his Investigation.429  
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3.5.1 Mill‖s psychological theory of the belief in the external world 
In examining Mill‖s criticism of Hamilton‖s theory of the natural duality of 
consciousness, one can hardly fail to notice its similarity to the rhetorical strategies 
used by Helmholtz to refute nativism (see chapter 2). To be more precise, Mill‖s criticism 
unfolds from three major objections, namely (i) the rejection of the introspective 
method as an adequate means of determining the primitive facts of consciousness, (ii) 
the metaphysical audacity of intuitionism, and (iii) the redundancy of the intuitionist 
hypothesis with regard to the genesis of the object in consciousness.  
3.5.1.1 The Inadequacy of the Introspective Method 
The most important argument Mill raised against intuitionism is that “we do not 
know by intuition what […] is intuitive.”430 In itself, Mill argued, the introspectively 
established fact that the form of perceptual consciousness is fundamentally dual is quite 
obvious superfluous, and therefore “admitted […] without appeal.”431 On the other hand, 
however, Mill contended that the introspective immediacy of the differentiated nature 
of consciousness does not warrant Hamilton‖s intuitionist conclusion. More particularly, 
the intuition of an original duality does not at all exclude the possibility that the notion 
of a Not-I actually has a formative history in the mind. Even if no one is ever able to find 
anything in consciousness prior to the belief in the object, this still does not exclude 
that the belief could be experienced as if it were primitive, but is actually acquired 
through ―strong association‖.432 Therefore, introspection cannot be considered to be a 
reliable method to distinguish between those elements of consciousness that are 
primitively given, and those that are acquired through learning and experience.433  
3.5.1.2 The Metaphysical Audacity of Intuitionism 
Referring to his broad category of a priori philosophers, Mill furthermore argued that 
those who take certain mental phenomena to be simple and immediate do so “not as 
psychologists, but as ontologists”:434 
[T]he crowning peculiarity of each [i.e. the a priori and the a posteriori school] 
resides in the superstructure. That the constitution of the mind is the key to the 
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constitution of external nature—that the laws of the human intellect have a 
necessary correspondence with the objective laws of the universe […] —is the 
grand doctrine which the one school affirms and the other denies […]. But this 
question is beyond the compass of psychology. The à priori philosophers, when 
they inculcate this doctrine, do so not as psychologists, but as ontologists. 
In other words, irrespective of the methodology used, the assumption of the object as 
a primitive, unanalyzable element of consciousness relies on the metaphysical 
assumption of a pre-representational similarity, or original correspondence, between 
subject and object. Only by virtue of a Leibnizian assumption of pre-established 
harmony, can one assume that the Not-I is present on the level of the self without 
further mediation.435 
3.5.1.3 The Redundancy of the Intuitionist Hypothesis 
A final argument which Mill appealed to in his refutation of intuitionism is the 
principle of parsimony, which is supposed to prevent the proliferation of hypotheses 
such as Reid‖s ―mental magic‖ in the theory of mind. The intuitionist hypothesis, Mill 
contended, is utterly redundant:436 
The first of the laws laid down […] for the interpretation of Consciousness, the law 
[…] of Parsimony, forbids to suppose an original principle of our nature in order to 
account for phaenomena which admit of possible explanation from known causes. 
If the supposed ingredient of consciousness be one which might grow up […] and 
if, when it had so grown up, it would, by known laws of our nature, appear as 
completely intuitive […]; we are bound […] to assign to it that origin.  
Hence, Mill based his account solely on the known laws of thought, and considered 
this explanation to be preferred as the more parsimonious explanation.437 
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After this refutation of the intuitionist theory, Mill proceeded to outline his own 
psychological account, that set out to show that438 
[…] there are associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of 
our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensation, which, supposing no 
intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness, would inevitably 
generate the belief, and would cause it to be regarded as an intuition. 
Only two general presuppositions are needed, according to Mill, in order for the 
empirical approach to the belief in externality to work, namely (1) the presumption that 
“the human mind is capable of expectation,” i.e. that it can conceive of future 
possibilities, and (2) the laws of association.439 Starting from these two postulates, Mill 
argued that it is theoretically possible to prove that the idea of the object is a 
psychological construct, produced through the association of sensations.440 More 
specifically, he hypothesized that the notion of the object as an independent existence in 
perception, arises from the recognition of a difference between present and possible 
sensations:441 
I see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another room. […] [T]hough I have 
ceased to see it, I am persuaded that the paper is still there. I no longer have the 
sensations which it gave me; but I believe that when I again place myself in the 
circumstances in which I had those sensations, that is, when I go again into the 
room, I shall again have them; and further, that there has been no intervening 
moment at which this would not have been the case. […] The conception I form of 
the world existing at any moment, comprises, along with the sensation I am 
feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation. 
In other words, if we state that consciousness contains a belief in the Not-I, this 
means that apart from the flow of actual sensations, we recognize the permanent 
possibility of sensation as a conditional certainty.442 From the totality of the disparate 
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sensations, certain aggregates are gradually set apart (i.e. those pertaining to external 
objects), as permanent possibilities of sensation, thus giving rise to the notion of 
perdurability and “the general notion of difference”:443 
[W]e believe that we perceive a something closely related to all our sensations, but 
different from those which we are feeling at any particular minute; and 
distinguished from sensations altogether, by being permanent and always the 
same. 
To account for the intuitive nature with which the belief in a Not-I emerges in 
consciousness, Mill introduced the principle of obliviscence, which postulates that the 
associative chain from which the idea of an object is generated, tends to “drop out of 
consciousness […].”444 By virtue of this principle, “we see, and cannot help seeing, what 
we have learned to infer.”445 In conclusion, Mill summarized his theory as follows446:  
[T]he very idea of anything out of ourselves is derived solely from the knowledge 
experience gives us of the Permanent Possibilities. Our sensations we carry with 
us wherever we go, and they never exist where we are not; but when we change 
our place we do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: 
they remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions with which our 
presence in general has nothing to do. 
In short, the notion of the object, according to Mill, is identified with the permanent 
possibility of sensation, as derived from the unconscious association of sensations. Mill‖s 
psychological theory of the belief in externality thus resonates with Hume‖s in 
important respects: the experience of thinghood is equated with having a belief, which 
is in turn claimed to have been constructed through associative processes. However, in 
resurrecting a Humean-inspired strict methodological naturalism, Mill also brings back 
to life Hume‖s labyrinth.  
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3.5.2 Back into the Labyrinth: Mill and the Self 
One striking feature of Mill‖s Examination – which, much to my surprise, has received 
almost no attention in secondary literature – is the way in which it reproduces Hume‖s 
Labyrinth. As Alan Ryan notes:447 
Mill‖s philosophy required an active mind which would construct an external 
world out of sensations, and order it according to rationally organized theories; 
and yet he had no way of accounting for the existence of such an active 
intelligence. If the external world was to be constructed out of experience by a self 
which tried out inductive hypotheses about the course of its experience, then this 
presupposed a unitary self to do the experiencing, and to make inferences.  
In other words, Mill‖s theory of the belief in externality as the Permanent Possibility 
of Sensation once again leads us to consider the failure of the strict methodological 
naturalistic approach to account for synthesis and unity. 
The question of the self is addressed in a surprisingly short and quite puzzling 
chapter of Mill‖s Investigation, entitled The psychological Theory of the belief in matter, how 
far applicable to mind, which starts out with the question “whether, at the first moment of 
our experience, we already have in our consciousness the conception of Self as a 
permanent existence; or whether it is formed subsequently, and admits of a similar 
analysis.”448 Like Hume in his chapter on Personal Identity, Mill formulates the problem at 
stake as pertaining to the origin of a belief, and more in particular, as the belief in a 
mind as a continued and distinct existence, thereby transforming the problem of the 
ground of the unity of experience into an empirical question pertaining to the 
construction of a mental content.449  
Mill‖s reasoning has the following buildup: if the belief in matter allows for an 
analysis in terms of the permanent possibility of sensation, then the mind can be 
equated with something like a permanent possibility of feeling, i.e. the imaginative 
compound of the flux of feelings presently experienced, and those to be experienced in 
the future. However, as Mill correctly observes, this would be an entirely circular 
account, as the very idea of permanent possibilities is grounded in the capability of 
expectation, and as such, the theory would presuppose the very thing it aims to 
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demonstrate. More specifically, Mill admits that the self would then have to be 
something like “a series of feeling, [….] aware of itself as a series,” which is a circular 
definition, and therefore inadmissible.450 Just as the case was with Hume, Mill‖s 
methodological framework thus forces him to produce a circular account, described by 
Alan Ryan as follows: “any attempt to construct a Self out of the series of such 
sensations is circular, because knowing which sensations to count presupposes that 
they belong to my Self already.”451 The only difference with Hume is that Mill gives up 
on the matter more quickly than did the Scottish sceptic . After pondering a bit more on 
the topic, he concludes that the self does not allow for psychological analysis, and 
admits:452  
The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability […] [O]ne 
mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another […] I think, 
by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any 
theory of how it takes place. 
The feeling of déjà vu grows even stronger when we consider the Appendix added in 
the 1878 version of the Examination, in which Mill acknowledges that “in so far as 
reference to an Ego is implied in Expectation, I do postulate an Ego.”453 At this point Mill 
seems to grant that the very ability to anticipate (which is implied in the concept of 
Expectation) presupposes a subject that is somehow aware of itself as a unity in time, 
referring past and future experiences to itself, while maintaining its numerical identity. 
The Ego, he states in the Appendix, is “the inexplicable tie, or law […] which connects the 
present consciousness with the past one […],” which “is as real as the sensations 
themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of thought.”454 Strikingly enough, 
however, he maintains that he can affirm the self as “the series of its feelings or 
consciousness […] but beyond this, we can affirm nothing of it.”455  
So on the one hand, the psychological method allows for nothing but a self as a 
bundle or a series, while on the other, Mill‖s psychological theory of the object proceeds 
from the inexplicable postulate of the subject as a uniting principle that grounds the 
very possibility of association. In his attempts to account for this Ego, however, Mill is 
driven to the same aporetic corners of his naturalistic strategy that once had lead Hume 
to plea the privilege of the sceptic. As Mill only allows for knowledge that is given by, or 
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inferred from sensible information, in his own terms he is simply unable to account for 
the subject as the connecting principle that makes experience possible in the first place.  
It did not take long for Mill‖s (lack of a) theory of the Ego to be criticized. Not 
surprisingly, those criticisms developed roughly along the same lines as the ones 
expressed regarding Hume‖s problem, i.e. the problem of synthesis and unity. The 
British idealist F.H. Bradley, for example, expressed his discomfort over the fact that 
Mill simply pushed the problem of the Ego aside as an ―inexplicable fact‖, as if thereby 
“he got rid of its existence.”456 William James even considered Mill‖s work to be 
symptomatic for “the definitive bankruptcy of the associationist description of the 
consciousness of self.”457 Just like Hume‖s, Mill‖s account, or attempted account, can be 
considered symptomatic for what James diagnosed as the “lurking bad conscience about 
the self” and the shyness “about openly tackling the problem of how it [the Self] comes 
to be aware of itself.”458 Alan Ryan even expressed his puzzlement over the fact that Mill 
did not seem to realize “the extent to which this admission was a disaster for his whole 
philosophical system,” as “the metaphysics to which Mill was committed had a 
contradiction at its heart.”459 Andy Hamilton was one of the few writers to connect Mill‖s 
―final inexplicability‖ to Hume‖s labyrinth, in writing that the former‖s perplexity with 
regard to the problem of the Ego460 
[…] echoes Hume‖s confession of failure in his own Appendix to the Treatise, even 
if the tone appears unduly complacent rather than troubled. […] Both writers, 
perhaps, suspect that a yawing chasm is opening up around their philosophical 
viewpoint, and would prefer not to peer into it. 
Hamilton noted that Mill‖s attempt to reestablish methodological naturalism as the 
only legitimate framework for the study of the object, is a replication of Hume‖s 
labyrinth, which, for the purposes of this dissertation is a highly significant observation. 
It provides us with a motive for a shift towards the transcendental level of analysis, and 
as such, allows one to grasp the systematic nature of Helmholtz‖s empirico-
transcendentalism, or his so-called dovetailing between empiricism and transcendental 
philosophy. Before diving into Helmholtz‖s strategy to avoid the problems of strict 
methodological naturalism, however, the continuity of his psychology of the object with 
those presented by Hume and Mill will be addressed.  
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3.6 Helmholtz‖s Empiricism 
In considering Helmholtz‖s theory of perception, it soon becomes clear that it resonates 
in important ways with the psychological accounts of the object as presented by Hume 
and Mill, at least insofar as Helmholtz conceives of the perceptual process as an a 
posteriori constructive mental process that is founded in previous experience. Based on 
this observation, Boring, for example, has argued that there is sufficient evidence to 
claim that “he [Helmholtz] belongs […] systematically more with British thought than 
with German, in the tradition of John Locke down to the Mills […]” and that Helmholtz‖s 
theory resonates in important respects with Mill‖s psychological theory of the belief in 
the external world.461 Hochberg likewise assimilates Helmholtz‖s psychology of the 
object entirely to Mill‖s approach by discussing it as the ―Helmholtz-Mill‖ theories of 
perception.462 Finally, Meulders, in his turn, considers Helmholtz to be a “remote 
disciple of the English empirical school.”463 As will be argued in the next section, there 
are indeed compelling arguments to read Helmholtz‖s work on perception against the 
background of British and Scottish empiricism. It should be noted, however, that despite 
the textual evidence in support of Helmholtz‖s indebtedness to Mill, Helmholtz was 
defiant of Hume‖s scepticism, or his “complete negation of the possibility of objective 
knowledge.”464 Notwithstanding his rejection of the Scottish philosopher‖s sceptic 
outlook, however, Helmholtz‖s work certainly bears the traces of the naturalized 
approach to the mind, and therefore can be read as an intellectual heir of Hume‖s 
program for a science of man, as suggested by Hatfield, among others (see section 3.1).  
3.6.1 The Object and Psychological Construction  
Most generally, Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object can be interpreted as a 
continuation of the empiricist tradition, insofar as he (i) conceives of the perceptual 
object as a complex – as opposed to a simple, intuitive, unanalyzable – mental 
phenomenon, which can hence be (ii) decomposed into more basic elements (sign-
sensations) and (iii) reconstructed according to general mental laws.465 Based on his 
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physiological epistemology (see chapter 2), Helmholtz argues that perceptions, defined 
as “representations of the existence, form and position of external objects”, are mental 
acts, and that it is the task of psychology to investigate the nature and structure of the 
psychological activity involved in the transition of the sign-sensation and their 
meaning-objects, and to determine its laws.466 To this end, Helmholtz somewhat 
reluctantly adds, we cannot rely on “a method founded in generally accepted and clear 
principles,” but have to resort mainly to self-observation.467 Nevertheless, in 
combination with physical and physiological research on the sensory apparatus, this 
method should enable the formulation of general laws governing the perceptual process 
that transcend individual differences and aberrations.  
As already explained in the previous chapter, Helmholtz mainly uses the term 
―empiricism‖ to differentiate his psychological account from physiological reductionism 
or nativism, and consequently conceives of the perceptual process as an a posteriori 
constructive activity, based on previous experience.468 In defending his approach, a 
certain programmatic similarity to the rhetorical strategies used by Mill to refute 
intuitionism and nativism cannot be denied: both defend the psychological method as 
having greater explanatory power, being more parsimonious, and free from 
metaphysical presuppositions (see chapter 2). Moreover, the details of Helmholtz‖s 
account resonate in important respects with Mill‖s theory of the genesis of the belief in 
external existence in terms of permanent possibilities of sensation.469  
“To see,” Helmholtz states in 1855, is “to understand sensation.”470 Accordingly, the 
task of psychology can be reformulated as an attempt to grasp the general nature and 
structure of perceptual understanding. To explain the general rationale underlying his 
empirical theory of perceptual understanding, Helmholtz frequently invokes the 
example of language acquisition and comprehension as an analogon to the perceptual 
process:471 
An instructive example is the comprehension of our native language. This 
knowledge is not inborn; […] we have acquired our mother tongue by learning, 
that is, by usage through frequently repeated experience. […] The child hears the 
usual name of an object pronounced again and again when it is shown or given to 
him, and constantly hears the same change in the visible environment described 
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with the same word. Thus the word becomes attached to the thing in his memory 
[…] [A]t the beginning we still remember the individual cases where we have 
heard it used. Later […] we are no longer able to recount under what particular 
circumstances we came to this knowledge […]. 
In the same manner, Helmholtz states, sensations are “signs which we have learned 
to decipher” through experience.472 More particularly, we learn to interpret sensation-
signs through the repeated experience of a lawlike covariation between voluntary 
movement and the coming into being of certain sensations:473 
Let us call the entire group of aggregate sensations induced […] by a certain 
definite and finite group of the will‖s impulses the ―current presentables‖; by 
contrast, let us call ―present‖ the aggregate of sensations from this group which is 
just coming to perception. Our observer […] can make each individual presentable 
present to himself at any moment through execution of the relevant movement. 
In this way it seems to him that each individual from this group of presentables 
exists at each moment during this period of time. […] Thus the idea of a 
simultaneous and continuous existence of different things alongside one another 
will be achieved. 
In somewhat less abstract terms, Helmholtz explains the basic dynamics underlying 
the perceptual process as hypothesized by his empirical theory as follows:474 
We become acquainted with their [i.e. the sensations] meaning by comparing 
them with the result of our own movements, with the changes which we thus 
produce in the outer world. […] [T]he child learns to recognize the different views 
which the same object can afford, in connection with the movement he is 
constantly giving it […]. When we have obtained an accurate conception of the 
form of any object, we are then able to imagine what appearance it would present, 
if we looked at it from some other point of view.  
In other words, the notion of the object emerges from the experience of a constant, 
lawlike relation in the succession of sensible qualities, discovered through voluntary 
movement and active experimentation. Subsequently, the knowledge of lawlikeness 
gives rise to the hypothesis of a continuous and independent existence as the cause of 
sensible variation.475 To understand sensation, for Helmholtz, is thus the same as to 
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determine the uniform law that regulates the succession of sensible events.476 In the 
end, to represent an object, according to this theory, comes down to the acquired ability 
to imagine “the whole series of sensible impressions that would be had in such a 
case.”477 The most general rule underlying the perceptual process, Helmholtz therefore 
specifies, is that “such objects are always imagined as being present […] as would have 
to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism […].”478 
Not unlike Mill, in Helmholtz‖s theorizing the notion of the object is the associative 
compound of possible sensations, or a generative hypothesis pertaining to expected 
contingencies, that is projected onto the visual field and as such, gives rise to the 
experience of a world out there.  
This, in short, is the basis of Helmholtz‖s theory of perception as unconscious 
inference, or his ―projection theory‖ of perception: it is the unconscious application of a 
general law (the major premise) to a particular sensible event.479 In accordance with 
Helmholtz‖s empirical outlook, the major premise in this unconscious inferential 
process must be further specified as a law of experience [Erfahrungssatz] that pertains 
to acquired knowledge about the covariation between voluntary movement and the 
coming into being of certain sensations, or, in short, an acquired idea of an object 
(conceived of as a generative hypothesis).480 Consequently, Helmholtz writes:481 
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Hence we see how memory images from previous experiences cooperate with 
present sensations, in order to produce a perceptual image, that imposes itself […] 
with such force, without our being conscious of how much of it was produced 
through memory, and what was given in present perception. 
Perceptual judgments, according to Helmholtz, can be treated as being similar in result 
to conscious forms of inductive reasoning, although we can never be sure that the 
underlying processes are entirely identical, due to their non-observable nature.482 
Scientific as well as perceptual understanding – which Helmholtz denotes respectively 
as discursive Wissen [knowledge] and non-discursive Kennen [cognizance or familiarity] – 
both involve the determination of a sensible manifold based on previous experience, but 
whereas the former proceeds according to the objective, logical principles of thought, 
the second unfolds in the opaqueness of the unconscious, and can therefore only be 
hypothesized to have a quasi-logical structure.483 Furthermore, in contrast to logical 
forms of reasoning, unconscious inductions take place “without reflection, without 
mental effort from the moment that a sensation affects us.”484 The finality of both 
scientific and perceptual understanding, however, is the subsumption under an 
acquired notion of lawlikeness:485  
To find the law by which they are regulated is to understand [begreifen] 
phenomena. For law is nothing more than the general conception [begriff] in 
which a series of similarly recurring natural processes may be embraced. 
Helmholtz summarizes his psychological theory as follows:486 
[W]e can never emerge from the world of our sensations to the apperception of an 
external world, except by inferring from the changing sensation that external 
objects are the causes of this change. Once the idea of external objects has been 
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formed, we may not be concerned any more as to how we got this idea, especially 
because the inference appears to be so self-evident that we are not conscious of its 
being a new result. 
“This,” Helmholtz concludes, “is the solution to the riddle of how it is possible to see”:487 
The correspondence […] between the external world and the Perception of Sight 
rests, […] upon the same foundation as all our knowledge of the actual world – on 
experience, and on constant verification of its accuracy by experiments which we 
perform with every movement of our body […].  
Helmholtz‖s treatment of the perceptual process as an inductive judgment implies 
that it is essentially fallible. Illusions, in Helmholtz‖s thought, are essentially wrong 
applications of unconscious Kennen (the major premise in unconscious inductions). In 
other words, illusory experience can be ascribed to a flawed inductive judgment, in 
which sensation-signs are tied together inadequately on the basis of expected 
lawlikeness, that is consequently projected onto the visual field:488 
The explanation of the possibility of illusions lies in the fact that we transfer the 
notions of external objects, which would be correct under normal conditions, to 
[…] unusual circumstances […]. The simple rule for all illusions of sight is this: we 
always believe that we see such objects as would, under conditions of normal 
vision, produce the retinal image of which we are actually conscious.  
In other words, the underlying dynamics of subnormal perception are identical to 
those of normal (veridical) perception; illusory experience is not due to a deviance in 
the perceptual process itself, but should be ascribed to a misapplication of a normal 
mode of perceptual interpretation. At this point, the parsimonious nature of 
Helmholtz‖s theorizing becomes especially clear: the psychological dynamics underlying 
perception and illusion are one and the same.  
More importantly, however, the inductive nature of the perceptual process has 
serious repercussions on Helmholtz‖s notion of truth or objectivity. More in particular, 
what we consider to be objective (in perception as well as in science), according to him, 
is but a fallible inductive hypothesis based on previous experience, and hence, only has 
practical (as opposed to absolute) value.489 Helmholtz‖s empirical theory thus leads him 
directly to a pragmatic notion of truth. As a consequence of his empirical theory, he 
writes, “it follows, […] that we are only warranted in accepting the reality of this 
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correspondence [between perception and the external world], […] for practical 
purposes.”490 Elsewhere, Helmholtz states that “we call our representations of the 
external world true, when they inform us sufficiently about the consequences of our 
actions […] and allow us to draw right conclusions about the changes to expect.”491 As 
such, Helmholtz‖s semiotic understanding of the subject-object relation amounts to an 
epistemology in which the concept of objectivity is to be understood as an infinite and 
fundamentally incomplete process of interpretation or objectification.  
In conclusion, if we restrict ourselves to the empirical level of analysis, Helmholtz 
combines all of the elements of the empiricist methodological naturalistic project with 
regard to the mind, and especially resonates with Mill‖s theorizing. Helmholtz 
acknowledges he was in fact inspired by Mill – who according to him “gave the best 
explanation” of the nature of inductive conclusions [Inductiven Schlüsse]492 – in his 
formalization of the inductive process underlying perception. More importantly, 
however, Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object comes quite close to Mill‖s theory of the 
belief in externality as the permanent possibility of sensation, as Boring (1950) and 
Hochberg (2007) note: to ―see‖ an object means to have the conditional certainty, based 
on experience, that under a certain set of conditions, certain sensations can be made 
present.493 Finally, Helmholtz‖s theory contains a further elaboration of Mill‖s principle 
of obliviscence, in hypothesizing that the apparent intuitive and unmediated character 
of the phenomenal can be ascribed to the unconscious nature of its formative history in 
the mind.  
In contrast to Hume and Mill, however, and contrary to Boring‖s argumentation, 
Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object exceeds the framework of methodological 
naturalism by far, and as such, is not condemned to its aporetic corners with regard to 
the questions of synthesis and unity in experience.  
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3.6.2 Overcoming the Labyrinth: Helmholtz‖s Intellectual Leap 
At least two major programmatic differences can be pointed out between the third part 
of Helmholtz‖s physiological inquiry of perception, and Mill‖s psychological endeavor, 
namely (i) that the former, in contrast to the latter, acknowledges that there is a generic 
difference between the Geisteswissenschaften and the natural sciences, and (ii) their 
respective attitudes towards German idealism in general, and towards Kant‖s philosophy 
project in particular. Through a brief discussion of these crucial differences, we will 
clear the way for a consideration of other levels of analysis in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, 
which transcend his methodological naturalism, and, as such, create the opportunity to 
overcome the inextricable difficulties associated with the pure empiricist psychology of 
the object.  
3.6.2.1 Helmholtz and the Specificity of the Geisteswissenschaften 
There has been considerable disagreement over whether Helmholtz is on a par with Mill 
in his conception of the relation between the natural sciences and the 
Geisteswissenschaften. In contrast to Hatfield, for example, Gadamer claimed that 
Helmholtz‖s methodological assimilation of the science of mind and natural science had 
no restrictions.494 Helmholtz does make some rather trivial statements about the 
―generic difference‖ between the natural sciences on the one hand, and the science of 
mind on the other, e.g. that the former, in contrast to the latter, deals with “richer 
material,” and that its object (the mind and its processes) poses some serious 
methodological problems. In themselves, however, these remarks do not prevent a view 
of psychology as a science whose limits are determined by the limits of naturalistic 
explanation, leaving the remainder up to philosophical speculation. Consequently, these 
comments do not allow for a conclusive answer to the question concerning the extent of 
Helmholtz‖s assimilation of both fields of inquiry.  
There is however, one significant element in Helmholtz‖s theorizing that implies a 
denial of the possibility of a complete reduction of the Geisteswissenschaften to 
naturalistic modes of explanation, i.e. Helmholtz‖s assumption that mental processes, in 
contrast to natural entities and events, are not (entirely) subject to deterministic, 
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mechanical causality. To be precise, Helmholtz‖s theory of perception proceeds from the 
“essential assumption” that the “will‖s impulse has neither already been influenced by 
physical causes, which simultaneously determine the physical process, nor itself 
psychically influenced the succeeding perceptions.”495 So, while Helmholtz, to some 
degree, modeled his approach to the perceptual process on the modes of explanation 
associated with the natural sciences, at the same time he maintained that “in ascribing 
to ourselves free-will […] we deny in toto the possibility of referring at least one of the 
ways in which our mental activity expresses itself to a rigorous law.”496 Contrary to Mill, 
whose Science of Man was founded on the doctrine of philosophical necessity, stating 
that “the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other 
phenomena,” Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object hinges on the assumption of an 
unconditioned, autonomous impulse of the will as a constitutive element of the 
perceptual process.497  
With this shift from the constructive factors of experience to constitutive elements – 
or from natural to normative analysis – Helmholtz oversteps the strict empiricist 
framework, and his thought begins to resonate with the transcendental tradition. This 
―transgression‖, so to speak, was less problematic for Helmholtz than it was for Mill, as 
the former never juxtaposed the a posteriori school of philosophy with transcendental 
philosophy, but instead conceived of both as being complementary to some degree. As 
such, his account left room for philosophical reflection on the subjective functions that 
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are to be presupposed at the basis of the empirical construction of reality in perception. 
This brings us to the second programmatic difference between Helmholtz and Mill.  
3.6.2.2 Helmholtz and the German idealist tradition 
The rhetorical strategies used by Helmholtz to argue for the superiority of the 
empiricist account over nativism bear a strong programmatic similarity with the 
polemical structure of Mill‖s defense of empirical psychology against the a priori school 
of philosophy, but there is a major difference between both authors with respect to 
their attitude towards German critical philosophy. More particularly, whereas the 
English empiricist defined his approach in opposition to critical philosophy, this was 
never the case with Helmholtz.498 Quite the contrary. As is clear from his 1892 lecture, 
Helmholtz did not so much intend to refute the critical system, but rather to rethink it, 
by redrawing the border between the a priori and the a posteriori, or the formal and 
material aspects of experience:499 
[T]he physiological investigation of the sense organs and their activity […] agree 
with Kant; indeed, already in the physiological field there are the clearest 
analogies to Kant‖s transcendental aesthetic. However, an objection […] had to be 
raised against the borderline that Kant had drawn between the facts of experience 
and the forms of intuition given a priori. And with the required redrawing of the 
border […] the fundamental principles of spatial theory are subsumed under the 
facts of experience.  
Elsewhere, Helmholtz likewise states that500 
Kant‖s theory of the a priori given forms of intuition is a very apt and clear 
expression of the relation of things; but these forms must be without content and 
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underlie the laws of unconscious induction (Ferdinand and Hermann von Helmholtz, as quoted in 
Koenigsberger, 1902/03, p. 286, 292 [my translation]). 
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sufficiently free to assume any content […] Kant has here, in his Critique, not been 
critical enough. 
In short, Helmholtz‖s empiricism was not meant to replace Kantianism, but to correct 
it where it had “not been critical enough.” This has enormous implications with regard 
to his psychology of the object. Although Helmholtz treats external perception and 
objectification mainly as an a posteriori constructive process, his theorizing contains a 
level of analysis that exceeds the empiricist framework, in addressing the subjective 
conditions of possibility for empirical construction. In sharp contrast to the empirical 
theories sketched above, Helmholtz‖s work implies a subject that is not just an empty 
locus of construction, but rather a function of synthesis and unity in experience.  
In accordance with this shift in perspective, the subject is absolved from its 
indeterminable position in methodological naturalism, in order to be established as the 
locus of empirical determinability. To introduce these further levels of analysis in 
Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object, it will be helpful to take his semiotic 
understanding of the subject-object relation as a point of departure. The levels at stake 
can then be conceived of as pertaining, not to the structure of perceptual 
comprehension, but to the principles of comprehensibility.  
First of all, there is the question concerning the foundation of sensation qua sign. In 
other words, how is it that the physiologically neutral event of sensation forms the basis 
of grasping something (internal or external) that is not sensation itself? And how is it 
that a group of essentially disparate sensations come to be ordered in such a way as to 
give rise to the idea of a unitary cause? It is true, Helmholtz states, that we “have 
learned to see,” i.e. “we have learned to link certain representations to certain 
sensations,” and that from this (empirical) perspective, perception is “nothing but a 
mechanically acquired association of ideas.”501 But we need to take “one more step 
[einen letzten Schritt],” he immediately adds, as empirical analysis should necessarily 
be paired with an account of “what first enables us to pass from the world of nervous 
sensations into the world of actuality [Welt der Wirklichkeit]?”502 In other words, how 
did we first come to grasp (groups of) sensations as signs, given their fundamentally 
underdetermined nature with regard to external objects? At this level, Helmholtz thus 
interrogates the necessary principle of synthesis, or, in psychologistic terms, the motive 
for empirical association.  
Second, Helmholtz addresses the question of how it is that one can differentiate 
between those signs referring to external objects or events, and those that are 
endogenous in origin. “What is it,” he asks, that “first makes the distinction between 
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thought and reality possible [Scheidung von Gedachtem und Wirklichem erst möglich 
wird]?”503 At this point we touch on the important problem concerning the foundation 
of the unity of experience, or the foundation of ownership of experience, as well as the 
differential consciousness of the I and the Not-I. From a systematic point of view, these 
complementary levels of analysis in Helmholtz can be considered as attempts to 
overcome the yawning gaps in the strict empiricist psychology of the object, produced 
by the restrictiveness of the naturalistic framework.  
Helmholtz‖s so-called dovetailing between empiricism and rationalism takes a start 
when he supplements his naturalistic analysis with the appropriation of the Kantian 
idea of the a priori causal structure of understanding to address the first problem, and 
the Fichtean elaboration of the self-referential structure of the I think to address the 
second. Although the former has received the most attention by far in the secondary 
literature, I will argue in the following chapters that both levels of analysis ought to be 
taken into account, although neither one can be considered as an identical replication of 
the Kantian and Fichtean arguments from which they are derived. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have offered a historical-systematic analysis of the empirical 
dimension in Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. The historical framework for this 
analysis was outlined by taking Hume‖s and Mill‖s proto-psychological analyses as a 
point of departure. Subsequently, Helmholtz‖s theory of perception as unconscious 
inference was systematically analyzed against the background of empirical philosophy. 
It was argued that Helmholtz‖s theorizing is continuous with Hume‖s and Mill‖s, to the 
extent that the former considered the perceptual object as arising from a projection of 
meaning onto the visual field. A ―meaning‖ that is generated from the lawlike 
combination of sensations and previous experience. Furthermore, we have illustrated 
the peculiarities of this empirical approach by contrasting it with the common-sense 
accounts of the object, as prototypically represented in the philosophies of Thomas Reid 
and William Hamilton.   
On the other hand, empiricism‖s ―abysmal failure‖ with regard to the problem of 
subjectivity was discussed extensively. In this discussion, we took Hume‖s Labyrinth as a 
point of departure. It was argued that Hume‖s failure to produce a satisfactory account 
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of the Self was a logical consequence of his empiricist methodology. Furthermore, 
Hume‖s retraction of his bundle-theory of the Self not only revealed the limits of the 
empiricist framework, but more importantly confronted us with a fatal incoherence at 
the heart of his psychology of the object, i.e., its inadequacy of accounting for one of its 
most essential presumptions: the constructing subject. As was explained, this failure 
ultimately undermined Hume‖s entire account of experience, as it left him without a 
means to make sense of the foundational principles of association, and the unity of 
experience. As Strawson aptly described it in his recent analysis of Hume‖s failure:504 
Hume applies his empiricist principles to the idea of the mind or self […]. Within a 
year, Hume sees that he can‖t maintain the view that this is the true idea of the 
mind, although his empiricist principles commit him to the view that it is. […] he 
sees that it‖s not the idea of the mind that he‖s worked with in his philosophy, 
although his empiricist principles commit him to working with no other. This is 
his problem: the empiricistically ―true‖ idea of the mind isn‖t consistent with his 
philosophical commitments and presuppositions considered as a whole. 
 
And further: 
 
He [Hume] needs what he can‖t have. He needs it in order to legitimate the notion 
of the mind he makes use of as a philosopher who, whatever else he does, can‖t 
give up the empiricism which rules out […] the mind as illegitimate.  
Indeed, the empiricist accounts of the object as discussed in this chapter, become 
“incoherent,” “self-refuting,” or “circular” at the point where they fail to account for 
the experiencing subject, and hence, for the synthetic unity of experience. Both Hume‖s 
and Mill‖s psychologically naturalistic theories of the object presuppose an active, 
unitary subject as the basis of their constructive accounts, which cannot, however, be 
integrated in their theories because of the foundational empiricist scheme itself.505 The 
observation that Mill‖s psychological account of the belief in externality reproduces 
Hume‖s labyrinth, leads one to suspect that the problem at stake is not restricted to 
Hume‖s philosophy, but in fact points to an inherent weakness of the strict empiricist 
framework.    
As a consequence, one could argue that the problem of subjectivity – the ―labyrinth‖ 
in which Hume found himself involved, and which to Mill was an ―inexplicable mystery‖ 
– entails the ―bankruptcy‖ or the ―ruin‖ of the empiricist psychology of the object, and, at 
the same time, the motive for a shift towards idealism in Helmholtz‖s thought. Hence, 
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this chapter not only provided a historical-systematic framework for the interpretation 
of Helmholtz‖s psychological empiricism, it furthermore revealed a motive for 
transgressing that very framework. From the perspective of empiricism‖s abysmal 
failure, Helmholtz‖s recourse to Kant and Fichte (as discussed in the following chapters), 
is not at all coincidental, and still less a product of his idiosyncratic philosophical 
inclinations. An in-depth analysis of Hume‖s labyrinth – or by extension: empiricism‖s 
labyrinth – leads one to assume that strict empiricist accounts of the object require 
their own transgression in order to be consistent. In terms of the central problem of this 
dissertation, this would entail an interrogation of normative principles regulating the 
constructing mind or subject; principles that have to be accounted for in order to assign 
the subject a creative role in the construction of reality. Historically, it is Kant who first 
attempted to address empiricism‖s failure by taking the problem of subjectivity as the 
basis of his philosophical system. From a systematic viewpoint, it is at this point that 
Helmholtz‖s psychology shifts from an empirical, to a critical level of analysis. This level 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4  
Helmholtz‖s Intellectual Leap (I): Towards a Critical 
Understanding of Experience 
4.1 Introduction 
From the problems with the strict empiricist account of the object as discussed previous 
chapter, a motive can be derived for supplementing or completing the empirical 
perspective with a critical level of analysis. First and foremost, this ―intellectual leap‖ to 
a critique of experience in the Kantian sense, entails a transformation of the empiricist 
concern with the structure of psychological construction, to an interrogation of its a 
priori subjective conditions of possibility .  
In this chapter, we will analyse the particular way in which Helmholtz overcomes the 
inherent problems with empiricism by taking refuge to Kant‖s critical system. In doing 
so, we enter upon a dimension of Helmholtz‖s work that has been fiercely debated ever 
since the nineteenth century (see section 4.6). The question of Helmholtz‖s Kantianism 
is complicated by two elements in particular. On the one hand, Helmholtz was as much a 
indebted to Kant‖s philosophical project, as he was a critic of Kant. Secondly, Helmholtz 
appropriated elements of Kant‖s epistemological/logical analysis of experience within 
an explicitly psychological framework, which had quite drastic implications with regard 
to the interpretation of the a priori.  
Furthermore, from the perspective of this dissertation, the Kantian dimension in 
Helmholtz‖s psychology constitutes an intermediate level of analysis between 
empiricism on the one hand, and Fichteanism on the other. Therefore, we are not only 
interested in the question of Helmholtz‖s adherence to Kant‖s critical investigation, but 
also in the way in which the ―aporetic corners‖ of Kantianism provided Helmholtz with a 
motive for further extending his psychological analysis along the lines set out by 
Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine. The aim of this chapter is therefore fourfold, and we will 
subsequently address (i) the way in which Kant‖s critical philosophy of experience can 
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be read as providing an answer to Hume‖s Labyrinth, (ii) the aporetic corners of Kant‖s 
analysis, (iii) Helmholtz‖s appropriation of certain elements of Kant‖s account of 
experience, and (iv) Helmholtz‖s criticism of Kant and the way in which it prompted him 
to push his analysis to yet a further level of analysis, as discussed in the following 
chapter. Hence, this chapter is organized as follows: 
 
(1) First, an analysis is presented of the way in which Kant‖s transcendental doctrines 
of synthesis and apperception can be read as a response to the problems related 
to the strict empiricist account of the object (sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). 
(2) Second, the possible problems with Kant‖s critical analysis are discussed, with the 
aim of constructing a framework from which to interpret (i) Helmholtz‖s criticism 
of Kant, as well as (ii) his subsequent move to a metacritical level of analysis 
(section 4.5). 
(3) Third, we will investigate Helmholtz‖s account of perceptual comprehensibility, 
and its relation to Kant‖s first Critique (section 4.4). In the context of this 
discussion, the implications of Helmholtz‖s psychological appropriation of the a 
priori will be scrutinized (sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 ). 
(4) Finally, we will go into Helmholtz‖s criticism of Kant‖s transcendental theory of 
space, and the significance of this criticism for his theory of perception (section 
4.6.3). 
4.2 Kant on Hume‖s Labyrinth 
David Hume […] brought no light […] but he certainly 
struck a spark from which light could have been kindled, 
if it had hit some welcoming tinder. 
 
- Kant (2004 [1783]), p. 6. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, Hume‖s psychological inquiry made the problem 
of the object especially tangible, not in spite, but rather because of the his failure to 
thematize the ―necessary connecting-principle‖ and the foundation of the unity of 
experience. In terms of the poetical descriptions presented in the introduction, one 
could say that Hume‖s vanishing hopes, as well as Mill‖s reproduction of Hume‖s 
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labyrinth, invoke the Faustian question of What was there in the beginning with an 
unforeseen urgency. A question which Husserl once called that of the world-enigma:506 
What is […] the objective world […] once we have seen […] with Hume […] that 
―world‖ is a validity which has sprung up within subjectivity […]. The naïveté of 
speaking about ―objectivity‖ without ever considering subjectivity […] is naturally 
no longer possible […]. […] [M]ust this liberation not come to anyone who 
seriously immerses himself in the Treatise? The world-enigma in the deepest and 
most ultimate sense, the enigma of a world whose being is being through 
subjective accomplishment, [...] that, and nothing else, is Hume's problem. 
As such, Hume‖s scene of thought immediately gave rise to another one, on which the 
problems which the sceptic had left lingering in his Appendix were addressed. From the 
perspective of Hume‖s aporia, Kant‖s famous Copernican turn to the subject as the 
foundation of experience and knowledge is as ingenious as it seems natural and 
logical.507 As is well known, Kant credited Hume with awakening him from his dogmatic 
slumber in the Prolegomena, and also he described his attempt to address the question 
concerning the nature and structure of knowledge in the first Critique as “the 
elaboration of the Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification.”508  
From a Kantian viewpoint, however, Hume‖s problem as it was presented in the 
previous chapter, i.e. as pertaining to the necessary foundation of his psychological 
theory, is only relevant to the extent that it points to the much broader (and 
profounder) epistemological problem of objectivity. Hume‖s psychological account 
eventually lead to the dissolution of objective knowledge in the contingency of the 
constructing subject, and this dissolution was most probably what Kant took to be 
Hume‖s main problem.509 Hence, what we call ―Hume‖s problem‖, and, by extension, the 
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problem of strict empiricist accounts of objectification, in the scope of this 
investigation, is Hume‖s problem in the restricted sense: it pertains to the sceptic‖s 
failure to found his psychological theory of objectification, and not to the broader 
problem of the foundation of knowledge as such. Nevertheless, Kant‖s turn to a quid juris 
interrogation of knowledge and experience, and especially his central doctrines of 
synthesis and apperception, provide an effective way out of Hume‖s labyrinth.510 In 
addressing the broader problem of validity, Kant at the same time responded to the 
restricted problem of Hume‖s perplexity with regard to the foundation of the associative 
theory of objectification. As will become clear, quite a few readings have emerged in the 
past decades, that concentrate on the way in which Kant‖s Critique should be read 
against the background of Hume‖s abysmal psychology of the object. These are of 
central interest to this investigation, as they are helpful in constructing the historical 
background against which Helmholtz‖s systematic appeal to Kant can be made 
insightful. 
In what follows, the general tenets of Kant‖s transcendental analysis of experience 
will be outlined, as well as the way in which it can be read as a response to the problems 
that were discussed in the previous chapter. In accordance with the aims of this 
investigation, however, the subsequent inquiry will be limited in two ways. More 
particularly, the next sections will only elaborate on those tenets and aspects of Kant‖s 
critical system that can be useful in pinpointing (i) the systematic significance of 
Helmholtz‖s appeal to Kant in his theory of objectification, as analyzed from the 
correlative problem of subjectivity, and (ii) the scope and purport of Helmholtz‖s 
appropriation of specific elements of Kant‖s theorizing. This way of limiting our inquiry 
is necessary so that we may navigate our way through the Kantian system, and it will 
prevent us from obfuscating matters by indulging in exegetical problems that are not 
relevant for our purposes, which, in the case of Kant scholarship, are numerous. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
representations under the law of association, passes off the resulting subjective necessity (i.e. habit) for an 
objective necessity (from insight).”  
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4.3 Kant‖s Analysis of Experience: Preliminary Remarks 
Before embarking upon this analysis, some preliminary remarks are in order. It is 
important to make clear, for example, that there is a crucial difference between Kant‖s 
and Hume‖s conception and rhetorical use of the concept of ―mind‖. Although it has been 
argued that Kant found his way out of Hume‖s Labyrinth by examining the formal 
features of the Gemüth, or, as Kitcher argues, by centralizing the quid juris question of 
what the subject must be like in order to produce objective experience, the former‖s 
philosophical project is certainly not an inquiry into the Humean mind.511 That is to say, 
while Hume‖s mind denotes both the empirical faculty of association and construction, 
and the metaphorical space (the ―theatre‖) in which these constructions are carried out, 
Kant‖s Gemüth is a pure principle of experience, and as such, it has a transcendental 
sense.512 The notion refers to the totality of a priori powers [Vermögens], active and 
passive, that is to be presupposed in a being that is capable of knowing and experiencing 
objects. As such, its characterizations pertain to necessary conditions, as opposed to the 
contingent features of Hume‖s mind.  
More importantly, however, it should be made clear from the start that while Kant‖s 
transcendental analysis of experience unfolds from a critical inquiry into the subjective 
foundations of experience, it does not in the least present a theory of the subject.513 On the 
contrary, in Kant‖s technical use of the term, “the subject is not a thing, but an idea.”514 
It is no more than an empty concept [ens rationis] that denotes the transcendental idea of 
“the determining Self (the thinking),” as “that which I must presuppose in order to 
cognize an object.”515 As Kant puts it elsewhere, the “transcendental subject of thoughts 
= x,” is not knowable as such, but nevertheless, it is that around which the entire Critique 
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circles [welches wir uns daher in einem beständigen Zirkel herumdrehen].516 As such, Kant‖s 
―subject‖ is nothing but a “formal requirement of having and thinking about 
representations,” as Brook notes, “roughly on a par with putting ―it‖ in ―it is raining‖.”517 
If we remain faithful to Kant‖s technical use of the term, the critical analysis of 
experience cannot be called a positive theory of the subject, although the elusive 
subject = x constitutes the transcendental horizon, so to speak, of the inquiry into the 
Gemüth.  
Contrary to the very careful and altogether rather sparse use of the term ―subject‖, 
the Critique is replete with references to the subjective, as specifications of the conditions 
of the necessary organization of the Gemüth. As such, Kant‖s investigation into what the 
mind must be like could well be called a theory of subjectivity, as long as one keeps in 
mind that the subject implied in that statement is nothing but the empty referent of the 
critical project.  
Before going into the relevant features of Kant‖s transcendental analysis of the 
Gemüth, or his theory of subjectivity, the reader should be reminded of the general aim, 
method and structure of Kant‖s critical inquiry. Although the basic tenets of Kant‖s first 
Critique and its epoch-making attempt to address the question What can I know have 
become commonplace since its publication, this quick recapitulation is necessary in 
light of the discussions to follow.518  
 
Kant famously defined his transcendental project as being “occupied not so much 
with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.”519 More 
particularly, the first Critique approaches the question of objectivity not by means of an 
inquiry into its factual basis (i.e. its constructive conditions in experience), but on the 
contrary, through an analysis of its a priori necessary constitutive elements on the level 
of the knowing subject. This shift from construction to constitution, or from questions 
quid facti to questions quid juris, correlates with a decentralization of the problem of 
empirical determination, in favor of a focus on the problem of determinability, which is 
articulated in accordance with the way in which possible objects of knowledge conform 
a priori to the structure of the ―two stems of knowledge‖, i.e. sensibility and 
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understanding.520 The question of determinability is thus further specified as pertaining 
to the conditions by virtue of which the object can be given in sensibility and can be 
conceptually determined by the faculty of understanding. The transcendental 
perspective requires that both these faculties, which respectively denote the passive 
and the active side of the Gemüth (mind), are examined in abstraction of empirical 
content, and characterized in their capacity of pure form, as Kant respectively does in his 
Transcendental Aesthetics and his Transcendental Logic. While the former sets out to 
prove that no object can be given to sensibility if it is not given in space and time – both 
of which are hence established as the pure forms of intuition – the latter deduces and 
analyzes the categories (quantity, quality, modality and relation) as the necessary a 
priori forms of understanding. Consequently, Kant determines every possible object of 
knowledge or experience a priori as the product of the synthetic operations of 
receptivity and spontaneity, or of the passive and active powers of the mind. 
“Experience,” Kant states, “is […] the […] product that our understanding brings forth as 
it works on the raw material of sensible sensations.”521 
The overturning of the empiricist model of knowledge in Kant‖s critical analysis is 
achieved mainly by the conceptual coupling of necessity and objectivity. More specifically, 
the philosopher‖s most innovative contribution to the problem of knowledge was his 
transcendental deduction of the objective validity of concepts (e.g. causality), from their 
a priori universal necessity with regard to the possibility of experience and knowledge 
(i.e. their status as conditions of determinability).522 Hence, the demonstration of the 
objective validity of the categories of understanding, as outlined in Deduction of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding, succeeds on the condition that “we can prove that by 
means of them alone an object can be thought.”523  
In the A-edition of the CPR, Kant introduces his deduction as an attempt to address 
two interrelated questions, which he respectively calls an objective, and a subjective 
deduction:524  
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One side refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is supposed to 
demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a 
priori […]. The other side deals with the pure understanding itself, concerning its 
possibility and the powers of cognition on which it itself rests. 
While the objective deduction (OD) attempts to establish the objective validity of the 
categories of understanding – the sum of which constitutes the logical function of 
thought – by determining them as a priori conditions of possibility for objective 
representation, the subjective part (SD) presents a transcendental description of the 
objectifying function, so to speak.525 As it is particularly the SD that has been interpreted 
as addressing the problem of Hume‖s labyrinth by presenting an analysis of what the 
mind must be like, or, more particularly, of the conditions of synthesis and unity in 
experience, it forms a most interesting point of departure for the present 
investigation.526 The distinction and interrelation of the arguments presented in the OD 
and the SD respectively, was captured by Kant as follows:527 
[I]t is already a sufficient deduction of them [i.e. the categories] and justification 
of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them alone an object 
can be thought. But since in such a thought there is more at work than the single 
faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and the understanding itself, as a 
faculty of cognition that is to be related to objects, also requires an elucidation of 
the possibility of this relation, we must first assess […] the transcendental 
constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori foundations for 
the possibility of experience. 
While the deduction in general is a notoriously hard nut to crack, in the past decades 
quite some grappling has been going on regarding the status and systematic 
significance of the SD in particular. In itself, this is hardly surprising, given Kant‖s rather 
hesitant presentation of it in the A-edition of the Critique:528  
[T]he chief question always remains: “What and how much can understanding and 
reason cognize free of all experience?” and not: “How is the faculty of thinking 
itself possible?” Since the latter question is something like the search for the 
cause of a given effect, and is therefore something like a hypothesis (although, as I 
will elsewhere take the opportunity to show, this is not in fact how matters stand), 
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it appears as if I am taking the liberty in this case of expressing an opinion, and 
that the reader might therefore be free to hold another opinion.  
Furthermore, given the aim of the SD to determine the necessary characteristics of the 
cognitive faculty in general, its vocabulary and tone, especially in the A-edition, is 
rather psychological, and hence, the exposition occupies a bit of an odd position amidst 
the formal expositions of the Critique. Kant‖s extensive revision of the Deduction in the B-
edition of the Critique, in which the SD is formulated in much more abstract terms, 
reveals the Prussian philosopher‖s struggle with his transcendental approach to the 
Gemüth. Due to these peculiar characteristics, the SD has been received by many with 
scepticism, or dismissed as an objectionable and altogether peripheral part of the 
Critique.529 However, there is some agreement that its core ideas are retained in the B-
edition, though in more abstract terms, which suggests that Kant never changed his 
mind with respect to its importance for the critical analysis of experience.530 
Furthermore, it should be noted that OD and SD are not presented in neatly separated 
sections, but that the former is largely embedded in the latter. Consequently, there is 
quite some disagreement over the limits and scope of the SD. From this it follows that 
the question of whether or not Kant abandoned his SD in the second edition of the CPR, 
depends on how one defines and limits its arguments.531  
In what follows, these exegetical difficulties will be set aside, and we will focus on 
Kant‖s doctrines of synthesis and apperception, as presented in both the A- and B-edition 
of the CPR, which were read by quite a few authors as being at least partly motivated by 
the problems that surfaced in Hume‖s Appendix.  
4.4 Kant‖s Doctrines of Synthesis and Apperception 
Through a series of articles and books, Kitcher presents a convincing body of evidence 
in favor of the hypotheses (i) that Kant was well aware of Hume‖s problems with Personal 
Identity when he wrote the CPR, and that hence, (ii) some passages in the latter work – 
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most importantly the deduction – were written explicitly as an attempt to overcome 
Hume‖s labyrinth.532 Even if one is not convinced by the textual and historical evidence 
Kitcher presents in support of her reading of the Deduction as a deliberate and explicit 
answer to Hume‖s problem with personal identity, it remains that one can find in Kant‖s 
CPR, whether intentionally or not, an adequate response to the problems raised in the 
previous chapter, and this in itself suffices for the systematic purposes of our 
investigation. 
First of all, Kant‖s Critique allows for a diagnosis of Hume‖s problem with personal 
identity in terms of a conflation of the (natural concept of the) empirical ―self‖ and (the 
normative concept of) epistemic subjectivity. For Kant, Hume‖s bundle theory was not 
so much wrong, as it was trivial with regard to the question of the foundation of 
experience. It is true, Kant claims, that what we find through ―inner sense‖ (or ―empirical 
apperception‖) is “forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this 
stream of inner appearances.”533 Neither a connecting principle, nor a unity can be 
found in experience, which reveals only a flux, a chaos and bundles. But then again, he 
adds:534  
That which should necessarily be represented as numerically identical cannot be 
thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that 
precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible […].  
In other words: the principles of determinability – i.e. Hume‖s connecting principle, 
and the principle for the unity of experience – and the subject they inhere, cannot be 
derived from, but precede empirical determination, and, consequently, Hume‖s 
empirical strategy cannot but produce tautological answers:535 
[S]ince I want to observe the mere I through the change in all my representations, 
I have […] no correlate other than myself for my comparisons […] I can therefore 
give nothing but tautological answers to all questions, because I substitute my 
concept and its unity for the properties pertaining to my self as an object, and 
thus merely presuppose what one demanded to know.  
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In these passages of the CPR, Kant‖s diagnosis of Hume‖s problem aligns with the 
problems that were pinpointed in section 3.3.1.1, where the methodological inadequacy 
of the latter‖s quasi-observational strategy was discussed.  
More interestingly, however, Kant‖s system provides an adequate answer to Hume‖s 
vanishing hopes with regard to “the principle of connexion which binds them [i.e. 
particular perceptions] together, and […] the principles that unite our successive 
perceptions in our thought and consciousness.”536 More particularly, Kant‖s doctrines of 
synthesis and apperception, as they are formulated in the context of his broader 
endeavor to investigate what the mind must be like to represent objects, can be read as a 
response to Hume‖s problems with the connecting principle and the unity of experience 
respectively.  
4.4.1 The Necessary Connection: Synthesis 
In the A-deduction, Kant presents a quite extensive argument against the sufficiency of 
associative mechanisms (or the reproductive power of imagination, as he calls it) to 
account for the unitary and determinate experience of an object. “Combination 
(conjunctio),” Kant echoes Hume‖s Appendix, “can never come to us through the senses,” 
nor is it “given through objects.”537 However, empirical synthesis would simply be 
impossible if one does not presuppose that a sensible manifold is always already 
subjected to a rule:538 
The law of reproduction […] presupposes that […] in the manifold of their 
representations an accompaniment or succession takes place according to certain 
rules. […] [I]f one and the same word were attributed now to this thing, now to 
that, or if one and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, 
without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already 
subjected […] then no empirical synthesis […] could take place.  
Whether deliberately or not, this passage starts where Hume left off, i.e. in the 
observation that connection is not a principle of experience, but that any experience 
would be impossible without an operative connecting principle.539 The problem is that 
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association in itself is too ―promiscuous‖, as Kitcher expresses it: in the end, everything 
can be associated with everything, and hence, there would be no experience possible, if 
the constructive process was not a priori guided by a rule that imposes its necessity on 
associative combination.540 In accordance with the transcendental mode of inquiry, Kant 
transforms the question of association into that of the associability of sensible manifolds, 
and, more particularly, he argues that the rule of association is given a priori through an 
act of pure spontaneity:541  
[A]ll combination […] is an action of the understanding, which we would designate 
with the general title synthesis in order […] to draw attention to the fact that we 
can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously 
combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is the only 
one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject 
itself, since it is an act of self-activity.  
In laying out the basic principles of his transcendental account of experience, Kant 
thus addresses Hume‖s necessary connecting principle by pointing out that the subject 
is not merely reactive, but active, and necessarily so, with respect to the incoming 
sensible material. One could argue that the theoretical significance of this intellectual 
leap from associative construction to the question of associability, is in the way in which 
it deepens the understanding of the dynamics of objectification. More particularly, Kant 
takes the object or phenomenon out of the realm of blind mental mechanics, and places 
it in an interpretive framework concerned with the conditions and principles 
underlying the subjective constitution of meaning. Furthermore, the transcendental 
categories provide the a priori rules of synthesis, and therefore, they derive their 
objectivity from their universal necessity with regard to the possibility of experience 
and knowledge.  
As will be discussed extensively in section 4.6.2, Helmholtz famously adopted one of 
Kant‖s a priori rules of synthesis, namely the principle of causality. Kant mainly 
elaborated his views on this principle in the Second Analogy of Experience, that sets out to 
demonstrate that all experience of succession is a priori conditioned by the principle 
that “[a]ll alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and 
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effect.”542 More particularly, Kant claims that all that is given through sensibility is 
ordered according to the rule that anything that happens presupposes “that something 
else precedes it,” and that543 
[i]t is only because we subject the sequence of the appearance and thus all 
alteration to the law of causality that experience itself, i.e. empirical cognition […] 
is possible; consequently they themselves, as objects of experience, are possible 
only in accordance with this law. 
In other words, the causal law in Kant‖s work is invoked to explain the way in which 
successive perceptions are transformed into the perception of succession.544 As such, the 
causal law is a necessary condition for experience, since it founds the determinability of 
a sequence of disparate elements given through the faculty of sensibility, and thus 
guarantees the discursive unity of a sensory manifold in time.545  
At this point, it is important to note that the discursive imposition of a priori 
principles on sensible givens is to be distinguished from the intuitive unity of sensible 
material, which does not pertain to the order of sensible events, but to the way in which 
they are determinable as temporal and spatial magnitudes in intuition.546 To be more 
precise, in accordance to his ―two stems of knowledge,‖ Kant distinguishes between 
mathematical principles of experience on the one hand, and dynamical principles on the 
other:547 
In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible experience 
the use of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical: for it pertains 
partly merely to the intuition, partly to the existence of an appearance in general. 
The a priori conditions of intuition, […] are necessary throughout in regard to a 
possible experience, while those of the existence of the objects […] are in 
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themselves only contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical use will be 
unconditionally necessary, i.e. apodictic, while the principles of the dynamical use 
[…] carry with them the character of an a priori necessity, but only under the 
conditions of empirical thinking in an experience, thus only mediately and 
indirectly […]. While the former are capable of an intuitive certainty, the latter are 
capable only of a discursive certainty. 
According to this distinction, the principle of causality – as a discursive, dynamical 
principle of experience – is subjected to the conditions of the materiality of experience, 
i.e. it presupposes that an appearance is given, and supplies the discursive conditions 
under which alone the appearance can be thought, and hence objectified, in accordance 
to definite rules.548  
4.4.2 The Unity of Experience: Kant‖s I think  
Kant‖s doctrine of synthesis, however, is only part of the way out of Hume‖s labyrinth, as 
it addresses the problem of the necessary connecting principle, but not that of the unity 
of experience:549 
[I]n addition to the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, the concept of 
combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. 
Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The 
representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather 
by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of 
combination possible. […] [W]e must […] seek this unity someplace higher, namely 
in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in 
judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding.  
In other words, the possibility of experience not only depends on spontaneous acts of 
synthesis, but more importantly, the synthetic manifold should be integrated in one 
consciousness. To account for the unity of experience, Kant introduces the concept of 
pure apperception, or the transcendental principle of the I think:550 
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The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at 
least would be nothing for me. […] Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary 
relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is to be 
encountered. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, i.e., cannot be 
regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to 
distinguish it from the empirical one […].  
In this passage it is clear that Kant grounds the possibility of synthesis in yet another, 
more fundamental transcendental principle, i.e. the I think, that denotes the necessary 
self-referential structure of the synthetical act. Hence, pure apperception is determined 
as the most fundamental act of spontaneity, the highest principle of all cognition, and 
the transcendental precondition for the (use of) the categories.551 The I think guarantees 
that a manifold “is united in one consciousness,” and it is only by virtue of this self-
referential structure that an object can “become an object for me,” i.e. it is the 
“condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my 
representations, and thus can grasp them together.”552 To illustrate his doctrine, Kant 
gives the following example:553 
[I]n order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it, and thus 
synthetically bring about a determinate combination of the given manifold, so 
that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the 
concept of a line), and thereby is an object (a determinate space) first cognized. 
This example clearly illustrate that Kant‖s doctrine of apperception is articulated not 
merely as an abstract principle, but also in reference to the unity of acts of synthesis. 
Furthermore, the principle relates the determinability of objects in space, to the unity 
of the act of determination. More particularly, the unity of consciousness is put forward 
as a condition of possibility for the Vor-stellung of the object, i.e. for its determination in 
terms of a definite out there, that occupies a determinate position in space.  
Again, this is a point in Kant‖s theorizing on which we should elaborate a little more, 
mainly because Kant‖s transcendental doctrine of space was famously criticized by 
Helmholtz (see section 4.6.2). Therefore, it is necessary to briefly restate Kant‖s 
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argument for the transcendental nature of space, as outlined in his Transcendental 
Aesthetics [A22-A30/B37-B45]. 
In his first Critique, Kant famously argues that “[s]pace represents no property at all 
of any things in themselves,” [A26/B42] but rather is “nothing other than merely the 
form of all appearances of the outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, 
under which alone outer intuition is possible.” Furthermore, he identifies this a priori 
spatial form with the Euclidean axioms, which are hence determined as a priori synthetic 
principles: although geometric propositions are synthetic (i.e. cannot be derived 
analytically from a general concept) they cannot be derived from, but should be 
presupposed as necessary conditions of experience and, by extension, of geometric 
knowledge. To arrive at this point, Kant‖s transcendental argument takes the following 
steps:554 
Space is not an empirical concept [….] for in order for certain sensations to be 
related to something outside me […] thus in order for me to represent them as 
outside one another […] the representation of space must already be their ground 
[… ]. [A23/B38] 
 
Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer 
intuitions. […] It is […] to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of 
appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori 
representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances. [A24/B38] 
 
The apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles and the possibility of their a 
priori construction are grounded in this a priori necessity. For if this representation 
of space were a concept acquired a posteriori, [...] the first principles of 
mathematical determination would […] have all the contingency of perception. 
[A24/B39] 
 
Space is […] a pure intuition. […] [A]ll geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle 
two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from 
general concepts of the line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition 
and indeed derived a priori with apodictic certainty. [A25/B39] 
To summarize: as space cannot be derived from, but is presupposed by, experience, it 
is not empirical, but a priori. Given that Euclidean space has a constitutive role for 
experience, it is necessary, and, in accordance with the transcendental rationale, this 
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necessity in turn founds its apodictic certainty.555 In conclusion, the Euclidean axioms 
belong to the pure form of intuition, i.e. express synthetic principles a priori. From these 
arguments, Kant arrives at his view of geometry as “a science that determines the 
properties of space synthetically, and yet a priori,” and restates this transcendental view 
as follows:556 
[T]he representation of space […] must originally be intuition; for from a mere 
concept no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the concept, which, 
however, happens in geometry […] but this intuition must be encountered in us a 
priori, i.e., prior to all perception of an object, thus it must be pure, not empirical 
intuition. For geometrical propositions are all apodictic, i.e. combined with 
consciousness of their necessity, e.g. space has only three dimensions; but such 
propositions cannot be empirical, or judgments of experience, nor inferred from 
them […]. Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the 
objects themselves […]? Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat 
merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects and 
thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e. intuition, of them, thus only as 
the form of outer sense in general.  
This passage captures the main spirit of Kant‖s Copernican revolution, i.e. his 
indication of the subject as the ―seat‖ of knowledge and experience, and the fusion of the 
question of objectivity with the interrogation of the necessary features of the 
objectifying function. Hence, it is a suitable way of concluding this rather lengthy 
section, in which Kant‖s interrogation of what the mind must be like in general, and his 
doctrines of synthesis and apperception in particular, have been put forward as apt 
responses to the problems with the strict empiricist framework of the object, as 
sketched in the previous chapter.  
However, one final aspect of Kant‖s theorizing should be addressed, which was soon 
perceived to be the aporetic corner of the transcendental project: the elusive subject = x 
of his Critique and the grammatical subject of the I think. In accordance with the general 
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strategy of this dissertation, this is the point where we find the motive for moving 
beyond Kant in the next chapter. More importantly, however, in order to get a firm 
grasp of Helmholtz‖s idiosyncratic appropriation of central aspects of Kant‖s critical 
analysis, one should not only consider the former‖s explicitly psychological perspective, 
but also his criticism and dissatisfaction with certain elements of Kant‖s philosophy. To 
be more specific, Helmholtz‖s reading of Kant is quite heavily tainted by his objections 
to Kant‖s dualism with regard to the stems of knowledge on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a psychological concern that pertains exactly to the further articulation of the 
self-reflexive structure of the epistemic subject, as captured in Kant‖s I think. As will 
become clear in the remainder of this chapter and the next, both problems, i.e. dualism 
and self-reflexivity, are interrelated in Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. Therefore, 
a closer look at Kant‖s I think is in order, although a full grasp of why this is so – and 
more importantly: why this is so in light of Helmholtz‖s theorizing – will only prove 
possible towards the end of this chapter, after we have considered the full extent of 
Helmholtz‖s relation to Kant. 
4.5 Kant and the I think: Discussion 
In hindsight, Kant‖s philosophical system proved to be a fertile ground for quite 
dramatic problematizations of the subject. Post-Kantian philosophy shows a virtual 
obsession with unity, in at least two different ways, i.e. the unity of the critical system 
on the one hand, and the unity of the subject on the other.557 To be more precise, many 
were concerned with the seemingly insurmountable duality between sensibility and 
understanding, or the passive and active side of the Gemüth, that was the starting point 
of Kant‖s analysis, and with the way in which Kant‖s elusive subject = x relates to these 
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―two stems‖. Therefore, we will now present a further analysis of Kant‖s I think, based on 
the CPR, and subsequently, three ways in which it has been scrutinized up until this day.  
In the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant further elucidates his view on the subject = x 
around which his whole Critique circles, but which is not an object of possible knowledge 
itself.558 In that section, Kant among other things distinguishes the I think, further 
defined as the concept that “serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to 
consciousness”, from the idea of a substantial self on the one hand, and of the empirical 
self on the other.559 The former idea, Kant specifies, “has its origin in a mere 
misunderstanding”:560 
The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an 
intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied to it. 
But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object is given; and 
thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, 
cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all. 
In other words, the (subreptive) idea of a substantial self is the product of a category 
mistake [Kategorienfehler], i.e. the application of the category of substance on a concept 
that merely denotes the transcendental unity of consciousness. The ―I‖ of the I think, 
Kant adds, differs fundamentally from the objectified self that is expressed in the idea of 
a substantial ego, as the former expresses “the thinking being in general”, while the 
latter refers to the “consciousness of a separate possible existence of my thinking 
self.”561 In conclusion, the idea of substantial ego is produced by a flawed objectification 
of what is nothing but a formal principle of experience: it is the confusion between the 
unity of perception and the perception of unity, which Kant calls the subreption of 
hypostatized consciousness (apperceptionis substantiate). The self-in-itself, or the noumenal 
subject, remains unknowable. 
Furthermore, the I of the I think is distinguished from the empirical subject or 
phenomenal self, i.e. the self that determines itself consciously as the owner and author 
of representations. This conscious determination, Kant explains, does not produce, but 
requires the transcendental act of pure apperception. In other words, empirical self-
consciousness is an act of empirical determination that presupposes the transcendental 
I think as a condition of determinability. This difference between transcendental and 
empirical self-consciousness is aptly described by Stevenson:562  
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Actually being aware of a representation as mind, i.e. representing to myself ―I 
think x‖, […] requires some specific determination of the manifold of intuition 
within inner sense (x). Original apperception is itself the ground of empirical self-
consciousness, that is, awareness of the contents of one‖s thoughts. It produces 
the simple representation ―I think‖, which itself is merely an expression of the 
original act of synthesis. 
In short, when attempting to distinguish the I think from the phenomenal self, we are 
once again confronted with the circularity that is produced by the attempt to determine 
principles of determinability through quasi-observational strategies (see chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1.1). 
So much for the negative descriptions of Kant‖s subject = x: the grammatical subject 
of the I think is neither a substantial self, nor does it express the empirical 
determination of self in self-consciousness. With these negative qualifications, the 
possible ways of circumscribing the I think are at once exhausted, as it would be a 
contradictio in terminis to infuse this x with positive meaning. Nonetheless, the limits of 
Kant‖s philosophy form the point of departure for Fichte, for example, who‖s 
philosophical project unfolds from the question “Which ―I‖ is being spoken of here? [Von 
welchem Ich ist hier die Rede]?”563 From a Kantian perspective, this question is in itself 
transgressive, as he defines the I think as both an empty concept, and a blind intuition:564 
[W]e can place nothing but the simple and in content […] wholly empty 
representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, […] Through 
this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a 
transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the 
thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never 
have even the least concept; […] we cannot separate ourselves from this 
inconvenience, because the consciousness in itself is not even a representation.  
 
[…]  
 
The ―I think‖ is […] an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the 
proposition ―I exist‖. It expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. a 
perception (hence it proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to 
sensibility, grounds this existential proposition), but it precedes the experience 
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that is to determine the object of perception […]. […] [W]ithout any empirical 
representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act I think would not 
take place, and the empirical is only the condition of application, or use, of the 
pure intellectual faculty.  
In the end, Kant‖s subject = x is both a definite nothing, and an indefinite 
something.565 As such, Kant‖s pure apperception has a status that is fundamentally 
different from anything else in the Critique. It transcends both stems of knowledge and is 
the empty and blind abyss from which the transcendental analysis arises, and yet, it is 
just that: subject = x.  
But then again, is there a problem with the I think, or with the ―I‖ of the I think, as 
many post-Kantians have believed? Although Kant takes up the matter of his highest 
principle of cognition over and again until he dies, he never seemed to consider it a 
problem himself, and one even gets the impression that he did everything he could to 
safeguard its unruly, elusive nature. In his Opus Postumum, for example, he revisits his 
highest postulate, but his additional remarks can hardly be called elucidating:566 
The first act of the faculty of representation […] is the representation of oneself 
(apperceptio) through which the subject makes itself into an object (apperceptio 
simplex); and its representation is intuition (intuitus), not yet concept (conceptus): 
that is, representation of an individual […], not yet that which is common to many 
[…], that is, a generally valid representation […] The first act of knowledge is the 
verb: I am, - self-consciousness, for I [as] subject, am an object to myself. 
In this passage, the I think is described not just as an indeterminate act, but an a priori, 
reflexive act of self-determination, through which the subject becomes object to itself, 
without becoming object altogether. At this point in the discussion, Kant‖s I think has 
apparently become an inextricable maze of negative and positive qualifications. 
Inextricable in principle, so it seems, although the I think is just as “systematically 
elusive” as it is “ineliminable.”567  
As already suggested, Kant‖s abysmal subject was not only productive from a 
systematic point of view – i.e. it founded the entire transcendental analysis of 
experience – but likewise from a historical perspective. That is to say, Kant‖s abysmal 
subject produced an astonishing amount of literature on the nature of the subject of 
experience, and how it is to be conceptualized, beginning with the post-Kantians, and 
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spreading out right up to the present. Furthermore, there is an endless variety of 
different ways in which the I think was conceived of as a problem. In order to grasp the 
extent of the post-Kantian problematization of pure apperception, three different forms 
will be presented below: two recent ones, i.e. Patricia Kitcher‖s and Manfred Frank‖s, and 
finally the Fichtean one. All these authors share the claim that there was indeed a 
problem with Kant‖s foundational postulate, although they disagree on what this 
problem amounted to. Although we are especially interested in Fichte‖s diagnosis, it is 
useful to also review Kitcher‖s and Frank‖s work, if only to get a taste of the ways in 
which Kant‖s theory of subjectivity was eventually received by many as ―Kant‖s 
problem‖.  
4.5.1  Patricia Kitcher‖s Construction of ―Kant‖s Problem‖ 
Kitcher‖s analysis of the I think is presented mainly in the introduction to her 1990 Kant’s 
Transcendental Psychology, and her interpretation actually founds her naturalized reading 
of Kant‖s Critique.568 The problematization of Kant‖s principle of apperception starts with 
an attempt to determine the nature of the grammatical subject of the I think, through an 
analysis of how it relates to Kant‖s foundational distinction between noumena and 
phenomena, and the derivative ideas of the noumenal and the phenomenal self, the ―two 
official selves of the Critique‖, according to the author.569 Kitcher‖s analysis can be 
schematized as follows:570 
 
(1) In Kant‖s philosophy, the self is either phenomenal or noumenal. 
(1a) This distinction is both exclusive and exhaustive. 
(1b) Hence, the I of the I think should be either phenomenal or noumenal. 
(2) If the I is noumenal, no positive statements can be made about it. 
(3) If the I is phenomenal, it is causally determined. 
(4) Kant makes (abstract and general) positive statements about the I (e.g. that it is a 
self-relating activity), so it cannot be noumenal. 
(5) Although Kant does not want to affirm the phenomenality of the I – in light of 
the desastrous consequences this would have for his moral theory, founded in 
the autonomous I – he cannot avoid it, given his own exclusive and exhaustive 
scheme. 
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(6) Hence, the I of the I think necessarily denotes the phenomenal self, and from this, 
its causal determination inevitably follows. 
 
The basic idea is thus that Kant‖s “doctrinal dualism” causes quite serious problems 
when it comes to determining the status of the I in the I think.571 To quote Kitcher:572 
[T]he Critique maintains that there are two selves […]. From one perspective, it is 
understood as ―phenomenal‖ or ―empirical‖, ―passive‖ subject to natural laws, and 
hence unfit to be the object of moral criticism. According to the other, the self is 
―noumenal‖, completely unknown and unknowable […] [I]t is not clear how the I of 
apperception can be fitted into this scheme. […] Given the impossibility of 
noumenal knowledge, the doctrine of apperception must present a phenomenal 
[…] aspect of the self.  
So, according to Kitcher, Kant “refuses to acknowledge” the phenomenality of the I 
think, given that this would make his subject = x a part of nature, subjected to the stern 
law of natural causality, which would in turn affect the autonomous, free subject of 
Kant‖s second Critique. Yet, Kitcher proceeds, Kant cannot consistently endorse a 
noumenal conception of the self as the basis of his critical analysis of experience. Hence, 
she concludes, that “we might as well admit” to the fact that the I in Kant‖s highest 
postulate is phenomenal. 573  
Several objections can be made against this reconstruction of Kant‖s problem. As 
Allison noted, the argument is already flawed from the start, as the phenomenal-
noumenal distinction applies only to (possible) objects of cognition, and hence, not to 
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the I think, that is “not a thing, but an idea.”574 Both the noumenal and the phenomenal 
self, however, have an objectal structure in cognition: while the former denotes the 
transgressive concept of the self as substance, the latter refers to the subject as it 
objectifies itself in experience as the subject of experience. As already explained in the 
previous section, the I as act, should therefore be distinguished from both the noumenal 
and the phenomenal self, and hence, it cannot be analyzed according to Kant‖s dualist 
scheme. More importantly, however, Kitcher‖s naturalized conception of the I as a 
phenomenal self turns Kant‖s formal principle into an element of empirical cognition 
and through this operation, the whole transcendental project loses its foundational 
base:575 
[T]he phenomenal self cannot serve as the subject of transcendental psychology. 
Since it is itself an object in the phenomenal world (the object of inner sense), the 
possibility of cognizing or in any way representing to oneself the phenomenal self 
can be explained only in terms of transcendental grounds, and therefore, with 
reference to the transcendental subject. 
Again, we are lead to consider the methodological problems related to the empirical 
determination of Kant‖s pure apperception. Kitcher‖s naturalized conception of the I 
ultimately leads up to her definition of the mind as a system of “contentually 
interconnected systems of cognitive states,” which seems eerily similar to Hume‖s 
bundles.576 In conclusion, Kitcher‖s attempt to overcome the elusiveness of the I think 
through its naturalization, seems to lead us right back into Hume‖s labyrinth, or at best, 
to a “more sophisticated version” of Hume‖s bundles, as Marshall concludes.577  
4.5.2 Manfred Frank‖s Construction of ―Kant‖s problem‖ 
For Manfred Frank‖s approach to ―Kant‖s Problem‖ we can turn especially to his analyses 
of modern theories of self-consciousness, as presented for example in his articles from 
2004 and 2007. In contrast to Kitcher, Frank honors the foundational status of Kant‖s 
pure apperception as a formal principle and its logical primacy over phenomenal self-
consciousness. According to Frank, however, Kant‖s reluctance to clearly articulate the 
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structure of the I in the I think derives from a methodological deadlock.578 To be more 
precise, Frank argues that Kant was caught up in what he calls the ―representation-
model of the self‖, or the reflection theory of subjectivity.579 While the Prussian 
philosopher maintained that the I think should be able to accompany all of the subject‖s 
representations – or is the necessary correlate of all cognitive acts – his attempt to 
articulate his foundational principle failed, Frank argues, because he mistakenly applied 
his mode of thinking about objects to the subject of his principle. Therefore, he 
interprets Kant‖s claim that “I cannot cognize as an object […] what I must presuppose in 
order to cognize an object”, as a testimony of the philosopher‖s “peculiar aporia” with 
regard his own foundational principle.580 According to Frank, Kant found himself faced 
with the following problem:581 
A manifold of intuition determined by the categories is […] what Kant terms 
cognition. It is obvious, however, that the principle in whose name this 
determination takes place, […] cannot become an object of knowledge, because it 
is not sensible.[…] [T]he pure I cannot be known as an objective existent. As soon 
as this conclusion is accepted, however, it is clear that it has disastrous 
consequences for the self-evidence of the highest point of theoretical philosophy. 
In conclusion, Frank discusses Kant‖s embarrassment about finding himself caught up 
in the circle of the representing and the represented I, and, more importantly, about the 
observation that the principle that founds his entire system is in itself an ―unfounded 
presupposition‖.582 While Kitcher maintained that Kant could not affirm the phenomenal 
nature of the I in light of his moral theory, Frank‖s analysis amounts to the conclusion 
that Kant could not articulate the necessary Ideality of the I, due to his self-imposed 
limitation of cognition as a synthesis of sensible material and understanding. As such, 
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one could say that Frank pushes Kant‖s pure apperception towards the exact opposite of 
Kitcher‖s phenomenal ―solution‖, i.e. towards a radical idealization.583 
 
While Frank‖s overall work provides an intriguing narrative about the problem of 
subjectivity in the history of modern philosophy – with Hume, Kant and Fichte as 
important protagonists – his construction of Kant‖s problem seems to be quite 
problematic. First of all, Kant‖s ―confession‖ in [A402] was not a confession at all, but 
rather an explanation of why the I is elusive in its very nature. From all that has been said 
hitherto, it is clear enough that Kant (i) explicitly recognized the philosophical 
problems related to the attempts to objectify the subject = x, and (ii) that this was the 
very reason for his circling around it. Furthermore, as Frank himself suggests, the I in 
itself was never a problem for Kant, who was merely interested in its formal function 
within the context of his critical epistemology.584  
However, both Frank and Kitcher connect Kant‖s problem with the I to the dualist 
structure of his doctrine. As will be discussed in what follows, a clear articulation of the 
way in which the problem of the unity of the subject relates to the problem of duality, is 
to be found in Johann Gottlieb Fichte‖s work. Although a full discussion of Fichte‖s 
response to Kant‖s pure apperception is reserved for the next chapter, the broad 
outlines will already be sketched below.  
4.5.3 Johann Gottlieb Fichte‖s Construction of ―Kant‖s Problem‖ 
As already noted, Fichte‖s analysis of experience, as presented for example in his 
1797/98 Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftlehre, takes the question “Which I 
is being spoken of here?” as a point of departure.585 In contrast to the interpretations 
sketched above, Fichte‖s concern with the I think is not so much motivated by an 
attempt to solve Kant‖s alleged problem. Rather, he aspires to complete Kant‖s system by 
“demonstrating what Kant had postulated,” i.e. the self-reflexive structure of the I as 
the highest principle of critical philosophy, and the ultimate basis of all knowledge and 
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experience.586 Hence, the further elaboration of the nature and structure of the I that is 
the subject of the I think, was, in Fichte‖s mind, a logical completion of Kant‖s project. His 
analysis starts by pointing out the relation of the I think to the dualism in Kant‖s system, 
which Sturma expresses as follows:587 
The Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism, […] is specifically characterized 
by a fundamental dualist structure with regard to the distinction between the 
―given‖ and the ―constituted‖. It was precisely this dualism that represented the 
skandalon of philosophy for the post-Kantian idealists, and that had at all costs to 
be overcome. 
What is most intriguing about Fichte‖s philosophical system, however, is the way in 
which he transforms the self-reflexive structure of the I into an operator of difference, 
not only within the critical system (i.e. as the basis of Kant‖s two stems of knowledge), 
but likewise, at the level of experience (i.e. as the act of spontaneity that founds 
differential consciousness of an I and a Not-I). From this, Pinkard concludes that:588 
The core insight at the root of Fichte‖s attempt to complete the Kantian system […] 
had to do with what he saw as the basic dichotomy at the root of the Kantian 
system. […] Fichte concluded, that dichotomy itself – that core distinction 
between subjects and objects – was itself subjectively established; it was a 
normative distinction that subjects themselves institute. 
As such, Fichte‖s problematization of pure apperception amounts to an expansion of 
Kant‖s spontaneity from acts of synthesis to acts of differentiation. That is to say, Fichte 
assigns an active role to the subject not only in the conceptual determination of sensible 
givens, but more fundamentally, in producing the difference between intuition and 
thought, matter and form, passivity and activity in experience. Given this shift in 
perspective, Fichte‖s philosophical project has been aptly described as a metacritique , i.e. 
as a critique of Kant‖s critical analysis, which takes the latter‖s postulated duality as the 
first subject of critical inquiry.589  
The details of Fichte‖s account and the way in which it provides a relevant 
background for understanding Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object, will be discussed 
extensively in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to understand that Fichte not only 
established the self-reflexive structure of the I as a unitary foundation of critical 
philosophy, he furthermore thematized the critical function of this I in terms of subject-
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object differentiation in experience. In this sense, one might say that Fichte, who is 
commonly perceived as a philosopher obsessed with unity, was just as much, and more 
interestingly so, a philosopher of difference. More particularly, from a Fichtean 
perspective, the problem of Kant‖s pure apperception lies not primarily in its lack of 
articulation, but in the way in which the postulate of the I think at once postulates a 
duality between this I think and that which it is not, i.e. the object. From this standpoint, 
the lack of articulation of the I think in the CPR is only a problem to the extent that it 
bars the way for a critical investigation of the origin of duality and differentiality.  
With this analysis, we have thus arrived at the aporetic corner of Kant‖s philosophy, 
i.e. its lack of critical investigation of difference, and pinpointed the motive for the 
transition to a next level of analysis in the following chapter. In turning to Helmholtz‖s 
appropriation of Kant in the next section, however, it will soon become clear that this 
appropriation is already conditioned by a criticism of Kant‖s duality, which is why we 
need to discuss this before we can move on to the second (Kantian) level of analysis in 
Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object.  
4.6 Helmholtz‖s Kant: Towards a Critical Analysis of 
Experience 
In the early 1850s, when Helmholtz was appointed a professorship in anatomy and 
physiology in Bonn, and had started his research on the nature of human perception, he 
wrote to his father:590 
It seems to me a favorable moment for the voices of the old school of Kant and […] 
Fichte to obtain a hearing once more. […] Philosophy finds its great significance 
among the sciences as the theory of the source and functions of knowledge, in the 
sense in which Kant, and, so far as I have understood him, the elder Fichte, took it. 
Later in his career, Helmholtz used every opportunity to stress the way in which his 
research confirmed or continued aspects of Kant‖s philosophy.591 For the scientist, 
Kant‖s first Critique presented an epochal shift in thinking about human experience, and 
he credited the philosopher for demonstrating the constitutive role of “pure thinking a 
priori,” and for pointing out that all of our perceptions are “conditioned by the peculiar 
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ability of our mind [eigenthümlichen Fähigkeiten unseres Geistes].”592 Furthermore, he 
claimed that “according to this [i.e. Kant‖s] view perception is recognized as an effect 
[Wirkung] produced on our sensitive faculty […] this effect […] being just as dependent 
on that which causes the effect [dem Wirkenden] as on the nature of that on which the 
effect is produced [dessen, auf welches gewirkt wird].”593 Helmholtz was a self-
proclaimed Kantian in conceiving of the study of human perception as a borderland 
[Grenzgebiet] between the exact sciences and philosophy, in which the latter “considers 
[…] that which belongs to the mind‖s own activity. […] [T]hat which is definition, 
designation, form of representation and hypothesis.”594 In the next two chapters, we will 
therefore discuss the levels of analysis in Helmholtz‖s psychology that engage most 
generally with the critical question of what the mind or subject must be like in order to 
produce experience. These levels logically precede his account of perception as 
empirical construction, in considering the necessary a priori elements of experience.  
In analyzing the way in which Helmholtz‖s psychology relates to Kant‖s critical 
analysis of experience, we engage in one of the most debated characteristics of the 
former‖s theorizing. During Helmholtz‖s lifetime and soon after, a number of 
monographs appeared that were entitled “Helmholtz und Kant.”595 The debate on the 
peculiar entanglement of empiricism and (transcendental) idealism, however, continues 
up to this day.596 In addition to the discussions that arose as a consequence of 
Helmholtz‖s physiological interpretation of Kant‖s forms of intuition (see chapter 2), two 
other topics have dominated philosophical debates on Helmholtz‖s Kantianism, namely 
(i) the former‖s refutation of the transcendental doctrine of space, and (ii) his 
appropriation of Kant‖s apriorism with regard to the causal law.597 Remarkably, there 
seems to be little or no consensus on either one of these topics. While Helmholtz‖s 
refutation of Kant‖s doctrine of space was initially received as providing a final blow to 
the Kantian idea of the synthetic a priori, some have argued that it did not affect the 
Kantian system in any way, while still others maintained that Helmholtz‖s empirical 
theory of spatial determination amounts to a displacement or transformation, rather 
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than an elimination, of the a priori.598 With regard to Helmholtz‖s appeal to the causal 
law, the specter of different interpretations is equally broad: Helmholtz‖s use of the 
principle of sufficient ground has been interpreted as (more or less) Kantian, or as being 
on a par with Hume and/or Mill, while still others have interpreted it as explicitly 
Fichtean in character.599  
In contrast to the bulk of secondary literature that focuses on Helmholtz‖s 
epistemological position and his philosophy of science, we will now discuss these 
matters specifically from the perspective of Helmholtz‖s psychological concerns. More 
particularly, in order to grasp the systematic place of Helmholtz‖ relation to Kant in the 
former‖s psychological theory, we will analyze Helmholtz‖s adoption (and 
transformation) of Kant‖s category of causality and his revision of the transcendental 
doctrine of space against the background of the former‖s attempts to account for the 
psychogenesis of the object in perception. 
Within the context of Helmholtz‖s semiotic understanding of the subject-object 
relation, the general question of what the mind must be like takes the form of what it is to 
understand, i.e. which subjective functions underlie the possibility of the constitution 
and symbolic engagement with the external world? Perceptual understanding, in 
Helmholtz‖s theorizing, comes down to correctly deciphering the sign-language “by 
which external objects discourse to us.”600 In his empirical theory of perception as 
unconscious inference, Helmholtz accounts for the surface structure of this deciphering 
process by pointing out the mediating role of previous experience and voluntary 
movement. However, it is especially Helmholtz‖s quite abstract interrogation of the 
normative question regarding the conditions of understandability or comprehensibility that 
has raised particular attention since the nineteenth century.601 As already explained in 
the first chapter (see section 1.2), Helmholtz emphasized the causal structure of 
understanding, both on the level of discursivity (the scientific investigation of natural 
phenomena) and perception (the understanding of sign-sensations). In other words, to 
understand, according to Helmholtz, is to relegate the variety of natural phenomena, or 
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the flux of sensible material, to the lawlike action of a hypothesized real cause, or Ur-
sache:602 
If to conceive [Begreifen] means to form concepts [Begriffe], […] it follows that […] 
the concept must try to summarize a changing series of phenomena […] one which 
remains the same in all its stages. The wise man, as Schiller expressed it: 
  Seeks the trusting law in Chance‖s horrifying wonders, 
  Seeks the resting pole in Phenomena‖s flight 
In what follows, we will outline Helmholtz‖s views on perceptual comprehensibility 
and the way in which these relate to Kant‖s transcendental analysis. After considering 
Helmholtz‖s appropriation and adaptation of Kant‖s causal law, some interpretative 
difficulties will be sketched. In conclusion, it is argued that in order to grasp some of the 
idiosyncrasies regarding Helmholtz‖s appeal to Kant in this respect, one should take into 
account the former‖s criticism of Kant‖s epistemological dualism in general, and the 
concept of intuition [Anschauung] in particular. After this, I will turn to the 
investigation of Helmholtz‖s revision of Kant‖s transcendental conception of space, and 
the way in which it can likewise be related to his discomfort with the Kantian notion of 
intuition.  
4.6.1 Perceptual Comprehensibility: Founding the Signaling Function of 
the Sign-Sensation 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the concept of the object in Helmholtz‖s 
theorizing is generated through the recognition of a lawlike covariation of circles of 
sensations and bodily movement: to conceive an object x as being there, is to conceive 
of all the possible sensations it might produce under various circumstances. However, 
Helmholtz denies that the flux of sensations is in and by itself capable of producing 
these conditional certainties. Given the fundamentally underdetermined nature of 
sensations with respect to their origin, association alone cannot explain how we first 
escape the world of our nervous systems: 603  
 [I]s that which I have called thinking […] earlier, […] nothing but a mechanical […] 
association of ideas? I ask you, to take one last step with me, a step, that will take 
us back […] to Kant […] If there is to arise a connection between the idea 
[Vorstellung] of an object […] and sensations, we must already have the idea of 
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such a determined object. […] [W]e never directly perceive external objects, but 
only the effects of these objects on the nervous system, and that has been the case 
since the very first moments of our lives. What first enables us to pass from the 
world of nervous sensations into the world of actuality [Welt der Wirklichkeit]?  
Here again, we could appeal to the so called promiscuity of association to clarify the 
problem at stake (see section 4.4.2). In itself, everything can be associated with 
everything, and Helmholtzian sensations (successive states of excitation) are in 
themselves too meager, and the succession of sensations is too contingent, to produce 
the necessary associative combination, i.e. the associative process does not contain the 
rule for the associability of sensations.604 Hence, the flux of sensory modifications is 
inapt to produce anything that would come close to a lawlike connection, or the idea of 
the object as a necessary and sufficient cause. In Helmholtz‖s theorizing, the historical 
discussion regarding the necessary connecting principle thus reappears as the question 
concerning the signaling function of the sign, i.e. the problem of accounting for the 
foundation of the ability to establish lawlike connections between sensation-signs and 
object-meanings. This is the point where Helmholtz‖s inquiry shifts from an 
interrogation of perceptual comprehension to the question of perceptual 
comprehensibility.  
To address this problem, Helmholtz famously argues that the perceptual process is 
dependent a priori on the imposition of a causal structure on every possible experience. 
Consequently, he determines the law of causation as a necessary subjective function, 
that founds the possibility of perceptual reference and provides a motive for 
objectification:605 
We have to presuppose the presence of external objects as the cause of our 
nervous excitation, because there can be no effect without a cause. How do we 
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know that there can be no effect without a cause? Is it a law of experience 
[Erfahrungssatz]? According to some, it is. But […] we use the law to arrive […] at 
the insight that there are objects […] in the first place […]. Can we get it from the 
internal experience of our self-consciousness? No; since we conceive of self-
conscious acts of volition and thought as free; i.e. we deny that they are the 
necessary effects of sufficient causes. In this way, the inquiry into the nature of 
sense perception leads us to the insight that Kant had already revealed: that the 
law […] is a law of thought, given prior to experience. 
In other words, a sign is only a sign, according to Helmholtz, for a being that “is 
driven to seek the lawful,” as Hatfield put it.606 “Just as it is the particular activity of our 
eyes to experience light […],” the former writes in 1867, “it is the peculiar activity of our 
understanding [Verstandes] […] to search for causes, and it [understanding] cannot but 
understand the world as a causal connection.”607 The transition from the contingent and 
underdetermined world of nervous excitations to the notion of a law, is mediated by 
this ―regulative principle of our thinking‖:608 
If we assume […] that we will be able to establish a final unchangeable something 
as the cause of observed changes, then we call the regulative principle of our 
thinking, that which impels us, the causal law. […] [I]t expresses trust in the 
complete conceivability of the world. Conceiving […] is the method by means of 
which our thinking masters the world, orders the facts, predetermines the future. 
[…] The causal law is really an a priori given, transcendental law […] not even the 
first steps of experience are possible without […] the causal law.  
Subsequently, Helmholtz opposes this a priori conception to J.S. Mill‖s regularity view, 
i.e. the claim that “the law of cause and effect, is itself an instance of induction.”609 For 
Helmholtz, it is only “by virtue of” the law of causality as a form of thought [Denkform] 
that we progress from effects to causes, and hence, he argues that “this law of thought 
precedes experience. We cannot […] experience […] objects, if the law of causality were 
not already operative in us.” Consequently, the law “cannot be derived […] from 
experience” and cannot be demonstrated empirically.610 In the end, Helmholtz‖s 
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statement (see chapter 3) that “we can never emerge from the world of our sensations 
to […] an external world, except by inferring from the changing sensation that external 
objects are the cause of this change,” is only intelligible against the background of his 
insistence on the a priori causal structure of understanding, by virtue of which 
contingent sensations are transformed into constant signs.  
4.6.2 Helmholtz‖s Kantianism: Critical Reflections 
Although we have now pinpointed the systematic significance of Helmholtz‖s 
appropriation of Kant‖s causal law within his own theorizing – i.e. as the foundation of 
the signalling function of sign-sensations – we cannot sidestep the notorious 
interpretative difficulties surrounding Helmholtz‖s self-professed. In what follows, three 
of the most debated perceived difficulties with Helmholtz‖s view on causality will 
therefore be discussed: 
(i) The evolution in Helmholtz‖s conception of the causal law; 
(ii) Helmholtz‖s psychologistic understanding of the concept of necessity; 
(iii) The different reading of Helmholtz‖s use of the law that emerges when it is 
viewed in light of his criticism of Kant‖s Anschauung.  
The first two problems emerge mainly from the fact that Helmholtz adopts elements 
from what is essentially an epistemological theory into a psychological account. The 
third one, however, complicates Helmholtz‖s view of causality, and its relation to Kant, 
in quite a different way. More particularly, upon closer analysis, it is clear that 
Helmholtz appropriates the law in an interpretative framework of experience that 
differs radically from Kant‖s, in that it overthrows the latter‖s distinction between the 
passive (receptive) and the active (spontaneous) faculties of the Gemüth. 
4.6.2.1 The Evolution in Helmholtz‖s Understanding of the Causal Law 
One of the difficulties with interpreting Helmholtz‖s conception of the causal law, is the 
way in which his position evolved in the course of his career. There is considerable 
disagreement on both the exact nature of this evolution, and Helmholtz‖s mature stance 
on causality.  
To gain insight in the evolution of Helmholtz‖s conception of the causal law, his 1847 
paper, and especially the 1881 appendix added to it, offers an interesting point of 
departure. In the initial introduction to On the Conservation of Force, Helmholtz had stated 
that the theoretical part of physics that “seeks to determine […] the unknown causes of 
events,” is justified in this endeavor “by the fundamental law that every cause has an 
effect,” a law that is hence determined as the necessary presupposition of the 
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comprehensibility [Begreiflichkeit] of nature.611 In an 1881 appendix, however, 
Helmholtz seemingly changed his mind about the Kantian character of his initial 1847 
introduction:612 
The philosophical discussion in the Introduction was more strongly influenced by 
Kant‖s epistemological perspective, as I would now consider to be correct. It is 
only later that it became clear to me […] that the principle of causality is […] 
nothing but the presupposition of lawfulness in all natural phenomena. […] [T]he 
law posits conditions for every effect. 
Helmholtz‖s Appendix, however, poses at least two problems, namely (1) that his 
―revision‖ can hardly be called un-Kantian, as it reaffirms the status of the law as a 
principle of comprehensibility, and (2) that even after 1881, Helmholtz restates that the 
causal law is “an a priori, transcendental law” in the context of his psychological 
theory.613  
 
The first problem automatically raises the question as to what position Helmholtz 
had initially ascribed to Kant, given his own conviction that the appendix signifies a 
clear retreat. A first viable hypothesis in this respect can be derived from Helmholtz‖s 
discussions with Land on the metaphysical status of the Real as Ur-sache (see chapter 1). 
To be more specific, one might suggest that Helmholtz‖s 1847 appeal to the law was 
meant to justify positive statements made about the cause of natural phenomena, and 
hence indicated (and justified) a realist understanding of the epistemic status of the 
notion of cause.614 In that case, Helmholtz‖s 1881 withdrawal would have been 
intrinsically related to his mature emphasis on the hypothetical character of the 
metaphysical concept of Reality.615 If this was indeed the motive behind Helmholtz‖s 
appendix, however, this would entail that his initial understanding of Kantian causality 
as that which takes us immediately to things in themselves, was hopelessly flawed, as it 
would imply an illegitimate use of a category beyond the limits of possible knowledge. 
Furthermore, Helmholtz‖s 1881 correction, if understood in terms of a retreat from 
causal realism, would actually mean more of a rapprochement to than a departure from 
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Kant, who stressed that the causal law is a discursive principle of understanding, and, as 
such, not a feature of things-in-themselves.616  
  
There is, however, a second hypothesis that could provide more insight into 
Helmholtz‖s motive for reconsidering his initial stance. In comparing the 1847 and 1881 
statements, one notices that Helmholtz‖s retreat mainly affects the justificatory power 
of the causal law, while its subjective necessity is retained. In 1881, the law has become 
―a mere presupposition‖. Hence, one could hypothesize that the most significant 
―evolution‖ in Helmholtz‖s thought on causality was related to the way in which he 
dissociates its justificatory power from its subjective necessity, or its epistemological 
and its psychological necessity.617 This would likewise imply a misunderstanding of, or a 
disregard for, central elements of Kant‖s project, but in quite a different way. More 
particularly, this dissociation suggests a lack of sensitivity for the inextricable relation 
between subjective necessity and apodictic certainty in the Critique, and, more 
particularly, for the spirit of Kant‖s transcendental deduction.618 Although the 
dissolution of objectivity and subjective necessity significantly changes the meaning of 
the a priori, it seems indeed that the mature Helmholtz endorsed both (i) the 
epistemological contingency, and (ii) psychological necessity of the causal law. That is 
to say, although Helmholtz maintained that the causal structure of understanding is an 
a priori condition of knowledge and experience, he also emphasized its hypothetical 
 
                                                     
616
 Fullinwider (1990), among others, argued that Helmholtz‖s causal law takes us immediately to the thing-in-
itself, and therefore relates the discussion of Helmholtz‖s conception of causality to the problem of affection in 
Kant‖s first Critique. This problem – prototypically raised as an objection to the soundness of Kant‖s 
transcendental analysis of experience in Schulze (1911) – concerns the explanation of sensible affection in 
terms of the causal efficacy of the unknown thing-in-itself. As the latter would imply an illegitimate 
application of the category of causality beyond the realm of possible experience, this allegation would gravely 
affect the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself as a boundary concept (CPR [B311]). However, as Jacobi (1799), 
and, more recently, Hanna (2006) argue, one could ascribe this objection to a confusion between thinking and 
knowing, or between a subject‖s double nature as a sensible and a rational being. While the thing-in-itself can 
be legitimately thought of as the cause of sensible affection, this does not imply that it is thereby known. As 
rational beings, subjects produce the idea of a transcendent object as the cause of sensations, while this 
concept remains nothing but an empty ens rationis (a thing of reason), without an actual referent (CPR 
[A290/B347]). In the same sense, Helmholtzian sensation can be said to indicate the Real, or provide the 
occasion for the generation of the empty concept of Reality as cause, while this does not necessarily imply a 
robust metaphysical realism. For recent discussions of the problem of affection in Kant, see for example 
Westphal (1997), Hanna (2006), Sandkaulen (2007), Schulting & Verburgt (2010). As will be explained in the 
next chapter, the problem of affection was an important motive for Fichte‖s post-Kantian attempt to expand 
and complete the Kantian analysis of experience. 
617
 Hatfield (1990), Fullinwider (1990), Schmitz (1996), Patton (2009). 
618
 See Hatfield (1990), p. 216.  
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
170 
 
nature, especially during the last decades of life. In a posthumously published note, 
Helmholtz captures his thoughts on the matter as follows:619 
The Law of Causation […] is a mere hypothesis, and not otherwise demonstrable. 
[…] The sole test of any hypothesis is, try if it be so, and you will find out […]. In 
comparison with other hypotheses […] the law of causality is exceptional in the 
following ways: (1) all others presuppose it; (2) it gives us our sole possibility of 
knowing something we have not yet observed; (3) it is the necessary foundation of 
[…] action; […] Hence we are induced by the strongest motives to desire its 
validity. It is the groundwork of all our thoughts and acts. 
From this, Schiemann concludes that Helmholtz‖s conception of causality in his later 
years “no longer deviated much from Mill‖s standpoint on the issue.”620 In the same vein, 
Riehl (1904) and Schlick (1921) had argued earlier that Helmholtz “took the path of 
David Hume” with regard to causality, since its validity in Helmholtz‖s theorizing never 
rises above its status as a mere hypothesis.621 In the second, revised version of the 
Treatise, however, Helmholtz explicitly reiterates his Kantian stance on the matter, and 
furthermore, maintains that the principle of sufficient reason itself is not, and cannot 
be, a product of experience, but is rather an indispensible condition of possibility for the 
latter. Hence, it seems more reasonable to assume that while Helmholtz‖s 
epistemological stance with regard to the contingent status of the law is close to Hume‖s 
and Mill‖s, he never abandoned his ideas concerning its a priori necessity for experience 
and knowledge.622 With regard to the necessary role of the a priori causal structure of 
understanding in experience, Helmholtz thus sided with Kant, although he drastically 
reinterpreted the a priori to fit his psychological theory, as will be explained in the next 
sections. For one thing, the concept of necessity in Helmholtz‖s theorizing “ceases to be 
the factor that defines objectivity,” as Fullinwider notes.623 Evidence for this hypothesis 
can easily be found. Take for example the following passage, that claims that the law of 
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causality is a priori, transcendental, and yet contingent from an epistemological 
viewpoint:624 
The causal law is really an a priori given, a transcendental law. It is not possible to 
prove it by experience because, as we have seen, not even the first steps of 
experience are possible without […] the causal law; and from the completed 
experience, when it too taught that everything observed so far has proceeded in a 
law-like manner – which we are assuredly far from being justified in claiming – 
would always only be able to follow by an inductive conclusion, i.e. under the 
assumption of the causal law, that now the causal law would also be valid in the 
future. Only one piece of advice is valid here: trust and act! [...] This would be the 
response that we would have to offer to the question: what is truth in our 
representation. 
In this passage, Helmholtz at once formulates his pragmatic view on the 
epistemological status of causality, and his a priori perspective on its psychological 
necessity. In conclusion, it seems that Helmholtz‖s much debated ―evolution‖ was 
explicitly epistemological in nature, and did not affect his views on the a priori necessity 
of causality for perception. In the context of his psychological theory, Helmholtz 
maintained the aprioricity of the law, and the way in which this normative principle 
founds his empirical theory.  
As already suggested, however, Helmholtz‖s integration of epistemological concepts 
in a psychological framework did have drastic implications for the meaning of the a 
priori, and, more precisely, for the understanding of ―subjective necessity‖. As such, the 
consideration of the evolution of the causal law in Helmholtz‖s conception 
automatically leads us to another, related, interpretative problem, namely Helmholtz‖s 
psychologized understanding of Kant‖s a priori.  
4.6.2.2 Helmholtz‖s Psychological Interpretation of ―Subjective Necessity‖ 
While in the previous section we have pointed out that Helmholtz dissociated the ideas 
of subjective necessity and epistemological certainty, and as such, reduced the meaning 
of the a priori to the former, we now have to consider the scientist‖s psychological 
understanding of necessity. While Helmholtz‖s merit as a psychologist lies in his 
engagement with the critical question of what the mind must be like to experience objects, 
his recuperation of the a priori in a psychological framework, was, according to some, 
detrimental for the spirit of Kant‖s Critique. Consequently, Helmholtz was both 
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applauded as a philosophical psychologist (e.g. by the early neo-Kantian Otto Liebmann) 
and heavily criticized as a psychological philosopher.625  
Although Helmholtz frequently stated that the causal law is logical in character, his 
choice of terminology indicates a quite explicit psychological understanding of 
causality.626 In 1867, for example, he describes it as an “urge [Trieb] of our thought 
[Verstandes] to subject all perceptions to its control,” and later specifies this ―Trieb‖ in 
nativist terms, i.e. as “the inborn effect of our organization.”627 Elsewhere, Helmholtz 
argues that the law expresses a “trust in the complete comprehensibility of the world,” 
a “want to understand everything,” and the “method by virtue of which our thought 
masters the world.”628 This qualification of the causal structure of understanding in 
terms of a Trieb, a trust, and a wish, contrasts sharply with the abstract and formal 
character of Kant‖s transcendental exposition, and in that sense, Disalle‖s objection that 
Helmholtz “reinterpreted the Kantian a priori as something that Kant never intended it 
to be: a species of psychological adaptation,” does not seem to be far off the mark.629 
This resonates with Schmitz‖s understanding of Helmholtz‖s law of causality as that 
which first makes sensory modifications comprehensible: “the human mind does not 
understand change, without questioning the laws of changes.”630 The causal law in 
Helmholtz‖s theorizing expresses a psychological disposition, a subjective urge to 
interrogate and objectify sensory modifications. Helmholtz furthermore determines this 
urge to be a defining feature of a being that aims at obtaining mastery over its 
surroundings. As such, his psychological articulation of the causal law evokes the image 
of a goal-driven, action-oriented psychological subject, that is nothing like the abstract 
subject = x of the Critiques.  
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Helmholtz was soon criticized for the epistemological implications of this 
psychologized understanding of subjective necessity. More particularly, the two 
transformations the a priori underwent within Helmholtz‖s psychological theory – i.e. its 
dissociation from the question of objective validity, and its articulation in terms of a 
psychological Trieb – have led to a revival of the problem that Kant had purportedly 
solved in his first Critique, i.e. the epistemological problem of validity 
[Geltungsproblem]. The Marburg school of neo-Kantianism – including Hermann Cohen 
and Paul Natorp, among others – was especially concerned about the way in which 
Helmholtz‖s psychological appropriation of the a priori ultimately undid Kant‖s most 
fundamental epistemological gesture, i.e. the coupling of subjective necessity and 
epistemological certainty.631 Consequently, in the wake of Helmholtz‖s theorizing, a vast 
amount of literature arose on the importance of carefully distinguishing between the 
psychological and the philosophical analysis of experience, in order to prevent a 
complete deflation of the meaning of the a priori. Natorp, for example, contended that in 
psychological research “the objectivity of knowledge is entirely neutralized in 
subjectivity. As appearance of an objectifying thought is itself a mere content of 
consciousness, the objective foundation of truth seems in fact to be subjective.” Further, 
he writes: “if one understands […] by consciousness, a consciousness in the 
psychological sense, then the law that founds the unity of the object is inevitably a law 
of subjectivity, a psychological law, and the so-called objective foundation of the laws of 
truth are […] subjective and psychological.”632 In short, appropriations of Kantian 
concepts within a psychological framework, such as Helmholtz‖s adoption of the causal 
law, were heavily criticized, as the contingency of the psychological subject was 
apparently carried over to the epistemic status of transcendental laws, thus undoing 
Kant‖s most basic epistemological gesture.633 
From a historical viewpoint, Helmholtz‖s analysis of objectification in terms of the 
necessary structure of the objectifying function, thus led to his being denunciated for 
psychologizing epistemology. From the perspective of the psychological problem of the 
object, however, Helmholtz‖s inquiry into the necessary structure of understanding 
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marks a definite move beyond the naturalistic framework. This move derives its 
systematic significance from the way in which it allows the scientist to avoid the 
problems of strict empiricism while accounting for the necessary connecting principle.  
We need to address one last interpretative problem with regard to Helmholtz‖s 
conception of causality, which is especially significant in the context of this discussion, 
although it has been largely neglected by the secondary literature. While the previous 
two problems referred to the way in which Helmholtz transformed the meaning of 
Kant‖s a priori, the next section will take a look at the way in which Helmholtz changes 
the function of the causal law, in accordance with his criticism of the Kantian concept of 
intuition.  
4.6.2.3 Helmholtz, Schopenhauer and Intuition 
In accordance with Kant‖s discursive understanding of the causal law, the category of 
causality is invoked to explain the transition from undetermined objects of sensibility 
(appearances) to the determined experience of events in time (see section 4.4.1). As was 
explained in section 4.6.2 in Helmholtz, by contrast, the causal law functions as a 
principle of determinability for underdetermined sensations, and as such, its operations 
logically precede (and indeed found the possibility of) what Kant called appearances. 
Hence, in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, the law is operative at a more primitive level of 
experience, i.e. it is a condition of possibility for an object to be given, a givenness that is 
presupposed in Kant‖s exposition of the principle in his Second Analogy of Experience. 
Helmholtz‖s use of the principle of sufficient reason should therefore be considered 
against the background of his criticism of Kant‖s doctrinal dualism concerning the two 
stems of knowledge, i.e. sensibility and understanding, or the passive and active 
faculties of the Gemüth respectively.  
While Helmholtz presented his project as a ―redrawing‖ of the Kantian borderline 
between the matter and the form of experience (see chapter 3, section 3.6.2), a closer 
analysis reveals that this so-called ―redrawing‖ amounted to much more than a simple 
relocation. The Kantian system is improved above all, Helmholtz states, through “the 
resolution of the concept of intuition into the elementary processes of thought.”634 In an 
earlier lecture, Helmholtz had likewise expressed his scepticism over the seemingly 
―effortless‖ way in which the object is given in Kant‖s intuition, as if it were a case of 
mere receptivity.635 At this point, the focus of Helmholtz‖s revisionary project thus shifts 
 
                                                     
634
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878b]), p. 364. 
635
 See Helmholtz (1995 [1878b]), p. 355: “the older concept of intuition […] recognizes that as given by 
intuition whose representation comes to consciousness immediately with the sense impression and without 
recollection and effort.” Also see Helmholtz (1969 [1894]), p. 253-254.  
 Helmholtz’s Intellectual Leap (I): Towards a Critical Understanding of Experience 
 
175 
 
from a demarcation to a scrutiny of the concept of intuition itself, as this statement 
from 1892 shows:636 
Kant […] condensed into one act, which he named intuition, all the connecting 
links between pure sense perception and the formation of ideas of the perceived, 
spatially extended object. This plays a role for him […] as if it were merely the 
result of a natural mechanism that could not be an object of further philosophical 
and psychological investigations. 
In an article published a few months before his death, Helmholtz reiterates that his 
psychological theory rejects the concept of intuition as that by means of which “the 
idea of the object leaps into consciousness.”637 As already said, Helmholtz was not at all 
the only one to criticize Kant‖s dualistic scheme of knowledge. Schopenhauer, for 
example, had likewise contended that Kant had not been critical enough with respect to 
the passive side of the Gemüth (sensibility), through which objects are ―given‖ “as if it 
were by virtue of a miracle, a matter of receptivity, coinciding with sensation.”638 
Actually, in this respect, a short discussion of Schopenhauer‖s criticism of Kant, and 
especially his revision of Kant‖s conception of causality, will be instructive, as the 
former accused Helmholtz of plagiarizing his work. 
Soon after Helmholtz gave his 1855 lecture ―On Human Vision‖ [Über das Sehen des 
Menschen], it was published as a pamphlet, and under that form caught the attention of 
Julius Frauenstädt, one of Schopenhauer‖s pupils. Frauenstädt reviewed the young 
scientist‖s work approvingly for the journal Europa, and pointed to the striking parallels 
with Schopenhauer‖s revision of Kant‖s principle of sufficient ground as presented in his 
1813 On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.639 When yet another one of 
Schopenhauer‖s students, Johann August Becker, likewise alerted his teacher of 
Helmholtz‖s 1855 lecture, Schopenhauer replied that:640 
Somebody like that [Helmholtz] […] has not read Kant, but rather ascribes […] to 
him [Kant] what he has learned from me, without mentioning me. As you know, in 
Kant‖s work, the external world readily passes through the senses and enters the 
head. […] Helmholtz merely had the intention […] of establishing himself at all 
costs, and precisely to that end, does not credit others, even though he steels from 
them. Even half of his title was taken from me. 
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Subsequently, Schopenhauer sent a copy of the letter to Frauenstädt, who was 
finishing his Der Materialismus. Seine Wahrheit und sein Irrthum (1856) at that time, adding 
that “Helmholtz […] ascribes to Kant, what belongs to me.”641 Frauenstädt, in his turn, 
took up this accusation in his Der Materialismus, in which he states that it is difficult to 
believe that “Helmholtz […] had not known or learned from” Schopenhauer‖s work.642 
Eventually, the latter work fell into the hands of Helmholtz‖s father, a college 
acquaintance of Schopenhauer, who updated his son on the whole matter:643 
Frauenstädt accuses you of taking what say in your lecture […] from 
Schopenhauer, without […] referring to the latter. However, what he states on 
that topic is partially derived from Kant‖s, partially from Fichte‖s lectures, […] that 
Schopenhauer and I attended at the same time.  
In a reply to his father, Helmholtz politely praises Schopenhauer for his return to the 
“old, healthy standpoint of Kant,” but emphasizes the Kantian pedigree of his own 
conception of causality.644 In a letter a few months later – during which Helmholtz had 
apparently acquainted himself with some of the works of the post-Kantian – this initial 
positive attitude towards Schopenhauer had faded away, and Helmholtz now claims that 
he “thoroughly disliked everything he read” of the man.645  
 
In itself, this peculiar incident has been generally belittled in the secondary literature 
and ascribed to Schopenhauer‖s difficult persona and ―inflated ego‖.646 Given the lack of 
evidence, the case for Helmholtz‖s alleged plagiarism is not quite compelling, nor very 
interesting. However, up until today, Schopenhauer and Helmholtz are frequently 
mentioned together when it comes to their conception of the causal law, and its role in 
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experience.647 Admittedly, although the latter explicitly rejected the former‖s 
philosophical work in general – which is not surprising, given its robust metaphysical 
character – it is possible to discern some similarities between the two authors in their 
use of the causal law.648 Not only is the causal law the sole Kantian category that is 
retained in both Helmholtz‖s and Schopenhauer‖s work, more importantly, both authors 
are on a par when they assign a pivotal role to causality in trying to account for the way 
in which the object is given in sensibility.  
As an admirer and pupil of Goethe, Schopenhauer not only adopted the concept of 
physiological colors (see chapter 2), but was likewise very firm in his insistence on the 
purely subjective (or fundamentally underdetermined) nature of every sensation:649 
[W]hat a meager thing is pure sensation! […] Every kind of sensation, is, and 
always will be, a process taking place within the organism, and as such, is limited 
to the realm under the skin; therefore, it cannot contain anything beyond this 
region [jenseit dieser Haut] […]. […] [T]here is never anything objective in 
sensation. 
After denouncing the lack of intrinsic referentiality in sensation, Schopenhauer goes 
on to attack Kantian concept of intuition as utterly unintelligible.650 In sharp contrast to 
the latter, Schopenhauer contended that at least some degree of conceptual 
determination – which in Schopenhauer‖s case can be identified entirely with the causal 
form of understanding – has to be presupposed on the level of sensibility, to explain 
how something can be given at all:651 
It is only when the understanding […] begins to act, and applies its sole form, the 
law of causality, that a powerful transformation takes place, and subjective 
sensation is turned into objective intuition. That is to say, by virtue of its peculiar 
form, and hence a priori, it determines […] bodily sensation as an effect (a word, 
which it alone understands) that must have a cause […]. Therefore, this operation 
of understanding […] is not a discursive, reflective one […] but intuitive and 
immediate. 
 
                                                     
647
 See among others Liebmann (1869), Riefert (1984), Pastore (1978; 1993), Smith (2002). Zöllner (1872, p. 345-
350) presented a five-page analysis of the similarities between both authors in this respect, by matching 
quotations from Helmholtz‖s work with quotations from Schopenhauer.  
648
 That Helmholtz was not at all fond of Schopenhauer‖s metaphysics, is clear for example in his (1995 [1877a], 
p. 314) statement that “the unconscious will of Schopenhauer” is nothing but an illegitimate “psychological 
anthropomorphism” projected onto the natural realm.  
649
 Schopenhauer (1986 [1813]), p. 68 [my translation]. 
650
 This is also clear in his statements to Becker, as quoted above.  
651
 Schopenhauer (1986 [1813]), p. 69 [my translation]. 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
178 
 
As such, Schopenhauer emphasized the intellectual nature of intuition 
[Intellektualität der Anschauung].652 That is to say, in his work, the law of causality is 
transformed into an intellectual function of intuition, which moreover has logical 
priority over the spatial form of perceptions. It is only after determining sensation as an 
effect, Schopenhauer writes, that the process of constructing causes in space – and thus 
external to the organism – takes place.653 In reinterpreting the causal law as a 
constitutive element of intuition, Schopenhauer feels he has overcome the dogmatic, or 
in his own words, ―miraculous‖ nature of Kantian intuition, and he concludes that 
“intuition is essentially the work of understanding.”654 
Although Helmholtz is not as explicit as Schopenhauer in this respect, his mere 
definition of the law of causality as that which first enables us to escape the world of our 
nervous system, indicates a revision of Kant‖s exposition of the law that is quite close to 
Schopenhauer‖s. In Helmholtz‖s theory, receptivity in the Kantian sense presupposes 
thought, albeit unconsciously, and more particularly, causal inference. As we have seen, 
Helmholtz‖s causality does much more than connect disparate sensations: it founds the 
signaling function of the sign, and, as such, is a condition of possibility for the 
transcendent reference of perception. As has been suggested, it is at this point that his 
psychological theory can be said to bear some resemblance to Schopenhauer‖s analysis, 
although one should not exaggerate the similarities between the two authors.655  
This quite lengthy discussion of Helmholtz‖s conception of the causal law 
automatically leads us to consider the limits of his adherence to Kant‖s transcendental 
analysis of experience. Once on this path, the logical next step to take is that of 
Helmholtz‖s notorious refutation of Kant‖s doctrine of space, which, more than anything 
else, is revealing of Helmholtz‖s endeavor to “correct Kant, where he had not been 
critical enough.”656 Only after this discussion, which is the subject of the next section, 
can we get a clear picture of the scope and purport of Helmholtz‖s ―intellectual leap‖ to 
Kant, and establish its systematic significance for his psychology of the object. 
 
                                                     
652
 Schopenhauer (1986 [1813]), p. 67 [my translation]. 
653
 Ibid.  
654
 Ibid. p. 100. 
655
 The similarities between Schopenhauer and Helmholtz in their explanation of perceptual reference, have 
been pointed out by Pastore (1978, 1993) and Smith (2002). Both authors agree, however, that this causalism 
does not sufficiently account for the possibility of externalisation, and credit Helmholtz for taking his analysis 
one step further, and more particularly, for his stress on the pivotal role of voluntary action in internal-
external differentiation (see chapter 5).  
656
 Helmholtz (1883 [1878a]), p. 660.  
 Helmholtz’s Intellectual Leap (I): Towards a Critical Understanding of Experience 
 
179 
 
4.6.3 Helmholtz‖s Space 
One of the most prominent topics in discussions on the intellectual relation between 
Helmholtz and Kant has always been the former‖s refutation of the latter‖s treatment of 
Euclidean space as the a priori form of outer intuition.657 In the 1860s and 70s, Helmholtz 
set out to demonstrate the factual [Thatsächliche], or empirical basis of the axioms of 
geometry, in a series of papers that take Kant as a main antagonist. Helmholtz (1878b) 
claims that:658 
Kant was influenced in his claim that spatial relations which might contradict 
Euclid‖s axioms cannot even be imagined – just as he was in his overall view of 
intuition as a simple, not further reducible mental process – by the then current 
state of mathematics and sensory physiology.  
So Helmholtz‖s attempt to correct Kant did not only pertain to the latter‖s concept of 
intuition, but likewise, and more importantly so, to his transcendental account of space. 
Contrary to the available knowledge of geometry in Kant‖s time, Helmholtz had a large 
body of evidence at his disposal – e.g. the works of Riemann, Lobatsjevski, Beltrami, etc. 
– which demonstrated the logical possibility of non-Euclidean systems of geometry. 
Helmholtz‖s main argument, however, pertained not only to logical possibility (i.e. 
the conceivability) of alternative geometrical systems, but rather their imaginability 
[Vorstellbarkeit] for “beings whose powers of reason are quite in conformity with 
ours.”659 In his criticism of Kant, Helmholtz therefore starts from the conditional 
statement that “if we can imagine […] spaces of other sorts,[…] it cannot be maintained 
that the axioms of geometry necessarily follow from an a priori given transcendental 
form of our intuition […].”660 In other words, Helmholtz maintained that if it is possible 
to imagine the kind of sensible experiences that would be had in a non-Euclidean space, 
it follows that spatial structure is not a necessary form of outer intuition, but a 
contingent, i.e. empirically constructed, aspect of experience.661 
In tackling the question concerning the aprioricity of space, Helmholtz‖s point of 
departure was explicitly psychological, i.e. his interest in the nature of geometry 
derived from his research on the origin of spatial localization and the “genesis of 
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general spatial perception.”662 The crucial question at stake for him, was thus whether 
the metric system of Euclidean geometry – as a system of principles that provides the 
basic rules for spatial measurement – provides the exclusive, necessary ground of 
spatial localization, or whether spatial determination would be possible (i.e. imaginable) 
for human beings in a geometrical system that describes an alternative space, and 
hence, prescribes alternative principles for spatial measurement.663 In accordance with 
Helmholtz‖s definition of representation as anticipation (see chapter 3), the answer to 
the latter question would be positive if the scientist were able to describe “the whole 
series of sensible impressions that would be had in such a case.” 664  
Subsequently, Helmholtz attempts to demonstrate that such alternative spatial 
structures would in fact be imaginable [Vorstellbar], by means of a series of thought 
experiments – inspired mainly by Beltrami‖s work – in which he determines the possible 
perceptions a person would have when moving about in a non-Euclidean space. 
―Euclidean perceivers‖ that are transported into a pseudospherical world, according to 
Helmholtz, would be able to adapt the rules of spatial determination – i.e. their intuitive 
geometry – by means of active experimentation and bodily movement.665 What these 
experiments demonstrate, according to Helmholtz, is that the metric system by which 
the position and distance of objects in visual space is determined, is not a priori, nor 
inborn, but acquired through bodily movement: “our body with its organs is the 
instrument we carry about in space. Now it is the hand, now the leg, that serves for a 
compass, or the eye turning in all directions […] for measuring arcs and angles in the 
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visual field.”666 In conclusion, Helmholtz argues that the ability for spatial determination 
is a contingent, a posteriori element of perceptual experience:667 
[W]e can infer […] the series of sensible impressions which a spherical or 
pseudospherical world would give us, if it existed. In doing so, we nowhere meet 
an inconsistence or impossibility […]. We can represent to ourselves the look of a 
pseudospherical world […] Therefore, it cannot be allowed that the axioms of 
geometry depend on the […] form of our perceptive faculty. 
One of the crucial hypotheses underlying this empirical account of spatial 
construction is the principle of the free mobility of rigid bodies. In psychological terms, this 
implies that given Helmholtz‖s conception of the body as a measurement instrument, its 
reliability depends on its rigidity in space and time, i.e. on the presumption that its form 
is constant when subjected to temporal and spatial variations. The measurement 
process, in turn, is dependent on bodily movement, i.e. on the condition of free 
mobility.668 As Cassirer noted, Helmholtz thus accounts for the metric determination of 
space in terms of an ―unconscious mathematics‖, and therefore, he paraphrases 
Helmholtz‖s doctrine as Cum homo calculat, fit spatium” [as man calculates, so the world is 
made].669  
The impact of Helmholtz‖s empirisation (or rather psychologization) of the axioms of 
geometry can hardly be overestimated. The stakes of the debates that arose in the wake 
of Helmholtz‖s refutation of Kant‖s transcendental doctrine of space were very high, as 
is reflected by the quite dramatic tone of the introduction to Krause‖s 1878 Kant und 
Helmholtz:670 
Helmholtz has affected Kant‖s system in its foundations, when he denied the 
invariable and […] apodictic nature of the axioms of geometry […]. If Helmholtz is 
right, and if indeed, the Kantian foundation is false, it follows that the content and 
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method of Kant‖s system likewise fail […]. In that case […] German philosophy has 
erred for the last century […], and we can do nothing but send the German youth 
back to the school of the English to study philosophy; a philosophy that Kant and 
his followers had supposedly refuted or corrected.  
Helmholtz, so it seems, had dropped a bomb on the Kantian system, and in doing so, 
cleared the way for the hegemony of empiricism in philosophical thought. This, 
however, was not Helmholtz‖s aim, who maintained that by emptying the Kantian forms 
of intuition, he was merely correcting Kant where he had not been critical enough:671 
Kant‖s theory of the a priori given forms of intuition is a very apt and clear 
expression of the relations of things; but these forms must be without content and 
sufficiently free […]. The axioms of geometry […] limit the form of intuition of 
space in a way such that if geometry is to be generally applicable to the real world, 
then no longer can any imaginable content be included in it. If we eliminate the 
axioms, then the theory of the transcendality [sic] of the form of intuition of space 
is completely inoffensive. Kant has here, in his Critique, not been critical enough 
[…].  
In other words, according to Helmholtz, Kant had erred not so much in assuming that 
space in general is the necessary a priori form of intuition – i.e. in assuming the 
aprioricity of a “purely formal scheme” – but rather in including “certain peculiarities 
of the scheme” in his transcendental theory.672 By taking the principles of spatial 
structure to be a priori, Helmholtz contends, Kant falls back into the dogmatic 
assumption of a pre-established harmony between the form of thought and the external 
world, and because of this, his philosophical arguments against Kant‖s transcendental 
theory of space are very similar to the ones he presented earlier against the nativist 
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hypothesis (see chapter 3).673 Hence, while Helmholtz vehemently denied that the 
mathematical determination of space is a priori, he explicitly added that this does not in 
itself affect the hypothesis regarding the constitutive nature of space as a general form 
of external intuition. On the contrary, Helmholtz even states that “space can be 
transcendental, while the axioms are not,” and concludes that the Kantian hypothesis of 
the aprioricity of space is ”completely inoffensive”, as long as it pertains only to a 
purely formal scheme, devoid of metric specifications.674 But what does this mean, 
particularly in the context of Helmholtz‖s psychological theory? 
Helmholtz‖s empirical account of spatial measurement amounts to the following 
psychological approach to spatial determination:675 
It is easy to appreciate that by moving the […] finger along the objects, the 
sequence in which the impressions of the object are presented becomes known; 
that this sequence shows itself to be independent of whether one feels with this or 
with that finger; […]. […] and different tangible surfaces require different motions 
in order to glide along them […]. In such a way may knowledge of the spatial 
ordering of things existing beside one another be acquired. […] [T]his observed 
spatial order of things originally derives from the sequence in which the qualities 
of the sensation present themselves to the moved sensory organ. 
Helmholtz thus conceives of spatial determination as empirical, as it is mediated by 
active experimentation. As such, Helmholtz‖s ―correction‖ of Kant in this respect 
basically comes down to a displacement of spatial structure from the a priori form of 
intuition, to its a posteriori content. Furthermore, it should be noted that this 
displacement does not annihilate Kant‖s theory as such; rather, the a priori element of 
spatial perception is shifted to the condition of the free mobility of rigid bodies.676 
As Helmholtz notes, one could consider the notion of rigidity as “transcendental in 
Kant‖s sense, namely as formed independently of actual experience,” and of the 
hypothesis of free mobility as denoting the a priori form of intuition.677 In other words, 
the hypothesis of the free mobility of rigid bodies and the empirical theory of spatial 
perception relate to each other respectively as the general theory of space, and the 
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particular theory of spatial measurement. While spatial construction is a contingent, a 
posteriori aspect of experience, the determinability of space is founded in the non-
empirical condition of the free mobility of rigid bodies.678  
 
But what is the question of ―space in general‖ – as distinguished from the question of 
spatial determination – in Helmholtz‖s thought, and more importantly, how does it 
relate to his psychological theory? If the free mobility of rigid bodies is determined as 
the a priori form of intuition, i.e. as a condition of possibility for a spatial object to be 
given, what does this mean? This is where Helmholtz‖s theory becomes especially 
interesting for our discussion. As Kant famously argued, space in general is a condition 
of possibility for “sensations to be related to something outside me […] thus in order for 
me to represent them as outside.”679 For Helmholtz too, the question of space is 
intrinsically related to the question concerning the conditions underlying the 
representation of objects as external. As Heyfelder notes,680  
[t]he core of his [i.e. Helmholtz‖s] research interest […] pertained primarily to the 
genesis of our consciousness of an external world, […] opposed to the inside world 
[…]. But as the external world was a spatial world in his conception, his second 
concern was to establish how we come to know this objective space. 
As such, Helmholtz‖s question regarding the genesis of space, is closely related to that 
of objectification. In other words, to say that something is spatial, is to say that 
something is out there, as opposed to the internal world of self-consciousness:681 
[W]e understand as the external world precisely what we perceive as spatially 
determined. That which has no perceptible spatial relation, we conceive as the 
world of inner intuition, as the world of self-consciousness. 
Gradually, it thus becomes clear that the problem of space, in Helmholtz‖s thought, is 
closely related to the problem of differential consciousness in perception, insofar as the 
latter is defined in terms of a geometrical opposition between the spatial external world 
 
                                                     
678
 See for example Neuber (2012), p. 168-169: “The axioms of geometry, Helmholtz maintains, are embodied in 
the system of spatial measurement. Therefore, he thinks that they are not synthetic a priori. On the other 
hand, space itself is for Helmholtz the precondition (or, in Kantian terminology, the “condition of possibility”) 
of all measurement and, consequently, of the axioms of geometry as well. […] [T]he general concept of space 
(―space itself‖) can be characterized by an overarching feature, namely by the free mobility of rigid bodies. […]. 
Space – via its overarching feature of free mobility – is for Helmholtz ―a given form of intuition, possessed 
prior to all experience‖, and therefore transcendental.” 
679
 CPR [A23/B38]. 
680
 Heyfelder (1999), p. 19 [my translation]. Also see Heidelberger (1999).  
681
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878b]), p. 349. 
 Helmholtz’s Intellectual Leap (I): Towards a Critical Understanding of Experience 
 
185 
 
and the non-spatial internal realm of self-consciousness. The relevance of the question 
of space for Helmholtz‖s psychological theory ultimately comes down to the conditions 
underlying the “separation of thought and reality.”682 In other words, the most 
tantalizing question is that of what “produces the notion of separation in space?”683 
Indeed, the problem at stake pertains to that which we have put forward as the ―aporetic 
corner‖ of Kant‖s analysis, i.e. the problem of difference:684 
Kant […] designates […] space as the […] form of outer intuition. […] Even here the 
natural scientific view can, up to a certain point, go along […] [I]f we ask whether 
there is a marker which is common and perceptible by direct sensation, through 
which every perception relating to objects in space is characterized, then we find, 
in fact, one such a marker in the circumstance that the movement of our body 
places us in other spatial relationships […]. The impulse to movement that we give 
through innervation of our motor nerves, is something directly perceivable […]. If 
we now make such types of impulses – take a look, move the hands, go back and 
forth – then we find that the sensations belonging to certain quality circles – […] 
those belonging to spatial objects – can be changed; while other mental states […] 
cannot at all. A decisive distinction between the former and the latter is thus 
posited […]. 
In this passage, the displacement of the transcendentality of space to the condition of 
free mobility becomes especially tangible. Furthermore, the determination of the object 
qua external object, is said to be dependent on the self-relating structure of the will‖s 
impulse, as is implied by Helmholtz‖s remark on the direct perceivability of the will‖s 
impulse. As such, geometrical opposition supervenes on a dynamical opposition, i.e. the 
spatial and the non-spatial are distinguished by means of the awareness of what the will 
can, and cannot change, and as such, in accordance to the scheme of will and resistance. 
Although this process of differentiation in perception through voluntary movement is 
an empirical one, the determinability of the object, qua external object, is founded in the 
possibility for voluntary movement. Consequently, Helmholtz concludes that685 
[…] space would be a […] form of intuition prior to all experience insofar as its 
perception would be tied to the possibility of the will‖s motoric impulses, and for 
which the mental and corporeal ability must be given us through our organization 
before we can have spatial intuition. 
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A bit further, he reiterates that only through voluntary movement can a perceiver 
differentiate between686 
[t]hose changes which we can bring forth and annul by conscious impulses of the 
will […] from those which are not consequences of the will‖s impulses and cannot 
be overcome by such. The latter finding is negative. Fichte‖s appropriate 
expression for it is that a Non-Ego forces recognition of itself vis-à-vis the Ego.  
Helmholtz‖s reconsideration of Kant‖s transcendental theory of space thus comes down 
to an empirization of spatial construction on the one hand, and a naturalization of the a 
priori on the other. More particularly, as was the case with Helmholtz‖s appropriation of 
the causal law, his rethinking of the aprioricity of space in terms of bodily movement 
likewise entails a transformation of the a priori from a purely formal element, into an 
aspect of a perceiver‖s – defined as an agentive and goal-directed living being – ―mental 
and corporeal ability‖. 
 
Moreover, this discussion of Helmholtz‖s theory of space is helpful for acquiring a 
better grip on the conceptual intertwinement of cause and force, specifically within his 
psychological theory.687 As was outlined in the first chapter, Helmholtz relates the 
concept of cause to that of force, defined as “a power […] ready to take effect [zu wirken 
bereit] in every moment where the conditions for its efficacy [Wirksamkeit] occur.”688 
Furthermore, it was explained that to say that the object exists, in Helmholtz‖s 
psychology, is to have determined it as the external cause of internally felt sensory 
modifications. We should now add that this causal attribution is crucially mediated by 
voluntary movement, due to which an external cause reveals itself first and foremost as 
a “power opposing us” [uns entgegentretende Macht]:689 
[I]f […] we recognize it [i.e. the flux of appearances] as something existing 
independently […] we call it cause […]. Insofar, […] as we recognize the law […] as a 
power equivalent to our will, we call it ―force‖. This concept of a power opposing 
us is directly conditioned by the ways and means our simplest perceptions occur. 
[…] It is clear that the separation of thought and reality first becomes possible 
after we know how to complete the separation of that which the Ego can and 
cannot change. This, however, only becomes possible after we recognize which 
law-like consequences the will‖s impulses have at that time. 
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Here all the bits and pieces of Helmholtz‖s psychology start falling into place: while 
the perceptual process is governed by the a priori causal structure of understanding, the 
determination of the object as cause or Ur-sache, is in turn dependent on an act of 
differentiation, an Ur-teilung between the world of Will and that of Force.690 In this sense, 
Helmholtz indeed gives the mind a creative function in determining “not just the 
characteristics of external reality, but its independent existence as well.”691  
As such, Helmholtz‖s analysis of the act of differentiation – which will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter – can be understood as part of his attempt to analyze all of the 
mental acts involved in what Kant purportedly ―condensed in one act‖, i.e. in intuition. 
Therefore, his criticism of Kant‖s theory of spatial intuition can be related to his 
criticism of the Kantian notion of intuition in general.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the focal point of Helmholtz‖s theory of spatial 
perception is not, as in Kant, the question regarding the transcendental character of 
space as such, but rather the question regarding the nature and structure of voluntary 
movement, which founds the possibility of perceptual differentiation. From Helmholtz‖s 
remarks on the central role of the direct perceivability of the will‖s impulse, it follows 
that his perceptual theory ultimately hinges on the presumption that a perceiver is first 
and foremost an agent, and knowingly so. Indeed, Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object is 
ultimately founded in an epistemic subject that is characterized by its ability to say: I 
act. Only on condition of the self-reflexive structure of voluntary action, can something 
appear as ―resistance‖, and can perceptual consciousness be determined in accordance to 
the dynamical scheme mentioned above. Consequently, this investigation automatically 
leads us to reconsider the question of the self-relating structure of the subject, and 
indeed, Kant‖s I think, which functions as the primordial act of spontaneity in the latter‖s 
transcendental analysis. In terms of Helmholtz‖s theorizing, to account for this 
fundamental self-relation, is to account for the physiological and psychological 
structure of agency in general, and the will‖s impulse in particular.  
With this conclusion, we have at once sketched the broad outlines of the next 
chapter, in which Helmholtz‖s psychological account of the primordial act of 
differentiation will be analyzed, as well as the way in which this account marks a move 
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beyond the Kantian project, and rather points towards a rapprochement of Helmholtz‖s 
psychology with Fichte‖s metacritical analysis of experience. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In order to grasp the systematic significance of Helmholtz‖s allegiance to certain aspects 
of Kant‖s critical analysis of experience, this chapter started with an interpretation of 
Kant‖s work as a response to Hume‖s so-called ―labyrinth‖ with regard to the subject. 
First, we outlined Kant‖s diagnosis of Hume‖s problem. It was argued that from a Kantian 
standpoint, empiricism cannot but produce tautological accounts of the subject, as it 
searches for the conditions of experience in experience. As such, Hume‖s Labyrinth is a 
logical consequence of the empiricist framework itself.  
Second, we discussed Kant‖s attempt to overcome this aporia through the 
transcendental doctrines of synthesis and apperception, that respectively address the 
problem of the necessary connecting principle and the unity of experience, that left 
Hume perplexed. In doing so, Kant shifted the scope from the empirical analysis of the 
psychological construction, to the necessary a priori structure of the experiencing 
subject. As a consequence of this shift in scope, the subject is at once transformed from 
a mere theatre of construction, to an organized and spontaneous being.  
On the other hand, we have scrutinized Kant‖s concept of apperception, and explored 
the way in which it invites a further elaboration of the necessary structure of 
subjectivity in experience. It could be argued that by positing the I think as an ultimate 
principle, Kant simultaneously posited the difference between the thinking subject and 
the content of its thoughts, thus leaving the genesis and ground of differential 
consciousness unexplained. Therefore, Kant‖s apperception can be (and has been) the 
point of departure for a further articulation of what the subject must be like in order to 
address the problem of differentiation.  
 
After discussing these elements and possible problems of Kantianism, we turned to 
the critical dimension in Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. As is well known, 
Helmholtz was a self-professed Kantian in his use of the category of causality, that he 
did not consider to be a product of experience, but an a priori necessary organizing 
principle. We suggested that Helmholtz uses the aprioricity of causality to account for 
the signaling function of the sensation-sign. In his psychological account, the notion of 
―cause‖ regulates the association of disparate sensations, and determines their ability to 
symbolize a unitary origin. ―Cause‖, in the sense, does not denote the temporal priority 
of the object over the state of excitation, but rather the organizational principle of the 
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mind, that grounds the comprehensibility of subjective states of functional activity in 
the nervous system. Hence, causal attribution in Helmholtz, is not primarily a 
reproductive, but an a priori productive activity, that grounds the possibility of 
perceptual experience and objectification.         
In the context of this discussion, we were inevitably faced with the way in which 
Helmholtz‖s psychological adaptation of Kant‖s formal principle of causality, affected 
the meaning of the a priori. More particularly, we discussed the evolution in Helmholtz‖s 
conception of the causal law, and pinpointed the gradual dissociation of epistemological 
objectivity and psychological necessity as one of the distinctive characteristics of his 
changing views in this respect. More importantly, however, we have studied the 
peculiar polemics between Schopenhauer and Helmholtz, in order to shed light on yet 
another difficulty with respect to the interpretation of Helmholtz‖s Kantian inspired 
causalism. To be precise, we argued that in Helmholtz‖s psychological theory, the causal 
law functions as a constitutive principle for receptivity itself, and thus overthrows 
Kant‖s distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, the given and the constituted, 
or the active and passive side of the Gemüth.      
 Subsequently, we considered Helmholtz‖s revision of Kant‖s theory of space in 
light of his dissatisfaction with K ant‖s doctrinal dualism. In doing so, we found that 
Helmholtz‖s criticism of Kant‖s space (i) was motivated at least partially by an attempt to 
overcome the latter‖s strict distinction between passivity and activity, and (ii) opened 
up the way for an in-depth psychological analysis of the origin of differentiality in 
perception.    
        
As such, this chapter not only pinpointed the way in which Helmholtz transgressed 
the pure empiricist framework by taking recourse to a Kantian inspired account of 
subjective spontaneity, it likewise provided us with furtile ground for yet a further 
articulation of the necessary structure of subjectivity. Through Helmholtz‖s revision of 
Kant‖s theory of space, a principle emerged that is foundational with respect to his 
entire psychology of the object, namely the principle of the free mobility of rigid bodies, 
that founds the ability for differentiation. As will be argued in the next chapter, the 
introduction of this principle marks Helmholtz‖s departure from a critical, to a 
metacritical level of analysis, that resonates with Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine. 
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Chapter 5  
Helmholtz‖s Intellectual Leap (II): In the Beginning 
was the Act 
I can move, because I can move. This proposition is not a 
tautology 
 
- Erwin Straus (1935), p. 425. 
5.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we discussed Helmholtz‖s criticism of Kant‖s concept of 
intuition, and the interrelated problem of dualism within Kant‖s system. The purport of 
this criticism with regard to the problems of perception and objectification can hardly 
be overestimated. The unanalyzed assumption of an object-subject dualism – and the 
hypothesis of a primitive moment of passive affection – leaves the foundational 
dynamics of perceptual differentiation unexplained. In terms of Helmholtz‖s 
psychology, the problem at stake can be reformulated as follows: given that the image of 
the object arises from causal determination, it still remains unclear what founds the 
possibility of the dual consciousness of causes and effects.       
We therefore have to consider a final level of analysis in Helmholtz‖s psychology, that 
starts out from a critique of Kant, and is continuous with the metacritical idealist system 
of Fichte. More particularly, in this chapter we should go into the philosophical 
background of Helmholtz‖s perspective on the foundation of geometrical and dynamical 
opposition in perception. As will become clear, this entails a further exploration of the 
constitutive role of voluntary action, as it was discussed at the end of chapter 4.  
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In this chapter, the scope shifts from the analysis of the conditions underlying 
perceptual synthesis to those determining the possibility of what Kant called 
apperception. In other words: the central question now becomes that of the structure of 
the irreducible self-relation expressed in the I think, and of how this self-reflexivity 
founds the possibility of objectification.  
 
It is clear that at this point, we have reached a quite high level of abstraction. By 
turning to Fichte and his transcendental metacritique , it seems we are far removed from 
the subject in its spatiotemporal determination, with its physical body, and its concrete 
experiences. This is, however, not quite the case. As will become clear at the end of this 
chapter, the detour through Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine leads us right back to a consideration 
of Helmholtz‖s psychophysiological analysis of the experiencing body. More 
particularly, it will be argued that Helmholtz‖s account of the physiological structure of 
agency was ultimately informed by the idealist idea of the striving subject as the 
foundation of experience and knowledge.   
This chapter will be organized as follows: 
(1) First, a preliminary discussion is presented of the way in which Helmholtz‖s 
psychology of perception can be related to J.G. Fichte‖s work (section 5.2). 
(2) Second, the concept of ―metacritique ‖ is explained, specifically in its Fichtean 
elaboration (section 5.3). Fichte‖s metacritical analysis of experience will be 
discussed by subsequently going into (i) the way in which his philosophy can be 
read as a philosophy of difference (section 5.3.1), (ii) his metatheoretical view of 
the subject as a practical, striving being (section 5.3.2), and (iii) the way in which 
(i) and (ii) are articulated in his work ―The Facts of Consciousness‖ [die 
Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns] (section 5.3.3). 692 
(3) Third, we will take a look at the way in which Fichte‖s idealist theory of 
subjectivity determines his particular view of the body (section 5.5). Going into 
Fichte‖s conception of the body could prove to be valuable in facilitating the 
transition from the idealist theory of subjectivity, to Helmholtz‖s 
psychophysiological analysis of the perceptual process.  
(4) Subsequently, a more in-depth analysis is presented of Helmholtz‖s relation to 
Fichte. In this part, possible objections against this alleged continuity are first 
outlined, and overcome (section 5.5). 
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(5) Finally, textual evidence for Helmholtz‖s indebtedness to Fichte is presented 
(section 5.6), and the metacritical dimension of Helmholtz‖s philosophy (section 
5.6.1) and physiology (section 5.6.2) is outlined.   
5.2 Helmholtz and Post-Kantian Idealism: Preliminary 
Remarks 
Although post-Kantian philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel commonly 
placed themselves in the tradition of Kant, their work was received by many as a 
grotesque perversion of the critical system. In fact, it seemed as if post-Kantian 
metaphysical systems erased all traces of critique in the Kantian sense, i.e. as a 
philosophical project that aims to limit “the speculative use of reason.”693 A prototypical 
example of the nineteenth-century anti-metaphysical scientist, Helmholtz seized every 
possible opportunity to criticize post-Kantian idealism in general, and Hegelian 
philosophy in particular, and reproached its bold endeavor to derive truth from nothing 
but pure thinking itself.694 As will be explained in the course of this chapter, however, 
Helmholtz‖s attitude towards J.G. Fichte‖s philosophical work was much less 
straightforward as it might seem at first. As Turner has noted, Helmholtz apparently 
distinguished between “two aspects of Fichte‖s thought,” and accepted Fichte‖s 
philosophy to the extent that it “represented a phenomenology of consciousness,” while 
he “resolutely rejected Fichte‖s […] attempts to build an idealist metaphysics on that 
basis.”695 In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that Helmholtz‖s work indeed supports 
the hypothesis of a restricted indebtedness to Fichte‖s philosophy. While Helmholtz 
despised metaphysics, and thus also ―Fichte the metaphysician‖, the same does not hold 
for his attitude towards ―Fichte the philosopher of mind‖. Actually, a closer analysis of 
Helmholtz‖s theorizing even reveals that Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine might well contain the 
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essential key to an in-depth understanding of his psychology of the object in general, 
and his emphasis on the constitutive role of agency in perception in particular.696  
In order to grasp the systematic significance of Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine for Helmholtz‖s 
psychology, an analysis will be offered of the way in which the latter‖s philosophical 
work can be interpreted as a metacritical expansion and radicalization of Kant‖s 
transcendental theory of experience. The metacritical project was launched by Karl 
Leonard Reinhold – the first to hold the Jena chair in critical philosophy – and was 
motivated mainly by concerns about (i) critical philosophy‖s lack of a first foundational 
principle, and (ii) the dualism inhering Kant‖s system.697 Both problems, however, are 
interrelated, as the attempts to overcome Kant‖s dualism in post-Kantian philosophy 
proceeded mainly from the search for a single uniting principle, that should not only 
transcend Kant‖s doctrinal dualism, but also form the unitary foundational basis of the 
critical system. Fichte‖s project as well can be interpreted as a metacritique in this sense, 
to the extent that it aims to address both problems through an extensive elaboration of 
the notion of the self-reflexive I as the highest principle of knowledge, as the alpha and 
omega of the Science of Knowledge (see below).698  
5.3 Fichte‖s metacritique of Experience 
Because Fichte‖s project of a metacritique is closely related to his criticism of Kant‖s 
dualism, it is first of all important to gain insight into what the problem of Kant‖s 
dualism is, or may be, and how it relates to the central topic of our investigation, i.e. the 
problem of the object. As Zöller has observed, Fichte‖s metacritical aspiration, i.e. the 
attempt to found Kant‖s critical project in an overarching principle, comes “under 
different guises”, namely699  
as the unity of intuition and concept in the first Critique, as the unity of moral fact 
and moral law in the second Critique, and as the unity of aesthetic feeling and 
knowing in the third Critique. Fichte‖s radical integration of (theoretical) 
understanding and sensibility, of (practical) reason and desire, and of (reflective) 
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judgment and feeling aims at a deep structure of subjectivity that lends specificity 
and determinacy to what was left unspecified and indeterminable by Kant‖s triple 
critique of reason. 
In short, the notion of ―metacritique ‖ is an overarching term for specific metacriticisms 
that have an equal amount of Kantian dualisms as their object. The term denotes Fichte‖s 
endeavor to found Kant‖s three Critiques individually, i.e. the latter‖s critical theories of 
knowledge, ethics and desire, as well as his overall attempt to articulate their mutual 
relation and unity, and as such, bring the critical project to its systematic completion.700 
While we are especially interested in Fichte‖s metacritique of experience – i.e. those parts 
of his work that present a critique of Kant‖s first Critique – it will soon become clear that 
this dimension of Fichte‖s work is closely related to other aspects of his overall 
metacritical endeavor.  
If we restrict ourselves to Fichte‖s metacritique of experience, the relevant dualism 
pertains to Kant‖s ―two stems of human cognition‖, i.e. sensibility and understanding, 
and their alleged ―common root‖ that Kant had intimated, but never articulated.701 As 
was explained in the previous chapter, Kant‖s doctrine of synthesis analyzed experience 
as the synthetic product of both the passive (receptive) and spontaneous (active) 
faculties of the Gemüth. Upon abstraction, these two stems, as well as their synthetic 
unity in experience and knowledge, respectively express the two foundational 
characteristics of the critical project.702 On the one hand, Kant‖s emphasis on the 
constitutive nature of subjective spontaneity is defining for his project as a critique of 
immediacy, i.e. Kant denies that receptivity alone suffices to bring about an object in 
experience, and by contrast, establishes the object as a function of subjectivity. On the 
other hand, however, subjective spontaneity is in turn claimed to be limited by the 
sensible material provided by sensibility. Hence, Kant writes, the finite mind “cannot 
become active except through being passive.”703 In that sense, the defining feature of 
Kant‖s ―third way‖ approach between empiricism and rationalism is the way in which his 
work combines a critique of immediacy and an epistemology of constraint.704 Kant‖s 
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famous credo that “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts 
are blind” seems to refer exactly to the way in which both stems of knowledge mutually 
determine and limit each other.705  
 
As already suggested, however, Kant‖s doctrinal dualism was soon received as 
problematic. One of the bones of contention for post-Kantians pertained to the 
intelligibility of the idea of receptivity, and the way in which it relates to his critique of 
immediacy:706 
According to the Kantian no object can count as an object for a human knower, 
apart from the knower‖s own activity or spontaneity […]. […] But […] how is it 
possible to accept the Kantian critique of immediacy while also giving an 
epistemologically adequate account of the constrained or finite character of 
human knowing (i.e., an account that does not rely on some appeal to what is 
simply ―given‖)? […] Many post-Kantian thinkers have accepted the Kantian 
critique of immediacy while at the same time rejecting Kant‖s account of such 
constraint. Some, in fact, have held that Kant‖s epistemology of constraint 
commits him to backtrack on his own critique of immediacy.  
With regard to the question of experience and in light of Kant‖s criticism of 
immediacy, it was especially the idea of passive affection that was received as 
problematic. That is to say, given that there can be nothing in experience that is not a 
function of the subject, the mere notion of intuition was criticized as a dogmatic 
element of the critical system, i.e. as a premise that assumed the existence of objects, in 
a theory that exactly aimed to found the object and the process of objectification in 
subjective spontaneity.707 According to many, this was one of the aspects of Kant‖s 
philosophy that made it vulnerable to sceptical attacks, such as, for example, Schulze 
notoriously presented in his Aenesidemus.708 The latter criticized Kant‖s system exactly 
on this point, with the argument that the idea of a passive givenness presupposing the 
causal efficacy of a thing-in-itself is very hard to reconcile with the idea of a passive 
givenness at large, and that Kant‖s analysis of experience is unintelligible if one doesn‖t 
presuppose that moments of affection have a Real-Grund.709 This became a classic 
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problem for Kant scholars, and is commonly denoted as the problem of affection. The crux 
of the problem pertains to the epistemic status of ―the object‖ in, for example, the 
following quote: “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as 
we are affected by it, is sensation.”710 This passage in particular could invite 
interpretations in terms of noumenal causality, i.e. causal affection by the thing-in-
itself, which would be inconsistent with Kant‖s restriction of the applicability of the 
categories to the realm of possible experience.711 
In reading Fichte‖s 1797/98 Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, one 
can hardly fail to notice the centrality of the problem of affection and of the question 
regarding the ground of passivity experience. However, Fichte explicitly rejects 
Schulze‖s dogmatic, realistic reading of Kant.712 More particularly, Fichte firmly denies 
that the moment of affection in Kant is to be explained by referring to a causally 
affecting thing-in-itself, as this would, indeed, run counter to the Kantian prohibition to 
apply the categories beyond the realm of possible experience. “For me,” Fichte writes, 
“it is impossible to impute this absurdity to any still in possession of his reason”:713 
So long, therefore, as Kant does not expressly declare in so many words, that he 
derives sensation from an impression given by the thing-in-itself; or, to employ his own 
terminology, that sensation is to be explained in philosophy from a transcendental object 
existing in itself outside us; for so long I shall decline to believe what his expositors 
have to tell of him. 
The basic mistake, according to Fichte, is that philosophers such as Schulze, for 
example, state that the idea of the thing-in-itself is grounded in sensation, and that 
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hence, sensation itself is grounded in the thing-in-itself. Thus, he concludes, “[t]heir 
earth reposes on a mighty elephant, and the mighty elephant reposes on their earth.”714 
Yet, Fichte does admit that there are passages in the Critique that invite an 
interpretation in terms of this ―absurdity‖. In this context, Fichte refers especially to the 
ambiguous use of the term ―object‖ [Gegenstand] in CPR [A20/B34], as quoted above, and 
to CPR [A19/B33]: “The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the 
way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility.”715 As Fichte likewise 
maintains that Kant cannot have meant that affection is founded in the thing-in-itself, 
he sets out to analyze the latter in terms of an act of spontaneity, thus accounting for 
the transcendental faculty of receptivity in terms of a subjective act of positing:716 
What, then, is the object? […] The object affects us; something that is merely thought 
affects us. […] What now is this? […] If you posit an object with the thought that it 
has affected you, you conceive yourself in this case affected […] [B]y this thinking of 
yours you ascribe to yourself receptivity or sensibility […]. Is there then assumed 
to be no contact, no affection whatever in accounting for knowledge? […] 
[C]ertainly, our knowledge all proceeds from an affection; but not affection by an 
object. […] As surely as I posit myself, I posit myself as something restricted […] 
This restrictedness of myself […] is evinced in a limitation of my practical capacity 
[…]: the immediate perception of this limitation is a feeling. 
The object that founds experience, in other words, is not the thing-in-itself, but the 
thing-for-me in its capacity of being posited through an operation of negation.717 This is 
receptivity in Fichte, and this, in short, is how he resolves Kant‖s concepts of intuition 
and understanding in one, single, transcendental act of positing and counterpositing.  
Hence, if a metacritique of experience is needed at all, then, from a Fichtean 
perspective, it is meant to complete and improve the Kantian critique by critically 
analyzing the subjective ground of the passivity experience, or affection, and in doing 
so, strengthen the Kantian project against sceptical attacks. More particularly, Fichte 
sets out to demonstrate the way in which Kant‖s critique of immediacy and his 
 
                                                     
714
 Fichte (1982 [1794, 1797/98]), p. 55. 
715
 Fichte (1982 [1794, 1797/98]), p. 59. 
716
 Fichte (1982 [1794, 1797/98]), p. 59-61. Also see Lumsden (2004), p. 124: “Fichte […] was convinced by 
Maimon‖s criticism of Kant […]. On this reading of Kant, his reliance on a passively delivered intuitive content 
of knowledge left knowledge tied to an external and unknowable thing-in-itself. […] Any first principle, which 
might secure the completion of the critical project, had to establish that knowledge was not given its content 
by a passively conceived model of intuition but that the subject was active in the determination of the 
intuitive component of knowledge as well.”  
717
 Also see Fichte (2008 [1817]), p. 2: “[A]ffection itself is a limitation of the general sense to be affected in this 
particular manner. For instance: ―I perceive this flower to be red‖ means simply, that my seeing in general, and 
particularly my seeing of this colour, is limited by that particular seeing of a colour […].” 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
198 
 
epistemology of constraint can be united, by deriving the possibility of affection from 
the subject‖s spontaneity. As Baur explains, one could say that Fichte sought to found 
Kant‖s theory of constraint through a radicalization of the critique of immediacy, i.e. by 
turning passivity experience into a function of spontaneity.718  
The basic operator in this process is that of negation: affection – or the appearance of 
a Not-I in experience – denotes a moment of limitation, of constrained activity, and as 
such, should be thought of, and made intelligible against the background of the I‖s 
centrifugality. As was already noted, from this perspective, Fichte‖s system appears 
above all to be a philosophy of difference, i.e. an interrogation of the ground of 
differentiality in experience. 
5.3.1 Fichte‖s Ego-Doctrine as a Philosophy of Difference 
As the previous section has pointed out, Fichte‖s metacritical project – i.e. his attempt to 
found Kant‖s dualism between intuition and concept – was at least partially motivated 
by a concern for Kant‖s intuition in general, and his conception of affection in 
particular. All dogmatic suspicion with regard to the critical project, according to him, 
would disappear by resolving the notion of affection – or in Fichte‖s terminology “the 
feeling of necessity” – into spontaneity. In doing so, Fichte believed he was bringing the 
“fragments [Bruchstücke] and consequences” of Kant‖s critical philosophy to their 
necessary systematic completion, a completion that would not only render the latter 
intelligible and consistent, but furthermore transform transcendental philosophy into 
an airtight ―System of Knowledge‖, properly so called.  
Fichte‖s metacritical project starts from Karl Leonard Reinhold‖s reading of Kant‖s 
system as a philosophy of consciousness. In his Elementarphilosophie, the latter set out to 
unify Kant‖s critical system by founding it on one single principle from which the 
critical distinctions could be derived.719 In accordance with his peculiar 
phenomenological reading of Kant‖s first Critique, this endeavour amounted to an 
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attempt to pinpoint the first, primitive fact of all possible states of consciousness. In 
Reinhold‖s theorizing, this ―fact‖ was defined as that of representation. All consciousness 
is first and foremost a state of representation. Hence, he put forward his Satz des 
Bewusstseins [the principle of consciousness] as the first principle of philosophy: “[I]n 
consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object 
and relates it to both [Im Bewusstsein wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjeckt vom 
Subjekt und Objekt unterschieden und auf beide bezogen].”720 This principle, according 
to Reinhold, captures the unanalyzable basic fact of consciousness. In Pinkards words, 
the principle captures the following primitive ―truth‖:721  
This otherwise indemonstrable fact of consciousness […] constitutes the basic, 
ground-level complex […] of all knowledge: a subject, an object, a representation 
of the object, and the subject ascribing the representation to itself as a subjective 
state of itself, while at the same time taking that subjective state of itself to be a 
representation of an object different from and independent of that state. 
As this primitive fact expresses the synthetic unity of subject and object, according to 
Reindhold, it transcends Kant‖s two roots, and thus it could be accepted as the most 
fundamental principle of critical philosophy.  
Although Fichte accepted “consciousness” as the ultimate principle (and problem) of 
philosophy, he was not convinced by Reinhold‖s argument for ―representation‖ as its 
first principle, for the simple reason that “if the subject were not able to relate itself to, 
and to distinguish itself from, the object and the state of representing, then it could not 
have a representation at all.”722 Reinhold‖s principle, according to Fichte, presupposes 
yet another, more fundamental feature of consciousness, namely the acts of relating and 
distinguishing, and raises the problem of the conditions of possibility for these 
activities. In other words, representational consciousness requires non-representational 
states of relating and distinguishing, which therefore should be treated as logically 
prior, in order to avoid problems of circularity or infinite regress, which emerge from 
the conflation of acts of representing and representational content (see chapters 3 and 
4). From a Fichtean perspective, Reinhold‖s principle states the problem, not the 
solution.723  
Fichte articulates the ultimate task of philosophy to be the determination of the 
(transcendental) ground of experience, defined as “the system of representations 
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accompanied by the feeling of necessity.”724 His most basic point of departure is a 
phenomenological observation, i.e. from the very start, the philosopher accepts the 
feeling of necessity, or the fact that “I feel myself to be determined,” is “an immediate 
fact of consciousness [Tatsache].”725 Consequently, his transcendental analysis sets out 
to establish the transcendental ground of this phenomenological fact. As Fichte 
expresses it in 1817: What is it to say that “the thing is [das Ding ist]?”726 What is this 
feeling of necessity, once one denies that the feeling of affection is not caused by, nor 
grounded in the thing-in-itself?727 Or in other words: what is the ground of being for us, 
given that we should abstract of all thought of Being in itself? 
Fichte furthermore argues that the Reinhold‖s attempts to formulate the most basic 
principle have been in vain, because he was automatically, and mistakenly searching for 
a basic fact [Tatsache], while that what is at stake, is really a foundational act 
[Tathandlung], i.e. the act of relating and distinguishing. Hence, the fact of 
consciousness (relation and distinction) and this foundational act relate to each other as 
the grounded to the ground, and it is the philosopher‖s task, Fichte adds, to derive the 
possibility of the former from the latter.728 The most basic fact to be explained, 
according to Fichte, is the following:729 
I make a distinction within myself between a knowing subject and a real force 
[reelle Kraft], which, as such, does not know, but is […] How do I come to make this 
distinction? How do I arrive at precisely this determination of what is being 
distinguished? […] I do not know, without knowing something; […] or […] without 
separating something subjective in me from something objective. As soon as 
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consciousness is posited, this separation is posited; without the latter no 
consciousness whatsoever is possible. […] Knowing and being are not separated 
outside consciousness, and independent of it; instead, they are separated only 
within consciousness, since this separation is a condition for the possibility of all 
consciousness […]. 
The most fundamental question of Fichte‖s philosophy thus becomes that of difference 
– or the search for the transcendental ground of the phenomenological fact that 
“consciousness as a whole is informed by a dual structure” – and it is only by addressing 
the question of experience as a problem of difference and differentiation, that the 
central question of his philosophical project can be answered, i.e. : “How do we come to 
believe in an existent [ein Sein]? […] How is an existent possible for us [Sein für uns]? 
[What is] the ground of the predicate of existence in general […][?]”730 
In accordance with Fichte‖s understanding of the object as limitation, the question of 
consciousness qua differentiated consciousness can therefore be reformulated in terms 
of the possibility of representing qua determined [bestimmte] activity:731 
Now what does a determinate activity [bestimmte Thätigkeit] mean, and how does 
an activity become determinate or determined? Merely by having some resistance 
[Widerstand] posited in opposition to it – posited in opposition [entgegengesetzt]: 
that is to say, a resistance that is thought of by means of ideal activity and 
imagined to be standing over against the latter. Wherever and whenever you see 
activity, you necessarily see resistance as well, for otherwise you see no activity. 
In conclusion, the question of the object, in Fichte‖s theorizing, takes the form of the 
question regarding the foundation of the phenomenological experience of necessity, 
determination, and limitation. As is clear from the above quote, the possibility of this 
experience, in Fichte‖s analysis, is made to depend on the principle of resistance. This 
principle, in turn, can only be made intelligible in reference to the principle of ideal 
activity. “A determined consciousness,” Fichte writes, is at once “a determined 
freedom,” and hence, the object as determination is produced from self-determination, 
i.e. the object is conceived of as a negative moment – a moment of limitation – in the 
subject‖s unbridled (ideal) activity. To say that ―the thing is‖, is at once to determine the 
self as limited to this being: “in every determined knowledge, there is a duplicity melted 
into a oneness: freedom, which makes it a knowledge, and a certain limitation, or 
canceling of this freedom, which makes it determined knowledge.”732 Fichte‖s 
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transformation of the question of the object into the question of the production of 
difference, thus automatically leads us to consider the core of his transcendental 
idealism, i.e. his doctrine of the self-positing subject. 
5.3.2 Fichte and the Striving Subject 
The Wissenschaftslehre calls upon every person to 
reflect upon what he does when he says ‘I’. 
 
- Fichte (1992 [1796/99]), p. 82. 
 
In accordance with Fichte‖s conception of the object as limit, his analysis of experience 
assumes the I to be a principle of absolute activity, and a condition of possibility for 
object constitution. Fichte therefore establishes the self, not as a fact [Tatsache], but as 
an act [Tathandlung], as the first principle of transcendental philosophy: the I posits 
itself, absolutely and infinitely.733 It is only for an I thus conceived, that an object can be 
posited as a Gegenstand or resistance:734  
Insofar […] as an object is to be posited, and as a condition of possibility for such 
positing, there must be another activity (=X) occurring in the self, distinct from 
that positing.[…] The object is merely posited, insofar as there is resistance to an 
activity of the self; no such activity, no object. It is related as determinant to 
determinate. Only insofar as this activity is resisted, can an object be posited; and 
so far as it is not resisted, there is no object.  
Hence, consciousness is constituted as a dual structure, through the reciprocal 
determination of I and Not-I, dialectically related to each other as reality and negation, 
and posited by the active self through the awareness of limitation or resistance.735 In 
short, the object as negation, in Fichte‖s theorizing, is grounded in the striving subject; it 
is only through this striving I, that a Not-I or ―check‖ [Anstoss] can arise.736 The concept 
of ―check‖ in Fichte‖s philosophy denotes the constitutive moment at which the infinite 
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activity or striving of the Ego encounters resistance, and the possibility of 
differentiation arises between the I and the Not-I.737  
At this point it becomes clear why Neuhouser, among others, interpreted Fichte‖s 
system first and foremost as “as an attempt to construct a ―theory of subjectivity‖, or “an 
explanation of what it is to be an I.”738 As already mentioned, Fichte‖s conception of the 
self-positing I can be read as an elaboration and expansion of Kant‖s pure apperception. 
That is to say, the Tathandlung, in which Fichte founds his entire philosophy, does not 
just denote the activity of the I, but more importantly, the self-relating activity of the I. At 
the very beginning of his project, Fichte takes up the question of the I think as a 
condition of possibility for representation:739  
He [Kant] […] says: “The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition, in its 
relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to 
conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception” […] [F]or Kant […] all 
consciousness, […] stands under conditions of the original unity of apperception 
[…] [W]hat, then, is the condition of the original unity of apperception? […] [T]hat 
it should be possible for my representation to be accompanied by the ―I think‖, that 
is, that I am what thinks [Ich bin das Denkende] in this thinking. Which ―I‖ is being 
spoken of here?  
And he continues:740 
Hence, for Kant, the possibility of all consciousness will be conditioned by the 
possibility of the self, or of pure self-consciousness […] [S]o for Kant, therefore, a 
systematic derivation of all consciousness, or what comes to the same, a system of 
philosophy, would have to set out from the pure self […]. I am very well aware that 
Kant by no means established a system of the aforementioned kind […] I am aware 
that he by no means proved the categories he set up to be conditions of self-
consciousness, but merely said that they were so […] However, I think I also know 
with equal certainty that Kant envisaged such a system; that everything that he 
actually propounds consists of fragments and consequences of such a system, and 
that his claims have sense and coherence only on this assumption.  
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In other words, whereas Kant had assumed (or ―postulated‖) that pure apperception is 
a necessary condition of possibility for representation, Fichte, in his turn, aimed to 
determine the conditions of possibility for this implicit self-relation (or self-
understanding) that necessarily accompanies all acts of representation. The ―common 
root‖ of both the object and the subject of consciousness, according to Fichte, lies 
exactly in the ideal structure of the I, that grasps itself qua activity:741 
I find myself to be acting efficaciously in the world of sense. All consciousness 
arises from this discovery. Without this consciousness of my own efficacy 
[Wirksamkeit], there is no self-consciousness; without self-consciousness, there is 
no consciousness of something else that is not supposed to be I myself. 
Fichte thus conceptualized the I that accompanies all representation as a self-relating 
act of self-positing. This self-relating structure of primordial spontaneity is given, 
according to Fichte, through ―intellectual intuition‖:742 
[T]he immediate consciousness; that I act […]: it is that whereby I know something 
because I do it. […] I can take no step, move a hand or foot, without an intellectual 
intuition of my self-consciousness in these acts; only so do I know that I do it, only 
so do I distinguish my action, and myself therein, from the object of action before 
me.  
In other words, the intellectual intuition denotes the pre-reflective grasp which the 
subject has of itself as agentive, and, as such, it is a constitutive act of self-relation with 
respect to the possibility of consciousness. Hence, Fichte concludes:743 
Intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy. From thence 
we can explain everything that occurs in consciousness; and moreover, only from 
thence. Without self-consciousness there is no consciousness whatever […] The 
concept of action, which becomes possible only through this intellectual intuition 
of the self-active self [selbsttätigen Ich], is the only concept which unites the two 
worlds that exist for us, the sensible and the intelligible.  
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In the concept of the intellectual intuition Kant‖s two stems of knowledge are united: 
the object (as negation) can only be made intelligible in reference to a subject that is 
given to itself a priori as activity, or through a nonrepresentational primordial act of self-
positing.744 In Fichte‖s Tathandlung, matter and form, intuition and concept, are united in 
the grounding principle of the I‖s intuitive self-relating as the being of activity. This is 
what Henrich called Fichte‖s ―original insight’: in order to account for object-
consciousness, the correlative account of the subject should not proceed from a subject 
that discovers itself as object, but as pure act of spontaneity.745 Indeed, Fichte confirms: 
“From the moment we began the Wissenschaftslehre, we have been trying to characterize 
the I in terms of activity.”746 Through Fichte‖s theorizing, Kant‖s subject = x is 
transformed into the primordial principle of the I as a spontaneous, self-relating 
activity. Furthermore, the interrogation of the ―I‖ mentioned by Kant, is not an inquiry 
merely in and for its own sake, but an attempt to define the subject that can be the 
subject of a being-for-us. More particularly, as the object is first and foremost thought 
of as resistance and limit, it is to be thought against the background of a subject that can 
encounter resistance, i.e. a knowingly agentive being. This is why Fichte‖s 
transcendental theory of experience has been commonly received as an account in 
which practical and theoretical philosophy are united, or, in Beck‖s wording, as “an 
extension of Kant‖s Transcendental Deduction from the I think to the I will.”747 Through 
this extension, the subject-object opposition is resolved in the dynamical, reciprocal 
determination of the I and the Not-I. This, in turn, has consequences for Fichte‖s 
conception of spatial determination:748 
Our striving, or our practical acting, is […] the standard of measure for all spatial 
determination. […] [A]ny determination of the place of things – and thus 
consciousness itself – is possible only in consequence of some real efficacy. 
As such, the primacy of the I will over the I know transpires in the shift of the a priori 
from space itself to activity as a condition of possibility for external intuition. 
In the end, Fichte‖s extension and transformation of the I think from a Tatsache to a 
Tathandlung, not only unites Kant‖s two stems of knowledge, but likewise blurs the 
boundaries between a theoretical and practical project of reason. Knowing and acting 
form the opposite angles from which the same fundamental structure (determined 
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consciousness) is analyzed, and both unfold from the assumption of the self-relating I.749 
As such, the attempt to found Kant‖s theory of cognition by taking the self-reflexivity of 
the I as a point of departure, amounts to a System of Knowledge in which “philosophy is 
pushed out of the theoretical field […] over into the practical.”750 Or as Fichte captures it 
in his Vocation of Man:751  
[I]t is […] our own real activity and […] the definite laws of human action which 
lies at the root of all our consciousness of a reality external to ourselves […]. From 
this necessity of action proceeds the consciousness of the actual world; and not 
the reverse way […] We do not act because we know, but we know because we are 
called upon to act: the practical reason is the root of all reason. 
The possibility of the cognitive self (the self of the ―I know‖) is fully dependent on 
unconditioned self-affection, that is, on the immediate self-relating activity of the I‖s 
self-positing and the intellectual intuition of I=activity. Consequently, Fichte claims that 
freedom is not just a practical law [Praktisches Gesetz], but furthermore “a theoretical 
principle [Theoretisches Princip]” for the determination of our world 
[Weltbestimmung].752 In the end, Fichte‖s metacritical project amounts to the adoption 
of Kant‖s moral subject – as analyzed in the Critique of Practical Reason – as the foundation 
of the transcendental theory of knowledge.753 This practical (or ethical) subject is the 
autonomous and free subject that founds the possibility of ethics:754 
I assert that we must necessarily lend to every rational being that has a will also 
the idea of freedom, under which alone it would act. For in such a being we think a 
reason that is practical […]. [W]e cannot prove this freedom as something actual 
[…] [W]e have to presuppose it if we would think of a being as rational and 
endowed with consciousness of its causality in regard to actions, i.e. with a will; 
thus we find that […] we have to attribute to every being endowed with reason 
and will this quality, to determine itself to action under the idea of its freedom. 
Fichte‖s metacritical analysis of the question of ―what can we know?‖ – i.e. the crux of 
Kant‖s first Critique – ultimately finds its answer in the quid juris investigation of the 
structure of practical subjectivity. Or, in other words, in Fichte‖s philosophical project, 
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the problem of what the subject must be like to know, is grounded in, and unified with, the 
question of what the subject must be like to act. 
5.3.3 Fichte‖s Facts of Consciousness: The Phenomenology of Perception 
Here then, […] is the point to which the consciousness of 
all reality unites itself: the real efficiency of my 
conception, and the real power of action which […] I am 
compelled to ascribe myself. […] I conceive this, my real 
power of action, in thought, but I do not create it by 
thought. The immediate feeling of my impulse to 
independent activity lies at the foundation of this 
thought: the thought does no more than portray this 
feeling. 
 
- Fichte (1858 [1800]), p. 116-117. 
Fichte‖s posthumously published Facts of Consciousness [Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins].755 
is the only one of Fichte‖s works to which Helmholtz explicitly refers (see below). 
Furthermore, it is highly relevant to this discussion, as it can be read as an application 
of the Science of Knowledge to the specific problem of external perception. From this 1817 
work, Fichte‖s position in the history of philosophy as one of the precursors of the 
phenomenological tradition becomes especially clear, and his concern with experience 
qua experience of a living, acting being, becomes very poignant.  
The Facts of Consciousness is a transcription of Fichte‖s lectures at the university of 
Berlin in 1810 and 1811, which aimed to provide a comprehensible introduction to the 
complex matter of The Science of Knowledge:756 
The essence of all science consists in this: that we proceed from something 
sensuously perceived to it supersensuous ground. […] In the present series of 
lectures we shall be busied with the first part of this science, with the 
phenomenon. It is this phenomenon which we propose systematically to observe, 
and it will be my duty to guide your observation. 
In accordance with Fichte‖s distinction between the Tatsache and the Tathandlung, 
related to each other as the grounded to the ground, we could thus say that his 1817 
work presents the phenomenological argument that precedes and motivates his 
transcendental analysis of experience, and makes the latter intelligible.757 More 
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interestingly, however, the work ―hovers‖ between the empirical and the 
transcendental, between actual experience and the transcendental analysis thereof.  
Fichte‖s work begins with an analysis of perception as a form of externalizing 
thought, in which thought is defined as “a positing [ein Setzen], and a positing in 
opposition […] hence op-positing [ein Gegensatz].”758 To see an object, Fichte explains, is 
to say that “the positing of it is complete, and I am limited by this positedness.”759 In 
contrast to the quite abstract expositions of The Science of Knowledge, Fichte‖s Facts of 
Consciousness examines the ground and structure of this process of op-positing, and the 
conditions in which its possibility is founded for an actual living being.  
In empirical consciousness, one never finds absolute activity [Thätigkeit], but only 
determined activity or agency [Wirksamkeit], i.e., activity that is always already 
―checked‖ by, and directed to, resistance.760 But what is agency? The centrifugal activity 
of the Ego, to the extent that it is living will meet resistance, and through resistance, “a 
tendency of the Ego to overcome that check,” i.e. the drive [Trieb], is posited.761 This 
drive – defined as the “tendency to absolute self-activity” – that defines the Ego to the 
extent that it is part of the natural order, is thus called into being in and through 
resistance, which is first and foremost felt as “a force stronger than […] life, opposing 
itself to life,” and “posited outside […] as an independent being.”762 The subject-object 
opposition (or more precisely the subject-object op-positing) thus manifests itself first 
and foremost in terms of a dynamical opposition between forces.763 The concept of drive 
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[Trieb] in Fichte‖s theorizing denotes the unity of striving and check that is the “actual 
condition” of the Ego.764 To the extent that the Ego is drive, however, it is a natural 
being, not an agent. The Ego is an agent only insofar as it is able to relate to itself as 
possible activity, i.e., to the extent that it can determine its actions in the material world 
in accordance with the concept of an end, or in other words, to the extent that it is 
intentional.765 The possibility for this conceptual self-determination, according to Fichte, 
transforms the drive-being into an agent.  
This agentive being that is presupposed in (and founds the possibility of) perception, 
defined through the dynamics of striving and resistance, is, again, the self-determining 
subject of practical reason. At this point, Fichte‖s analysis once again leads us from the 
facts of consciousness to its primordial act. In the context of his phenomenological 
analysis, this is formulated as follows:766 
The Ego must appear absolutely a priori. We do not learn by experience that we act 
[dass man wirke]; we have no perception of it as we have of our passive states. 
That causality [Wirksamkeit] of ours presupposes a free conception created 
through absolute self-activity. This conception, and our possible causality in 
accordance with it, are internally contemplated [innerlich angeschaut] […] as a 
mere faculty [Vermögen], even in advance of the actual accomplishment of the 
intended causality; and it is already in this executed and completed prototype 
[Vorbild] of such a causality that the Ego appears necessarily as a material organ. 
In other words, in experience, the self-reflexive structure of the Ego as an agent, 
which is required to posit resistance, is not given through or derived from physical 
action, but from the intuition of internal self-determination (also see section 5.4). As 
such, Fichte‖s phenomenology of perception is indeed rooted in, and intrinsically linked 
with what Martin calls Fichte‖s transcendental phenomenology of agency.767 If Fichte 
proceeds to inquire “[w]hat manifold is contained in this representation,” he 
emphasizes that at least one crucial element of it cannot be objectified, i.e. the 
immediate intuition that “I myself am supposed to be the ultimate ground of the change 
that has occurred. […] [T]he subject of consciousness and the principle of efficacy are 
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one.”768 ―The principle of efficacy‖ is the ability to say that I act, and it is not derived 
from, but precedes actual physical action. This is at once what defines the subject in 
Fichte‖s metacritical analysis of experience.769 In his Vocation of Man, Fichte adds that the 
conceptual determination of action, which is given in sensible experience as the feeling 
of a “real power of action,” is the subjective ingredient of action that makes the 
objective part – the action itself – determinable. Without it, “my action must appear to 
me as entirely without meaning, as a mere delusive picture.”770  
5.4 Interludium: From the Pure Ego to the Articulated Leib  
There is one final notion of Fichte‖s metacritical theory of experience that calls for 
further consideration, namely the notion of the body. Although Fichte‖s transcendental 
theory of subjectivity has become commonplace, the way in which this Ego-doctrine 
correlates with a philosophy of the human body remains underappreciated.771 Fichte‖s 
interest in the body as a constitutive dimension of experience is most apparent in his 
Wissenschaftlehre Nova Methodo (1796/99), the Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796/97), and Das 
System der Sittenlehre (1798). In those works, the focal point of his philosophical 
reflections shifts from the ideality of the pure Ego, to the reciprocal determination of the 
I and the Not-I in actual experience. In accordance with this shift, the body comes to the 
forefront as the instrument by means of which “the will of the person enters the realm 
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of the sensible world.”772 In other words, the human body emerges in Fichte‖s 
philosophy as the necessary tertium quid between ideal subjectivity and the material 
conditions of experience. As López-Domínguez noted, the Fichtean body constitutes the 
“link between theory and practice” and “the necessary place for the constitution of the I 
and the consciousness.”773 Hence, this discussion would be fundamentally incomplete if 
we were to ignore this dimension of Fichte‖s thought.  
 
If one takes the perspective of actual experience, Fichte explains, a consideration of 
the body – the material vehicle of the Ego – is needed first and foremost to found the 
intelligibility of the concept of resistance:774  
[T]hat which offers resistance is matter, and the purpose is to separate this 
matter, get it out of its place, or remove it. But matter can be moved out of its 
place in space only through other matter; and thus it appears that the Ego […] 
must itself be matter, […] an […] in-space-limited body [im Raume begränzter 
Körper].  
The necessity of the body as a material thing [Körper], is thus deduced from the 
transcendental analysis of experience: the dynamical constitution of the object qua 
resistance presupposes a physical, material body as a condition of possibility.  
However, the passage above also mentions the concepts of purposiveness and motion. 
As we explained in the preceding sections, the idea of ―resistance‖ in Fichte‖s theory of 
objectification, only becomes intelligible against the background of voluntary, 
purposive activity. Therefore, Fichte‖s body must be more than a material presence, and 
should be accounted for first and foremost in its capacity as an instrument of voluntary 
action, and as an expression of striving subjectivity.  In addressing the question 
concerning the necessary constitution of the acting body, Fichte introduces two 
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principles of comprehensibility, or two levels of transcendental analysis, namely that of 
organization on the one hand, and of articulation on the other:775  
[O]nly what is […] in space can be united with or related to something spatial […]. 
But what is in space and fills space is matter. As a product of nature, therefore, I 
am matter; more precisely […] I am organized matter [Organisierte Materie] that 
constitutes a determinate whole: I am my body. […] Moreover […] my body must be 
movable in many different ways. Such a constitution of the body is called 
articulation [Artikulation]. If I am to be free, then my body must be articulated. 
While the concept of organization founds the comprehensibility of the body as a 
moving organism, the concept of articulation transforms the organic body into a human 
body, i.e. an instrument of will, and the means for self-determined (or free) action. 
Through the power of self-determination, the body is transformed from an organism 
into an articulated structure. Hence, Fichte‖s metacritical analysis of the structure of 
subjectivity and his transcendental determination of the primacy of the Tathandlung in 
experience, are actualized in the concept of the articulated body. On the one hand, 
thinking the subject as free, necessitates a concept of the body as capable of self-
determined, voluntary action. On the other hand, the foundational experience of the I 
act is anchored in a pre-reflective awareness of the body as a sphere of willful 
articulation.  
Bodily articulation, thus conceived, is the foundation of differential awareness of 
subject and object in experience, given that this awareness is first constituted in 
accordance to the scheme of will and resistance: “[T]o say that an activity is restricted 
means that a certain determination of […] [the] articulated body has been rendered 
impossible.”776 Hence, the articulated body is a constitutive dimension of experience:777 
[T]his determination of the body‖s articulation is […] produced by the will‖s 
efficacy, and […] it is canceled by an influence from outside. […] If the person did 
not posit that it is at least possible for him to reproduce, through his mere will, 
the given determination of his body‖s articulation […] he could not at all ascribe 
his body to himself or posit that there has been an influence upon himself. 
Furthermore, the possibility of experience is not just founded in a conception of the 
subject as an embodied activity, but more importantly, in the subject‖s primitive bodily 
self-awareness as a “subject-object”, i.e. an articulated structure.778 Therefore, Fichte 
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defines willing as an “inner efficacy, an act of affecting oneself” or as an “intelligible 
feeling.”779 He adds that this ―finding‖ or ―positing‖ of oneself as an articulated body, is 
first and foremost an act of inner determination, that precedes and founds all acts of 
object-determination. The body is active, insofar “as I am active through it”, if not, 
“[m]y body [….] would have to exercise some efficacy […] without me exercising my 
efficacy through it.”780 In other words: without this inner determination, the body would 
be moving, but not genuinely acting, as the latter requires an act of self-determination. 
Hence, Fichte concludes, “my own efficacy,” and with that, my bodily articulation, is 
“not present for me through my outer organ,” but through my “inner one.”781 This 
internal feeling of the body as an instrument of the will, i.e., as articulated, is therefore 
posited as the condition of possibility for object consciousness:782 
[E]verything I perceive, all objects, are nothing more than something that hinders 
my own […] efficacy; but only if my efficacy is present for me can I know that 
something is hindering it. […] How do I know what is canceled [by the present 
object]? […] This certainly does not lie within my consciousness [of the external 
object]. Consequently, the very efficacy that is hindered must, at the same time, 
be […] present for me.  
The way in which this efficacy or the “practical power” is present for the subject 
through the inner organ, Fichte adds, is by means of an ideal prefiguration or model 
[Vorbild] of the concept of a goal.783 Fichte contrasts this Vorbild, that represents our 
practical power in actual experience, as given through the ―inner organ‖, with the 
Nachbilder [copies] of external actions, as received through the ―outer organ‖.784 
Fichte‖s transcendental analysis of experience thus amounts to the assumption of a 
necessary duplicity on the level of the body and bodily self-awareness.785 On the one 
hand, the body is a mere thing, a dimension of sense-perception, and as such, its 
constitutive conditions coincide with the ones determining the possibility of object-
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consciousness. On the other hand, the body is experienced as a source of self-
determination, and an articulated structure:786 
The body we have deduced is necessarily articulated, and must be posited as such. 
A material body [Körper] […] whose permanence and identity we tie to the 
permanence and identity of our own personality – a body we posit as a closed, 
articulated whole, and which we posit ourselves as a cause that acts immediately 
through our will – is what we call our human body [Leib] […]. 
The foundational experience of the body as Leib precedes and founds its self-
identification as Körper. It is only by virtue of its articulation, that “the body become[s] 
an object of perception.”787 Thus, Fichte concludes, “the outer organ proceeds from a 
higher, inner one.”788  
But what it to say that the Ego is a moving and acting physical structure? “Have I 
now, then, completely externalized [entäussert] the Ego, and placed it […] into the 
region of external perception?” Fichte wonders. “Yes and no,” he answers:789 
The bodily presentation of the Ego and its causality in the material world are 
externalized; but the self-determining [Selbstbestimmung] of this causality 
[Wirksamkeit], the conception and plan [Vorbild] that precede it, remain as yet 
mere objects of internal contemplation [innern Anschauung], and in so far the Ego 
has not […] been externalized. But that causality [Wirksamkeit], as the external, is 
conditioned by that self-determining, or by that conception, as the internal, and 
without an internal we shall never get an external.  
Hence, Fichte‖s expansion and radicalization of the idea of transcendental 
apperception along the lines of practical subjectivity (the I act) finds its terminus in, and 
is actualized by, the articulated body. The I act that should be able to accompany all 
representations, has now become the immediate ―intelligible feeling‖ of one‖s own 
embodied subjectivity, i.e. the immediate consciousness of the act as an articulation of 
the will.  
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One can hardly fail to notice the way in which Fichte‖s insistence on the necessary 
duplicity of the body as a material Körper on the one hand, and an articulated Leib on the 
other, anticipates later phenomenological analyses of perceptual experience. As is well 
known, it is exactly this distinction that was to become central in Edmund Husserl‖s and 
Merleau-Ponty‖s phenomenological projects.790 Consider for example the following 
passage from Husserl‖s Ideas II:791  
[The] Body [Leib] […] is an organ of the will, the one and only Object which, for the will 
of my pure Ego, is moveable immediately and spontaneously […] Only Bodies 
[Leiber] are immediately spontaneously (“freely”) moveable, and they are so, 
specifically, by means of the free Ego and its will […]. It is in virtue of these free 
acts that […] there can be constituted for this Ego […] an Object-world, a world of 
spatial-corporeal [raum-körperlicher] things (the Body as thing [das Ding Leib] 
included). […] The Ego has the “faculty” (the “I can” [“Ich kann”]) to freely move 
this Body –i.e. the organ in which it [i.e. the I can] is articulated [in die er sich 
gliedert] – and to perceive an external world by means of it.  
In this passage, the body is established as a constitutive condition for objectification, 
and more particularly, the body in its dual presence as ―apprehended‖ body-object, and 
―apperceived‖ body-subject, or as a material presence, and an intentional structure. 
Similar to Fichte, Husserl distinguished between the subject-body [Leib], as internally 
articulated through the I can, and the material object-body [Körper].792 More 
particularly, he considered the body to be as much a physical thing, as “a field of free 
movement.”793 This duplicity furthermore constitutes one of the most basic dimensions 
of experience.794 The phenomenological Leib or subject-body is the referential axis from 
which the possibility of objectification unfolds. That is to say, things are, according to 
Husserl, to the extent that they are able to relate to a perceiver‖s voluntary acts. He 
gives the following example:795 
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With a visual field that remains unchanged, things can appear both in movement 
and at rest. This shows us that purely visual indications do not suffice for 
apprehension, that they are not capable of differentiating between immobile and 
mobile appearances. This implies that the constitution of the objective place and 
of objective spatiality is essentially mediated by the movement of the body […] 
As Husserl expresses it elsewhere: the body [Leib] is a constitutive dimension of 
perceptual experience because it “has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of 
bearing in itself the zero point of all […] orientations.” And the body fulfills this role 
only to the extent that it is conceptualized not just as a thing, but more importantly, as 
the seat of voluntary action. In a similar vein, Merleau-Ponty described the body as the 
sphere of ―potential movement‖ and ―the power of action‖, and emphasized that this 
“plunge into action is […] an original way of relating […] to the object.”796 
 
Although it is tempting to further investigate the parallels between Fichte‖s 
articulated body and the phenomenological Leib, this would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. It suffices to point out that Fichte‖s articulated body, and the 
phenomenological Leib occupy the same systematic place in the theory of 
objectification. More than being an inert thing, the body is conceptualized as an 
expression of purposive subjectivity, and as such, it is the ―zero point‖ of experience.797 
This elucidation of the embodied dimension of Fichte‖s theory of subjectivity could not 
only instrumental in attenuating the common reception of his work as presenting an 
abstract, disembodied view of the subject, it could also form a valuable intermediate 
level between the idealist theory of subjectivity and the third level of analysis in 
Helmholtz‖s psychophysiology of perception, that is discussed in the following sections.  
5.5 Helmholtz and Fichte? Possible Objections 
Since the publication of Helmholtz‖s work, scholars have pointed to the important ways 
in which it resonates with Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine (see below). Notwithstanding the strong 
textual and systematic evidence in favor of this hypothesis, most of these 
interpretations remain fragmentary and vague, with comments on the matter being 
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restricted to no more than a few tentative statements.798 At least two obvious reasons 
for this state of affairs come to mind, namely the apparent opposition between (1) 
scientific psychology and post-Kantian idealism on the one hand, and (2) Helmholtz‖s 
anti-metaphysical stance and Fichte‖s metaphysics of the Absolute Ego on the other.  
5.5.1 Scientific Psychology and Post-Kantian Idealism 
First of all, the conceptual intertwinement of subjectivity and freedom in post-Kantian 
idealism in general, and in Fichte‖s work in particular, may seem to thwart its 
compatibility with a scientific psychology from the very start. That is, at least, to the 
extent that the latter is defined as a methodologically naturalistic project of the mind, 
in which mental phenomena are treated as if they were natural phenomena and as if 
they were susceptible to theoretical decomposition into basic indivisibles and 
reconstruction based on general laws (see chapter 3). Idealist subjectivity and scientific 
psychology, in this sense, would stand over and against each other as freedom and 
determinism respectively. In the same vein, Fichte‖s philosophy could also be 
considered to be inherently anti-psychologistic, i.e. a theory of subjectivity that is the 
complete opposite of the scientific viewpoint, understood in the restricted, 
deterministic sense.799 In the past decades, it has become quite common to oppose 
scientific objectivity and idealist subjectivity in exactly this sense.800  
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The alleged mutual exclusiveness of early scientific psychology and post-Kantian 
idealism is, however, heavily flawed, and seems to be symptomatic for the empiricist 
bias of psychology‖s historical self-understanding, which has been pointed out by 
Robinson, for example:801 
[I]t is not uncommon to find histories of psychology uncritically accepting the 
thing contemporary psychologists happen to be engaged in and, from these 
ventures, working back in time to discover their precedents. Such datings are 
often of use […], but as historical contributions they are incomplete and 
misleading. 
From this selective and partial historical self-understanding, it follows, according to 
the latter, that802 
[t]he aspiring psychologist might be expected to know something about “Mill‖s 
methods” and […] the general features of Darwinian biology and the sensory-
physiological theories of Helmholtz. But no one is asked any longer to pour over 
the works of Bain and Spencer, Fichte or Schelling, Kant or Hegel. 
In the past decades, however, a number of authors have attempted to overcome this 
strikingly selective and partial reconstruction of the history of psychology, by pointing 
out the continuity between early German psychology and post-Kantian idealism.803  
In the present exposition these efforts are extended through an analysis of the way in 
which Helmholtz‖s theory of the experiment, and its pivotal role in his psychology of 
the object, is rooted in an internalistic understanding of agency, which resonates in 
important ways with Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine as presented in the previous sections. As 
such, this challenges the idea of a mutual exclusivity of psychology as a science and the 
post-Kantian subject, as it is shown that Helmholtz‖s theorizing resists naturalistic 
reductionism from the very beginning. This is because his psychology of the object is 
founded crucially in the assumption of a free subject, i.e. a subject that is neither 
reducible to, nor can be inserted in, the causally determined chain of natural events.  
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5.5.2 Helmholtz‖s Anti-Metaphysical Stance and Fichte‖s Absolute Ego 
A more compelling argument against our analysis, however, could be that Helmholtz‖s 
anti-metaphysical attitude is seemingly irreconcilable with the quite robust 
metaphysical and speculative character of post-Kantian philosophy in general, and 
Fichte‖s system in particular. As already mentioned in section 5.2, however, the 
hypothesis endorsed in the subsequent analysis is that of a restricted indebtedness in 
Turner‖s (1977) sense, i.e. the continuity of Helmholtz‖s theorizing with Fichte‖s is 
affirmed, but only to the extent that the latter is read not so much as a metaphysician, 
but rather as a philosopher of mind. While Helmholtz‖s quite robust anti-metaphysical 
stance might be very hard to reconcile with Fichte‖s Absolute and infinitely striving Ego, 
he quite clearly appreciated Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine insofar as it presented an adequate 
analysis of passivity experience in perception in terms of the dynamical scheme of 
activity and resistance, constituted by the finite, living being. As such, one could say 
that Helmholtz transformed Fichte‖s ―most basic insight‖ from a metaphysical 
presupposition into a necessary normative component of the psychology of 
objectification in general, and the psychology of differentiation in particular.  
 
However, before we go on to explore the systematic relevance of Fichte‖s metacritique 
for Helmholtz‖s psychology, an overview will be given of primary and secondary sources 
that support the main hypothesis of this chapter, i.e. that Helmholtz‖s ―intellectual leap‖ 
in the context of his theory of perception is not only a leap to a critical level of analysis, 
but also to what we have called the metacritical perspective.  
5.6 Helmholtz‖s Fichte: In the Beginning was the Act 
For some of the most valuable clues regarding Helmholtz‖s appreciation of J. G. Fichte‖s 
work, his lifelong correspondence with his father Ferdinand forms an excellent starting 
point.804 As noted in the introduction, Ferdinand Helmholtz was a close friend of 
Immanuel Hermann Fichte (J.G. Fichte‖s son), who was the younger Helmholtz‖s 
godfather and namesake.805 In the letters to his father, Helmholtz describes his everyday 
life and his academic achievements and activities, and he engages in extraordinarily 
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interesting discussions on the philosophical purport of his work on sense perception. 
One of these correspondences is especially relevant to this analysis, namely the letters 
written in the aftermath of Helmholtz‖s 1855 lecture Über das Sehen des Menschen.806 In 
this lecture Helmholtz sketches the general outlines of his theory of perception, and he 
describes “Fichte, the grand thinker” as follows: “however drastic and strange he 
opposes the common world view, he does […] not contradict the natural sciences, but 
[…] is in complete accordance with […] the results […] of sense physiology.”807 In a letter 
to his father Helmholtz reiterates this claim:808  
Last Tuesday […] I gave another lecture upon Human Vision on occasion of the 
Kant memorial […] in which I tried to put forward the correspondence between 
the empirical facts of sense physiology and the philosophical attitude of Kant, and 
also of Fichte, although I was somewhat hindered in my philosophical exposition 
by the need of making it popular. 
In an earlier letter to Ferdinand (written in September 1852), the young Helmholtz 
even went so far as to claim that his theory perception can be read as “an empirical 
statement of Fichte‖s fundamental views of sense-perception.”809 Although Helmholtz, 
given the strong anti-metaphysical climate of his time, may not have been too keen on 
openly expressing his sympathy towards (certain aspects) of Fichtean philosophy, these 
letters provide a quite compelling argument in favor of a consideration of Helmholtz‖s 
theorizing in light of Fichte‖s philosophy.810 In later work also, however, Helmholtz 
approvingly refers to the philosopher‖s work in the context of his theory of 
perception.811  
Especially when reading Helmholtz‖s theory of the experiment – which will be 
discussed in detail below – one is easily reminded of the basic tenets of Fichte‖s Ego-
doctrine. More particularly, Helmholtz accounts for the problem of differentiation in a 
manner that resonates in important respects with Fichte‖s philosophy, and even 
articulated certain elements of his theory of perception in a Fichtean terminology. 
Consequently, the latter‖s philosophical system provides a relevant background for the 
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interpretation of what Heidelberger called Helmholtz‖s experimental interactionism. 
“From Fichte,” Heidelberger writes812  
[…] Helmholtz appropriated the view that our consciousness comes to shape its 
conception of the outer world through the limitations we experience in our 
practical actions. Only by actively interfering with the world of external objects 
can we interpret our sensations as due to external causes and thereby distinguish 
them from the free acts of thinking inside our consciousness. 
Notwithstanding the strong evidence in favor of a Fichtean strand in Helmholtz‖s 
theorizing, however, this peculiar indebtedness has been mostly neglected, or treated as 
a peripheral element of the latter‖s work.813 In the previous section, I have suggested 
two possible explanations for the minimal scholarly attention that has been given to the 
Fichtean dimension in Helmholtz‖s work. To this we might add that it remains unclear 
what exactly Helmholtz had read of Fichte. In a 1841 letter to his godfather Immanuel 
Hermann Fichte, the young Helmholtz – a student in medicine at that time – states that 
he has “recently studied some works of your great father [ihres Grossen Vaters],” but 
unfortunately, he does not specify which works exactly he had studied.814 From a 
footnote in the second, revised version of his Treatise, it is clear that Helmholtz had been 
impressed by Fichte‖s 1817 Facts of Consciousness, about which he writes that it contains 
“correct and sharp [Richtige, scharf ausgesprochen] insights” on the nature of sense 
perception.815 Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume, as Turner does for example, that 
Helmholtz must have had some degree of familiarity with the Science of Knowledge. 
Helmholtz‖s available writings and correspondence do not, however, provide decisive 
evidence on that matter.816  
Among those who have granted a certain significance to the Fichtean dimension in 
Helmholtz‖s work, opinions differ with regard to the precise manner in which it should 
be interpreted, without doing violence to Helmholtz‖s anti-metaphysical stance. 
Schiemann (2009), for example, suggested that there might be some way in which 
Helmholtz‖s theory resonates with the Ego-doctrine, but only to the extent that Fichte‖s 
work “reveals pragmatic aspects that Helmholtz felt were important for explaining life‖s 
everyday mechanism of perception and achievements in scientific experimental 
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action.”817 In contrast to Schiemann (2009), who puts the whole matter forward as an 
altogether rather trivial one, Meulders feels that Fichte‖s shadow (together with that of 
Kant), is ―omnipresent‖ in Helmholtz work, “because both philosophers were at the very 
roots of his [i.e. Helmholtz‖s] own concept of perception.”818 However, Meulders does 
not further elaborate on this point. This aligns with Cassirer‖s earlier statement that 
Helmholtz had not only been “deeply impressed” by Fichte, but furthermore had 
“assimilated […] the latter‖s theory of the I and the Not-I.”819 These suggested 
interpretations of the Helmholtz-Fichte relationship, however, remain fragmentary and 
vague, with comments on the matter being restricted to no more than a few tentative 
statements, made in the context of discussions pertaining to other aspects of 
Helmholtz‖s work. 
The only author to have presented extensive analyses of the Helmholtz-Fichte 
relation is Heidelberger, who convincingly argued that the failure of taking this 
indebtedness into account has led to a considerable misunderstanding of the scientist‖s 
overall philosophical position.820 More particularly, he claims that the “inner core of 
Helmholtz‖s philosophy […] had its roots in Fichte‖s philosophy,” and therefore 
maintains that “the essential key to understanding Helmholtz‖s philosophy of science 
lies in appreciating the influence of Fichte‖s idealism.”821  
In contrast to Heidelberger, however, who maintained that Helmholtz “proceeded 
from a metaphysical position in his philosophy of science,” the subsequent sections 
suspend the metaphysical question in favor of a restricted analysis of the Helmholtz-
Fichte relation which is more in line with Turner‖s 1977 suggestion on the matter (see 
section 5.2).822 Furthermore, in what follows, the focal point is not Helmholtz‖s 
philosophy of science, but the systematic place of the Fichtean ―moment‖ in Helmholtz‖s 
psychological approach to the problem of perceptual experience. In accordance with 
the psychological angle taken in this analysis, the main focus will be on the way in 
which Helmholtz‖s appealed to Fichte in the context of his attempt to address the 
problem of differentiation. It should be noted, however, that Helmholtz‖s view on the 
constitutive role of experimentation unifies his epistemological and psychological 
stance, as he states for example that823 
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[t]he same great significance which experiment has for the certainty of our 
scientific convictions it has also for the unconscious inductions of our sense 
perceptions. It is only by voluntarily bringing our organs of sense in various 
relations to the objects, that we learn to be sure as to our judgments of the causes 
of our sensations.  
In what follows, a systematic analysis of the constitutive role of agency in 
Helmholtz‖s theory of perception, as well as the way in which it resonates with Fichte‖s 
Ego-doctrine, is presented. This investigation subsequently goes into the philosophical 
purport (section 5.6.1) and the physiological structure (section 5.6.2) of agency in 
Helmholtz‖s theory.  
5.6.1 Helmholtz‖s Philosophy of Agency 
As was explained in the previous chapter, a determining factor for understanding 
Helmholtz‖s idiosyncratic appropriation of Kant‖s conception of the causal law, and his 
revision of Kant‖s theory of space, is the scientist‖s emphasis on the necessary mediating 
role of voluntary movement. To say that something is the cause of sensations, and to 
understand the spatial meaning of sign-sensations, presupposes a differentiating act, or 
an Ur-teilung. As such, the experiment, for Helmholtz, is not just a scientific technique, 
but a generalized epistemological strategy, as McDonald argues; or with Heidelberger: 
an ars inveniendi, rather than an ars demonstrandi.824 “Efforts […] to establish belief in 
external reality, […]” Helmholtz maintains, “must remain unsuccessful so long as they 
proceed only from passive observation.” And he goes on to explain that825 
[…] human actions, […] posited by the will, form an indispensible part of our 
sources of knowledge. We have seen that our sense impressions are only a sign 
language […]. […] We humans must first learn to understand this sign system, and 
that happens when we […] learn to distinguish which changes in our sense 
impressions follow from our acts of will, and which others enter independently of 
will. 
“The separation of thought and reality,” Helmholtz writes elsewhere “first becomes 
possible, if we know how to distinguish between that which the I can and cannot 
change.”826 As such, the perceptual process is founded in the dynamics of activity and 
check that Fichte had presupposed at the origin of perceptual consciousness. But there is 
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more to this story than just this rather superficial similarity. If one focuses on the 
philosophical presuppositions underlying Helmholtz‖s theory of the experiment, and 
especially on the irreducibility of his concept of voluntary action, Helmholtz‖s 
indebtedness to Fichte becomes especially tangible. This irreducibility in Helmholtz‖s 
theory of the experiment is manifested in at least three different ways, i.e., in (i) the 
irreducibility of volition to natural, deterministic causality, (ii) the irreducibility of the 
will‖s impulse to physiological processes, and (iii) the irreducibility of the self-reflexive 
structure of the voluntary act to a quasi-perceptual, a posteriori, self-determination.  
5.6.1.1 Agency and Deterministic Causality 
If we say that Helmholtz‖s conception of the role of causality in perception is mediated 
by his theory of the experiment, this means that the determination of the causal origin 
of a sensation emerges from the acknowledgment of an opposition between two 
generically distinct kinds of forces, i.e., natural, deterministic force, and the force of 
will. “In the experiment,” Helmholtz writes, “the causal chain runs throughout our self-
consciousness.” The possibility of making sense of this ―chain‖ in terms of external 
events, however, depends on the fact that “we know one member of these causes – our 
will‖s impulse – from inner intuition, and know the motive by which it has occurred.”827 
A necessary presupposition with regard to this dynamic, Helmholtz adds, is that “our 
will‖s impulse has neither already been influenced by physical causes, which 
simultaneously determine the physical process, nor itself psychically influenced the 
succeeding perceptions.”828 Or, as Helmholtz writes elsewhere, “we conceive of self-
conscious acts of volition and thought as free.”829 In his Treatise, this essential 
presupposition is articulated as follows:830 
[B]y the evidence of our own consciousness, we assume […] a principle of free will, 
for which we claim […] a complete independence of the stern law of causality. […] 
The case of conduct [handeln], that is best […] known to us, we consider as an 
exception to the law. 
As in Fichte‖s metacritical project, we once again see how the autonomous subject of 
Kant‖s second Critique emerges as the ultimate ground of knowledge and experience (see 
section 5.3). This free subject is defined negatively by Kant as that being which is 
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independent of natural causality.831 Volition, in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, is a self-
subsistent, inner determinant of action, that functions as a condition of possibility for 
perceptual Ur-teilung between the I and the Not-I, and as such, its autonomy is a 
theoretical principle for “the determination of our world.”832  
It is in this assumption of a free subject as the basis of experience and knowledge, that 
the spirit of post-Kantian idealism transpires most tangibly in Helmholtz‖s psychology 
of the object. In the latter, the assumption of freedom, however, functions not so much 
as a metaphysical, but rather as a transcendental presupposition. Helmholtz has 
absolutely nothing to say on the essence of free will, or what its metaphysical status is 
in the world. The principle of freedom is neither derived from, nor produced by 
experience, but has the status of a principle of intelligibility, i.e. it is a normative claim 
with regard to the subject of perception and how it has to be thought in order to make 
sense of its ability to objectify. The perceptual process qua causal attribution and Ur-
teilung presupposes the possibility of self-determined action.  
As already noted (see chapter 3, section 3.6.2), this is the point where Helmholtz‖s 
psychological project diverges drastically from the one proposed by Mill. In the sixth 
book of his A System of Logic, the latter claimed that the possibility of a science of man 
crucially hinges on the assumption that the mind is causally determined, and that 
hence, this assumption justifies what we have called methodological naturalism in 
chapter 3:833 
At the threshold of this inquiry, we are met by an objection, which, if not 
removed, would be fatal to the attempt to treat human conduct as a subject of 
science. Are the actions of human beings, like all other natural events, subject to 
invariable law? Does that constancy of causation, which is the foundation of every 
scientific theory of successive phenomena, really obtain among them? […] The 
affirmative opinion is commonly called the doctrine of Necessity [….]. The 
negative maintains that the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by 
antecedents, but determines itself; that our volitions are not […] the effects of 
causes […]. I have already made it sufficiently apparent that the former of these 
opinions is what I consider the true one. 
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Helmholtz‖s position in this respect could not be more different from Mill‖s: while the 
latter maintains that the science of man would be impossible under the assumption of 
the freedom of will, the former establishes autonomous action determination as one of 
its most essential presuppositions. The determination of the lawlike (the realm of the 
Actual) presupposes autonomy (the realm of the I) and their mutual interaction and 
reciprocal determination. Hence, in Helmholtz‖s theory, heteronomous action 
determination would prevent the foundational act of differentation, and as such, render 
experience utterly unintelligible. It is true, Helmholtz writes, that “in ascribing to 
ourselves free-will we deny in toto the possibility of referring at least one of the ways in 
which our mental activity expresses itself to a rigorous law.”834 In contrast to Mill, 
however, this autonomy of the subject is a principle of intelligibility, and as such, it does 
not oppose, but rather founds the idea of a science of mind.  
5.6.1.2 The Will‖s Impulse as a Mental Act 
In addition to the irreducibility of agency to natural causality, Helmholtz‖s stresses that 
“the will‖s impulse is a mental act [psychischer Act].”835 As such, agency is not (entirely) 
reducible to physiological processes and structures, but is defined primarily in reference 
to intentions and motives, i.e., mental states and events. Or in Fichte‖s terminology: 
through mental preconfigurations [Vorbilder] of a goal. This dissociation of the mental 
and the physical dimension of agency allows one to conceive of volition as the principle 
of articulation of bodily movement, which has a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis its 
physical manifestations. The significance of this second irreducibility of agency in 
Helmholtz will be further explained in the following section, in the context of 
Helmholtz‖s physiological theory of agency.  
5.6.1.3 Acting and Moving: The Primacy of the Act 
The third crucial irreducibility of Helmholtz‖s conception of agency pertains to its self-
reflexive structure. “The impulse to movement,” Helmholtz claims, “is something 
directly perceivable. We feel that we do something […] we do not know directly what we 
do.”836 In psychological terms, this self-relation is directly experienced as effort 
[Willensanstrengung], a concept that at once expresses the self-reflexive structure of 
the act, and the unity of will and resistance.837 Helmholtz‖s claim regarding the 
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immediate nature of the feeling that we do something – and the mediated awareness of 
the physical content, or result of our action – implies that the subject relates directly to 
itself in its effort, and hence, that this self-relation is not derived from the observation 
of movement, nor from the feeling of muscle contraction.838 By emphasizing the direct 
nature of the self-reflexive structure of the act, Helmholtz‖s theory maintains that 
actions are known by the subject “otherwise than by their effect,” as Jeannerod put it, 
i.e. that the feeling of activity or spontaneity is generated centrally.839 While the 
perceptual process in Helmholtz‖s theorizing can be understood as a continuous 
positing, a co-determination of activity and passivity experience, this differentiating 
activity presupposes a primordial sense of authorship and ownership of actions.840 As 
such, the self-reflexive form of the act (that we do something) or the pre-reflective sense 
of self as an agency, logically and necessarily precedes physical movement (what we do). 
Hence, the possibility of perceptual consciousness, in Helmholtz‖s theory, is 
fundamentally dependent on the Fichtean idea of “the acting I‖s ability to experience 
itself immediately in its productivity [sich in seiner Produktivität erfahrenkönnende 
handelnden Ich],” as Schulz expresses it.841  
By stressing the immediate nature of the self-relation that defines the subject of the 
act, Helmholtz furthermore avoids the circularity of so-called objectal accounts of the I, 
like we have encountered throughout this dissertation.842 Hence, the I = activity – or in 
Kantian terms, the I think that has to be able to accompany all representations – has a 
logical primacy over actual execution and objectal self-identification through 
observation. In other words, the I = activity cannot be derived from passivity 
experience, as this would leave a perceiver with nothing but ―optical phantasmagoria‖:843 
If the objects would simply be passed before our eyes by some foreign force […] we 
would never have found our way in […] such an optical phantasmagoria […]. 
Through […] experimentation […] some of the changes in the sense-impressions 
are found to be dependent upon our own will; whereas others […] are urged upon 
us with a necessity, that we cannot alter as we like […]. Thus we come to 
acknowledge something independent of our will and imagination, that is, an 
external cause of our sensations.  
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The primacy of experimentation thus comes down to the primacy of the will, and 
more importantly, the possibility to relate to our acts by virtue of the direct awareness 
of willed movement or bodily articulation, which determines the possibility of an indirect 
awareness of necessity or negativity. As was explained in the previous chapter, the 
logical primacy of the will in Helmholtz‖s theorizing is shown in his displacement of the 
transcendental element in the nature of space. He transforms the condition of space as 
an a priori form into the possibility of the will‖s impulse, which is the corporeal and 
mental ability for voluntary action – or the ability to say I act, even before the actual 
execution of movement – that founds spatial measurement and spatial differentiation.844 
This part of Helmholtz‖s theorizing resonates with Fichte‖s insistence on the logical 
aprioricity of the Ego, i.e. his insistence that “[w]e do not learn by experience that we 
act [dass man wirke],” but that the ―intellectual intuition‖ – defined as the “immediate 
consciousness that I act” – precedes and grounds experience, which is defined at its 
most basic level by acts of differentiation.845 
 
In conclusion, this triple irreducibility of the will‖s impulse in Helmholtz‖s theory of 
the object, tallies with the central tenets of Fichte‖s system of experience. The 
programmatic similarity with the Ego-doctrine is clear in Helmholtz treatment of 
differential consciousness as (i) constructed according to the general scheme of volition 
(or striving) versus resistance (or check), (ii) which is in turn dependent on the a priori 
assumption of an essentially free and active (or agentive) subject, which (iii) has a pre-
reflective grasp of its agency through a centrally generated self-relation of the form I = 
activity. If we take a more general perspective, however, Helmholtz‖s theory of the 
experiment incorporates all elements of Fichte‖s metacritical project, as discussed 
above. 
On the one hand, Helmholtz‖s theory of the experiment can be read as a further 
elaboration of Kant‖s I think as the highest principle of knowledge, albeit that this I think 
is transformed into the I will, and hence, specifies this primordial self-relation in terms 
of practical subjectivity. In the end, Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object is founded in 
the irreducible volitional subject, which functions as the ultimate ground of the 
appearance of the object as negation, external cause, and spatial object. The 
psychological answer to the Faustian question of what was there in the beginning, 
ultimately leads to a philosophical and physiological consideration of the structure of 
voluntary action as the quintessential axis from which experience and knowledge 
unfold. As such, Helmholtz‖s psychology incorporates the most general characteristic of 
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Fichte‖s metacritique , i.e. the insertion of “the practical into the theoretical, in order to 
explain the latter in terms of the former.”846 From this perspective, one can understand 
why Lenoir claims that Helmholtz‖s psychology contains a “gesture towards Kant‖s 
practical philosophy.”847 The possibility of cognition and experience is founded in the 
autonomous subject, the subject of Kant‖s second Critique, and the zero point of Fichte‖s 
metacritical analysis. 
On the other hand, this extension and transformation of Kant‖s highest principle at 
once eradicates the strict opposition between intuition and concept, as it did in Fichte‖s 
metacritique . By analyzing passivity experience, i.e. the moment of affection, in terms of 
an Ur-teilung, Helmholtz dissolves the concept of intuition in that of understanding. To 
say that an object is given, is to have determined it as independent of our self-
determination as agents. “Fichte‖s appropriate expression for it is that a Non-ego forces 
recognitions of itself vis-à-vis the Ego.”848 The Fichtean dimension in Helmholtz‖s 
psychology, in this sense, throws an interesting new light on Helmholtz‖s appropriation 
of Kant‖s analysis of experience, as the idiosyncrasies of this adoption can be made 
intelligible by placing them against the background of what we have called the 
―metacritical perspective‖ in this chapter. On the one hand, Helmholtz considers the 
causal structure of understanding to be the a priori form of understanding, but in order 
to realize its function, the law in turn presupposes the differentiation between inner 
and outer causes that is dependent on the theory of the experiment.849 On the other 
hand, we have discussed the way in which Helmholtz‖s theory of space finally amounts 
to a displacement of the a priori which can similarly be found in Fichte, i.e. from space as 
an a priori form, to the striving subject as the ultimate ground of opposition between the 
spatial and the non-spatial. In short, the Fichtean dimension in Helmholtz‖s thought not 
only refers to particular elements of his theory of perception, but also to the peculiar 
manner in which both attempt to overcome the Kantian ―skandalon‖ of duality, i.e. 
through an identification of the ―common root‖ of intuition and concept with the I think, 
and an interpretation of the latter in terms of the primacy of the practical. Hence, it is 
no exaggeration to say that Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine indeed provides “the essential key,” 
not only to understanding Helmholtz‖s philosophy of science, as Heidelberger has 
suggested, but to his psychological analysis of the object as well.850  
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So much for the explicitly philosophical dimension of Helmholtz‖s experimental 
interactionism. In the following section, we will address the question of how much 
remains of this practical, a priori self-relating subject in Helmholtz‖s physiological 
theory, or, more precisely, how this view of subjectivity is translated, and transpires in 
his physiological account of the structure of voluntary action. 
5.6.2 Helmholtz‖s Physiology of Agency 
Helmholtz‖s account of agency was not strictly philosophical, but correlated with a 
thorough concern for the physiological architecture of voluntary movement. As in 
Fichte‖s theorizing however, Helmholtz‖s body is as much a physiological structure, as it 
is an expression of practical subjectivity.  
In his Treatise, Helmholtz presents a physiological account of agency, hypothesizing 
that every voluntary act is represented on the level of sensibility as a complex of three 
sensations, which, when taken together, constitute what he calls the “muscular feeling” 
[Muskelgefühl]:851 
This term includes, […] several different sensations that have to be distinguished 
[…]: 
1. The intensity of the effort of will [Intensität unserer Willensanstrengung], 
whereby we attempt to set the muscles in action 
2. The tension [Spannung] of the muscles […] 
3. The result of the effort, which […] makes itself felt in the muscle, by an actual 
contraction […] 
In this physiological operationalization, the distinctive feature of Helmholtz‖s 
conceptualization of agency becomes clear when he distinguishes between the first 
sensation, and the others.852 While the last two sensations denote afferent (or 
centripetal) physiological markers for agency, the first sensation is a centrifugal, 
efferent signal, which precedes the action as such. Indeed, one could say, it is the feeling 
of effort, that transforms organized movement, into articulated action, in the Fichtean 
sense (see section 5.4). By including the Willensanstrengung in the compound sensation of 
Muskelgefühl – thereby introducing the irreducible concept of the ―will‖ in his 
physiological theory – Helmholtz‖s theory denies that the self-reflexive structure of the 
act is entirely reducible to sensory feedback (as given in the latter two sensations), but 
that it instead requires a central (feedforward) signal that precedes the sensory cues 
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related to actual movement. Simply put, an agent relates to itself as an agent, primarily 
through his identification with the intention, rather than the movement itself. As such, 
the Willensanstrengung is generically different from the other two sensations that are 
comprised in the term ―muscular feeling‖. Although Helmholtz calls the awareness of the 
effort of will a sensation, it is not sensed in the same way as the two afferent signals, i.e. 
it is not produced by, but precedes actual muscular contraction and physical movement. 
In his physiological theory, it is especially this concept of Willensanstrengung that reveals 
a certain continuity of Helmholtz‖s thought with philosophical voluntarism, and it 
earned the scientist credit as one of the last physiologists to have “a place for the will in 
his theory of perception.”853  
Given that the concept of ―will‖ is primarily psychological and philosophical, within 
Helmholtz‖s physiological theory it functions as a hypothesis that cannot be positively 
demonstrated on a factual basis. However, Helmholtz attempts to demonstrate the 
theoretical pertinence of the will‖s impulse as an independent dimension of voluntary 
action, by means of counterfactual evidence gathered through his experimental 
practice.854 One of his most significant observations in this respect, are the perceptual 
phenomena experienced by subjects suffering from a partial or total paralysis of the eye 
muscles, in which the complex of muscular feeling is reduced to the sensation of the 
effort of will:855 
[W]hen the external rectus of the right eye is paralyzed, or the nerve leading to it, 
this eye can no longer be moved to the right. […] [T]he moment he [the patient] 
tries to move his eye […] to the right, it no longer obeys his will [seinem Willen], 
but remains standing in the middle, while the objects appear to move to the 
right.[…] In the case of a paralyzed muscle, the effort of will [Willensanstrengung] 
is not followed by a movement of the eye, nor by a contraction of the muscles […] 
The act of will [der Willensact] has no effect whatsoever beyond the nervous 
system; and yet our judgment as to the direction of the visual axis is formed as if 
the will [der Wille] had produced its normal effects; we believe that […] the visual 
axis has moved to the right. 
Helmholtz also describes the opposite case: if the eye is moved to the right by some 
external force, an illusory perception of motion is experienced. In this latter case, the 
shifting retinal image cannot be related to an effort of will, and hence, is externalized, 
although no actual movement is taking place.856 These observations, Helmholtz argues, 
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demonstrate that the self-reflexive structure of the act – i.e., the ability to relate to a 
movement as being voluntary or involuntary – is only in the second place dependent 
upon sensory cues. To be more precise, they point to the constitutive role of intentions or 
internal articulation – described in terms of the efferent sensation of Willensanstrengung – 
in object perception on the one hand, and to the physiological irreducibility of 
voluntary movement to muscle contraction on the other. “These phenomena,” 
Helmholtz therefore concludes, “demonstrate beyond doubt that our judgment as to the 
direction of the visual axis, is a result of the effort of will [Willensanstrengung], by 
means of which we endeavor to adjust the position of the eyes.”857 
 
As explained in chapter 4 (section 4.6), Helmholtz conceived of the problem of 
perception as constituting a borderland [Grenzgebiet] between the exact sciences and 
philosophy. This view seemed to be based on a sort of cartesian mind-body dualism: 
whereas philosophy, according to Helmholtz, isolates that which belongs to the mind in 
the perceptual process, the natural sciences are interested in the physical, ―objectal‖ 
causes of sense perception. At this point, however, the problem at stake has shifted from 
a mind-body problem, to what is now known as the ―body-body‖ problem within 
phenomenological literature, i.e. “the problem of how to relate one‖s subjectively lived 
body to the […] living body that one is.”858 Or in other words: the problem of how to 
relate the pre-reflective, unmediated sense of bodily articulation, to the mediated 
representation of oneself as a moving body. The realm of the body has now become the 
sphere of an original and constitutive duplicity between material presence, and original 
striving. As we discussed in this section, this duplicity is expressed in Helmholtz‖s 
physiological analysis of the voluntary act by means of the distinction between 
centrifugal (central) and centripetal (peripheral) markers of self-generated action 
awareness. More particularly, the concept of ―Willensanstrengung‖ can be interpreted as 
an attempt to integrate the articulated subject-body into the physiological architecture 
of voluntary action. As such, it could be argued that Helmholtz‖s psychophysiology 
contains an irreducible element of ideality. It is exactly this element, however, that 
would be scrutinized by philosophers after Helmholtz. 
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5.6.3 After Helmholtz: The Two Williams Debate 
Helmholtz‖s non-reductionist view of voluntary movement was later adopted by 
Wilhelm Wundt.859 That is to say, Wundt also believed activity (and not receptivity) was 
the “ground-layer of consciousness”, and hypothesized an irreducible sense of agency 
founded all experience and knowledge.860 Therefore he explicitly called his psychology a 
voluntaristic psychology, as it starts out from the assumption that activity and volition 
constitute the most the most primitive and foundational level of our mental life.861 
Because of his emphasis on the constitutive role of the active ego, Wundt‖s theorizing 
has also been considered as continuous with the post-Kantian metatheoretical view of 
subjectivity, as sketched in this chapter.862  
 
Wundt‖s views of subjectivity and the architecture of agency, are reflected first and 
foremost in his autogenetic theory agency, in which it is stated that863  
[E]very act of will is the necessary sequence of an internal volition, and […] in this 
latter, which, as a change in consciousness resulting immediately from affective 
motives, bears the stamp of self-activity, the essential features of volition are 
involved. […] [W]e shall call that inner activity which bears the stamp of 
spontaneity apperception. 
As such, Wundt considered the pre-reflective, internal ―feeling of activity‖ 
[Tätigkeitsgefühl] to be a defining feature of voluntary action (as distinguished from 
―impulsive‖ acts) and one of the central building blocks of what he called the Ego.864 
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Furthermore, the feeling of activity is said to be a constitutive dimension of experience, 
as “we contrast with these active processes all other […] merely passive experiences.”865 
In other words: Wundt not only hypothesized that the feeling of activity is generically 
different from passive, affective states, he moreover established it as the central 
referential axis from which the possibility of perceptual differentiation and experience 
arises. 866  
Like in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, this perspective on the basic structure of voluntary 
action furthermore transpired in Wundt‖s physiological analyses. More particularly, he 
hypothesized that the feeling of activity is given through a central, centrifugal signal in 
the nervous system, that physiologically marks the self-generated nature of voluntary 
acts, namely the feeling of innervation. Hence, Wundt‖s philosophical, autogenetic 
theory of voluntary action correlated with his physiological ―theory of central 
innervation‖.867  
This kind of voluntarism, however, was soon countered by sensationalist theories of 
action and action-awareness, as those put forward by Hugo Münsterberg and William 
James, among others.868 James explicitly opposed Wundt‖s theory of innervation in the 
second volume of his 1890 The Principles of Psychology, in a passage that is at the heart of 
what would later become known as the “Two Williams Debate.”869 This debate revolved 
mainly around the question of whether self-generated action awareness is central or 
peripheral in origin.870 In contrast to Wundt, James believed that the belief in authorship 
of action is mediated by, and constructed from peripheral sensory cues. As such, James‖ 
sensationalism transformed the sense of agency into dimension of sense experience. To 
be more precise, the self-representation of oneself as agent, according to the American 
psychologist, is constructed in a similar way as perceptual objects, and in a similar vein, 
self-consciousness is a form of object-consciousness. James attacked Wundt‖s doctrine of 
central innervation and denied that “the will to innervate is felt independently of all its 
afferent results.”871 James argued instead that the “consciousness of muscular exertion 
[…] must be […] a consequence, and not an antecedent of the movement itself.”872 Hence, 
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he maintained that “[t]he entire content and material of our […] consciousness of 
movement is of peripheral origin,” i.e., reducible to the last two sensations of 
Helmholtz‖s muscular feeling.873 The conclusion of this sensationalist account of agency, 
is that voluntary activity is felt passively, i.e. through inflowing sensory signals 
originating from the muscles.874 Hence, agency and volition are dissociated and the 
volitional subject loses its constitutive status in favor of a view in which the self-
reflexivity of action is an a posteriori construct, built up from afferent bodily 
sensations.875  
 
Although the controversy between voluntarist and sensationalist accounts of action 
has been described primarily as a debate concerning the physiological structure of 
agency, the philosophical stakes of these debates were very high.876 More particularly, it 
pertained to the question of whether the philosophical categories of autonomy and 
volition could be integrated in a scientific psychology on the one hand, and to 
disagreements concerning the proper metatheoretical view of the psychological subject 
on the other. Indeed, discussions about the physiological structure of agency in early 
psychology, were “part of a normative discourse about the human subject or self.”877 As 
such, it seems that the guiding question of this dissertation, namely that of how the mind 
or subject has to be thought in order to account adequately for the possibility of 
experience, was revived in early scientific psychology.  
5.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter took Fichte‖s problematization of Kant‖s I think as a point of departure. 
Most generally, we argued that Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object has demonstrable 
roots in Fichte‖s radicalization and practical articulation of Kant‖s principle of pure 
apperception, and the idealist view of the subject implied in it.  
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First, this required a thorough analysis of the concept of ―metacritique ‖ as it arose in 
the wake of Kant‖s transcendental philosophy. As was explained, this notion expresses 
the post-Kantian endeavor to found and complete the critical project, by formulating a 
single, uniting principle. As such, ―metacritique ‖ is an umbrella term, that covers a 
variety of post-Kantian projects. Within the scope of this investigation, we were 
especially interested in Fichte‖s metacritical philosophy, and the way in which it can be 
understood as an attempt to overcome Kant‖s doctrinal dualism by founding 
transcendental philosophy in the all-encompassing principle of the striving subject. We 
argued that Fichte‖s principle of the Tathandlung functions not only as a uniting 
principle, but more importantly as the basis of a transcendental philosophy of 
difference and differentiation. To be more precise, Fichte‖s striving subject transcends 
Kant‖s dualism, not by annihilating the difference between receptivity and spontaneity, 
but by transforming the former into a function of the latter. For Fichte, the term 
―passive affection‖ is only intelligible to the extent that it presupposes a subject that 
immediately and irreducibly relates to itself in its striving. As such, Fichte‖s metacritique 
amounts to the conclusion that the production of difference between the I and the Not-I 
in experience – as mediated by the feeling of resistance – presupposes a primordial self-
reflexive centrifugality on the part of the subject. Interestingly enough, Fichte‖s 
metacritical view of subjectivity also amounted to a particular dual perspective on the 
body as (i) an organized part of nature on the one hand, and (ii) an articulation of the 
will on the other. As such, through the concept of bodily articulation, Fichte‖s abstract 
striving subject, is transformed into an embodied, living agent.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, we examined Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object 
against the background of Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine. After dealing with some prima facie 
objections against this analysis, we presented evidence supporting a certain continuity 
between Helmholtz‖s account of the role of active experimentation in perception, and 
Fichte‖s philosophy. By focusing on the philosophical dimension in Helmholtz‖s theory 
of agency, we pointed out the triple irreducibility of voluntary action in Helmholtz, i.e. 
his emphasis that (i) the concept of agency presupposes a non-deterministic view of 
human action, (ii) is not reducible to a physical or physiological process, and (iii) that 
the pre-reflexive sense of agency is not reducible to a form of receptive self-awareness. 
This analysis gradually revealed the centrality of the notions of freedom and autonomy 
in Helmholtz‖s psychological theory, and as such, the way in which the latter was 
founded in the kind of practical subjectivity that Fichte put forward as the 
transcendental basis of experience and knowledge. Based on this metatheoretical view 
of subjectivity, a view of objectification arises, in which the reciprocal limitation of 
subject and object in experience is constituted in accordance to the dynamical scheme 
of will and resistance. Hence, the object, in Helmholtz‖s theorizing, can only be 
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constituted as such, by a subject that is conceptualized as an autonomous self-
determining agent. 
Subsequently, we analyzed the way in which this philosophical view on the necessary 
structure of agency permeated Helmholtz‖s physiological analysis of voluntary action. 
In doing so, we argued that the systematic purport of the concept of muscular feeling, 
and more particularly, of the notion of the ―effort of will‖, becomes especially clear when 
placed against the Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine. More particularly, we suggested that 
Helmholtz‖s analysis of the physiological architecture of voluntary action, is rooted in 
philosophical voluntarism, and more particularly, in a conception of the subject as an 
active, striving being. In conclusion, we briefly sketched the ―Two Williams debate‖ in 
early scientific psychology, as it illustrates the centrality of the problem of voluntary 
action in early psychology, and more importantly, the reciprocal determination of 
metatheoretical views of subjectivity, and psychological theories of perception and 
experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Beginning was the Act  
 
238 
 
 
 
 
Summary and General Conclusion  
In this dissertation, we developed a historical and systematic framework for the 
analysis of Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object. The primary aim of this investigation 
was to provide insight into the internal dynamics of Helmholtz‖s multi-layered theory of 
perceptual objectification, and more particularly, into the systematic purport of 
combining empiricist and transcendental perspectives in addressing the psychological 
problem of the object. In doing so, we attempted to create an alternative perspective 
from which to approach Helmholtz‖s work. ―Alternative‖, in the sense that we took the 
philosophical problematization of object experience and objectification in modern 
philosophy as a point of departure, and as such, decentralized (alleged) historical facts 
or specific scientific, socio-economic, political events and (r)evolutions, that may have 
played a role in determining the specific nature of Helmholtz‖s proto-psychology. This 
choice of perspective was motivated first and foremost by the systematic nature of the 
central research question. That is to say, the focal point of this dissertation was not the 
specific modality of Helmholtz‖s empirico-transcendentalism, but its finality in 
confronting the problem of objectification and experience. Therefore, a key concept 
throughout this dissertation was that of ―motive‖. As such, one could say that the 
strategy used in this dissertation aligns with Schlegel‖s description of the historian as a 
―retrospective prophet‖ [einen rückwarts gekehrten Propheten]: in order to grasp the 
systematic purport of present and past events – or historical theories, in our case – they 
should be considered as meaningful points or transitional moments in the dynamical 
development of ideas.878 Of course, that is not to say that the existing histories or modes 
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of interpreting Helmholtz‖s theory have not provided a tremendously valuable 
background to this analysis. The particular angle of this dissertation, however, could 
add another, novel dimension to the available secondary literature.879 
 
In order to gain insight in the systematic purport of Helmholtz‖s empirico-
transcendentalism, we constructed an interpretive historical framework (or an ideal 
narrative if you will) that covered the history of philosophical reflections on the 
foundation and psychogenesis of (the belief in) externality from Hume and Mill, over 
Kant, to Fichte. We considered these figures as historical representatives of the 
empirical, critical, and metacritical levels of analysis that are entangled in Helmholtz‖s 
work. We argued that the historical progression from one level of analysis seemed to be 
mediated first and foremost by an increasing problematization of the experiencing 
subject. The problem of subjectivity in turn provided a valuable perspective from which 
to grasp the meaning and internal dynamics of Helmholtz‖s multi-layered psychology of 
the object. In what follows, we will briefly summarize the main insights and conclusions 
derived from this investigation.  
 
Before going into the subsequent levels of analysis of Helmholtz‖s psychology, we 
first needed to get a firm grasp of the philosophical and psychophysiological 
foundations of Helmholtz‖s conceptualization of the perceptual process as a process of 
meaning-production, mediated by psychological processes of interpretation. Most 
generally, we pinpointed Helmholtz‖s rejection of the Leibnizian idea of a pre-
established harmony between subject and object as the foundational thought of his 
semiotic understanding of the perceptual process. We argued that Helmholtz‖s work 
started out from what Foucault once called ―modernity‖s most radical epistemological 
event‖, i.e. the assumption of a radical discontinuity between the world of things, and 
the subjective states of affection, acts of representation and interpretation. As 
explained, the impact of Müller‖s Law of Specific Nerve Energies on Helmholtz‖s 
physiological epistemology in this respect, can hardly be overestimated. We argued that 
perceptual objectification emerged as a psychological problem in Helmholtz‖s 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
rules of semantics, not the laws of nature, are the general principles of historical thought.” Also see Cassirer 
(1912). We could also refer to Fichte (1801, p. 176) at this point, who emphasized that the task of the 
philosopher is not to determine the facts, but to construct (not reconstruct) modes of determination, i.e. to 
treat the facts as if they were the result of an original construction. “To consider this [ideal] as if, as a 
categorical that [dass],” Fichte adds, would be a “a big misunderstanding.”  
879
 I am referring for example to the political/ideological perspective on Helmholtz‖s work as put forward by 
Lenoir (1997), the consideration of Helmholtz‖s theory of perception from the perspective of paradigm 
changes in the history of science as presented by Turner (1994), or the interpretation of Helmholtz‖s work 
against the background of German Enlightenment (e.g., Cahan, 1993). 
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theorizing mainly as a consequence of his adherence to the epistemological 
consequences of Müller‖s law on the one hand, and his psychological anti-reductionism 
on the other. 
 
Next, we considered the subsequent levels of analysis in Helmholtz‖s psychology by 
means of the historical and systematic framework just outlined. First, this entailed an 
investigation of the empiricist or methodologically naturalist mode of analyzing the 
formative history of the concept of ―thinghood‖ in the mind. To this end, we studied the 
relevant sections of Hume‖s and Mill‖s work, and contrasted them with the common-
sense tradition in philosophy. Subsequently, we discussed the way in which Helmholtz‖s 
understanding of the perceptual process in terms of the associative connection of 
―circles of presentables‖ is continuous with the empirical (associationist) tradition in 
general, and with Mill‖s account of the belief in externality in particular. However, as 
Helmholtz‖s account is not exhausted by its empirical dimension, we were prompted to 
consider the ―aporetic corners of empiricism‖ that would provide a systematic motive 
for Helmholtz‖s move beyond the strict empiricist framework. Through an in-depth 
study of Hume‖s Labyrinth (and Mill‖s reproduction of it) we were lead to the conclusion 
that the orthodox associationist theory of the object lacks a normative foundation in 
general, and has problems accounting for associability on the one hand, and differentiality 
on the other.  
First, we considered the problem of associability, or the normative conditions 
underlying the possibility of association. This problem is founded in what Kitcher called 
the ―promiscuity of association‖, i.e. the fact that in principle, everything can be 
associated with everything.880 As such, mechanistic association of sensations cannot in 
and by itself account for the genesis of the belief in continued and distinct existence. 
This so-called ―promiscuity‖ could in fact pose a serious threat to the internal 
consistency of the associationist theory of the object, and the intelligibility of 
associationist psychology in general. One possible strategy to overcome this objection is 
by presuming a ―real‖ affinity between sensations, that would provide the necessary and 
sufficient basis of their associative connection in the mind. In that case, associability 
would be founded in a real connection between (certain groups of) sensations. Both 
Hume and Mill, however, vehemently denied the intelligibility of such real connections. 
Therefore, one is automatically led to consider the normative subjective principles that 
guide and found the associative process, and that would explain why certain sensations 
are associated, while others are not. Neither Hume‖s nor Mill‖s empiricist methodologies 
however, allowed them to take any other principles into account than those derived 
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from experience. As a consequence, both faced serious problems if it came to addressing 
the problems of associability and the synthetic unity of experience. More particularly, 
both developed (and retracted) empiricist theories of subjectivity that were inconsistent 
with the experiencing subject presupposed by their theories of objectification, and 
eventually abandoned the question of subjectivity altogether. Hume indeed “needs what 
he can‖t have”, i.e., “[h]is philosophy […] relies on a richer idea of the mind or self than 
his empiricist principles allow him.”881 Furthermore, the associationist theories of the 
mind (e.g., Hume‖s Bundle theory) assimilate the idea of the self and that of the object, 
which entails a correlative reduction of self-consciousness to a form of object-
consciousness. This kind of ―objectal subjectivity‖, however, leads to an infinite regress if 
it comes to explaining how an object can appear in experience as opposed to, and 
differentiated from, the subject.  
We have pinpointed these problems as the systematic motives for the transgression 
of the empiricist framework in general, and for Helmholtz‖s allegiance to Kant‖s and 
Fichte‖s analyses of experience in particular. That is to say, although Helmholtz‖s 
semiotic theory of perception accepted that the transition from sign-sensations to 
meaning-objects is mediated by a posteriori associative processes, he never reduced the 
process of objectification to a sort of mental mechanics. Quite on the contrary, he 
explicitly sought to determine the subjective elements underlying the possibility of 
objectification, and in doing so, placed himself in the transcendental tradition of 
philosophy.  
  
In exploring the transcendental perspective on objectification, we started out with an 
analysis of the way in which Kant‖s doctrines of synthesis and apperception can be 
interpreted as a response to the problems surrounding Hume‖s Labyrinth. Not only did 
we find in Kant‖s work an accurate diagnosis of the causes of the empiricist aporia about 
the subject – i.e., the confusion between normative principles of experience and 
experiental contents – we likewise found some first important steps towards its possible 
solution. First, Kant‖s doctrine of synthesis addressed the problem of the necessary 
connecting principle of experience (or the problem of associability), by introducing 
subjective a priori principles of understanding to guide and found the associative 
process. Second, Kant established the principle of pure apperception, i.e. the necessary 
self-reflexivity of the Ego, as the highest principle of cognition, the foundation of the 
difference between the representing (subject) and the represented (object), and the 
precondition of all experience.  
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Following up on the post-Kantian reception of the critical system, however, we also 
explored the possible problems surrounding Kant‖s pure apperception. More 
particularly, we examined the way in which the postulate of apperception at once 
implies the positing of a primitive or unanalyzable subject-object differentiality, i.e. a 
duality between the activity of thinking, and passive receptivity. Subsequently, we 
turned to Fichte‖s attempt to overcome this dogmatic residue in Kant‖s system, and to 
demonstrate what Kant had postulated, i.e., the conditions underlying the differential 
structure of consciousness, and the nature of the necessary self-reflexivity of the I. 
Hence, our analysis took Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine to be first and foremost a philosophy of 
difference.  
In completing and radicalizing Kant‖s project, Fichte established negation as the 
central operator in the objectification process, and accordingly, defined objective 
experience as the positing of resistance. The intelligibility of the concept of resistance 
or negativity in Fichte‖s theorizing, in turn hinged on the positive determination of the 
Ego as activity. Therefore, the subject that is presupposed at the foundation of the 
transcendental analysis of experience is conceptualized by him as a Tathandlung, i.e., an 
ideal act of self-positing, and an eternal centrifugal activity. In Fichte‖s philosophical 
system, this striving subject is at the foundation of the dynamical constitution of the 
subject-object opposition, in accordance to the general scheme of will and resistance. 
That is to say, it is only for the active subject, in Fichte‖s theorizing, that the object or 
Not-I can appear in its capacity of negativity or resistance. Subsequently, we discussed 
the way in which Fichte‖s Ego-doctrine and the dynamical theory of objectification that 
follows from it entail a reconceptualization of Kant‖s principle of pure apperception 
along the lines of practical philosophy. More particularly, we explored how Fichte 
transformed Kant‖s highest principle of experience, the I think, into an I act, and as such, 
posited the autonomous, free subject at the basis of all experience and knowledge. To 
conclude our discussion of Fichte‖s philosophy, we examined the way in which his Ego-
doctrine determined his view of the human body as an articulation of the will, i.e., as an 
autonomous and self-determining structure, that is moreover necessarily appreciated as 
such by the experiencing subject.  
 
In relating Helmholtz‖s psychology to these critical and metacritical levels of 
analysis, we first of all argued that the empirical dimension of Helmholtz‖s psychology is 
founded in a critical, Kantian inspired analysis of the necessary structure of perceptual 
understanding. In doing so, we analyzed the much debated issue of Helmholtz‖s 
appropriation of Kant‖s apriorism with regard to the causal law. As is well known, 
Helmholtz emphasized that the perceptual process is governed by the a priori rule that 
every effect has a cause. From the historical and systematic framework developed in 
this dissertation, Helmholtz‖s apriorism in this respect can be interpreted as an attempt 
to account for the associability of sensation, or in other words, as an attempt to found his 
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empirical account in normative a priori principles of subjective spontaneity. In addition 
to the classical interpretive issues with Helmholtz‖s Kantianism in this respect, we 
considered Helmholtz‖s use of the causal law from the perspective of his criticism of 
Kant‖s doctrinal dualism. In doing so, we argued that Helmholtz‖s causal law seems to 
operate on a more primitive level of experience in comparison in Kant‖s theorizing, i.e., 
whereas Kantian causality imposes a form upon sensible matter, Helmholtz‖s causality is 
a constitutive condition for receptivity itself. Without the a priori causal structure of 
understanding, sign-sensations would simply not be capable of referring to anything 
beyond themselves. Through this analysis, we were prompted to consider Helmholtz‖s 
self-professed ambition to overcome the Kantian dualism between intuition and 
understanding, by establishing the subject‖s spontaneity as a condition of possibility for 
passivity experience. Hence, the point of reference for our interpretation of Helmholtz‖s 
psychology gradually shifted from Kant, to the post-Kantian, metacritical appraisal of 
experience. Helmholtz‖s criticism of Kant‖s theory of space provided us with a first 
occasion to explore the structure and purport of what we might call Helmholtz‖s 
metacritical problematization of experience. We argued that this criticism did not entail 
an annihilation of the Kantian apriorism with respect to space, but rather a shift from 
space as a constitutive condition for experience, to the free mobility of rigid bodies as a 
condition of possibility for spatial construction and perceptual differentiation. 
Furthermore, we suggested that this shift seemed to be motivated at least in part by a 
dissatisfaction with the dogmatic residues in Kant‖s critical analysis, namely the 
unanalyzed assumption of a duality between the I and the Not-I in general, and the 
spatial and the non-spatial in particular. 
Finally, we analyzed the continuity between Fichte‖s metacritical expansion and 
radicalization of Kant‖s principle of apperception, and Helmholtz‖s analysis of the role of 
voluntary action in perception. Most generally, we argued that Helmholtz‖s theory of 
perception is founded in a similar dynamical view of objectification that takes the 
dialectics of will and resistance to be the ultimate basis of the perceptual process. 
Furthermore, we argued that Fichte‖s view of the striving subject, that underlies this 
particular dynamical perspective on experience, transpires in Helmholtz‖s psychological 
theory. More particularly, Helmholtz‖s psychology of the object seems to be founded in 
a Fichtean (practical) view of the subject as a free, autonomous being, that escapes 
deterministic natural causality. To be a perceiver, for Helmholtz, is to be a free agent, 
and knowingly so. Subsequently, we took a look at the way in which Helmholtz 
translated these philosophical views in his physiological analysis of the architecture of 
voluntary action. In doing so, we focused on the concept of Willensanstrengung in 
particular, i.e. the non-reducible, centrifugal feeling of effort, that is one of the building 
blocks of Helmholtz‖s Muskelgefühl, and more importantly, a constitutive element of self-
generated action awareness. We suggested that the philosophical significance of the 
hypothesis of the Willensanstrengung can be explained by means of Fichte‖s concept of 
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the articulation: the sense of agency is not primarily derived trough what Fichte called 
the ―outer sense‖, but first and foremost through the internal bodily articulation of goals 
and intentions.  
At the end of chapter 5, we also briefly discussed the so-called ―Two-William Debate‖, 
that put the problem of the architecture of the voluntary act, and the origin of self-
generated action awareness, high on the agenda in early scientific psychology. Most 
importantly, however, we suggested that important philosophical issues were at stake 
in these debates, pertaining mostly to metatheoretical views of the psychological 
subject.  
 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that many of the debates we have touched 
upon in the course of this dissertation, still persist up to this day. For one thing, the so-
called ―enactive‖ approach to perception has thrived in the past decades. This approach 
assigns a constitutive role to so-called ―sensorimotor understanding‖ in experience, and 
hence, starts out from the basic premise that “to be a perceiver is to understand, 
implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation.”882 Many questions arise, 
however, with respect to the theoretical foundation, and purport of the notion of 
―sensorimotor understanding‖, the most important one being formulated by Thompson 
as follows:883 
The dynamic sensorimotor approach needs a notion of selfhood or agency, 
because to explain perceptual experience it appeals to sensorimotor knowledge. 
Knowledge implies a knower or agent or self that embodies this knowledge. But 
what organization does a sensorimotor system need to have in order to be a 
genuine sensorimotor agent […]? 
In other words, the concept of ―sensorimotor understanding‖, according to 
Thompson, necessitates an account of the nature and structure of ―sensorimotor 
subjectivity‖. To be sure, O‖Regan and Myin, for example, spent quite some effort 
analyzing the subjective dimension of experience. They argued among others, that the 
phenomenal experience of ―ongoingness‖ and ―forcible presence‖, are two of the most 
salient subjective dimensions of what it is to see.884 On the one hand, perceptual 
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experience, according to them, is “experienced as occurring to me […] as though I was in 
inhabited by some ongoing process” (ongoingness). On the other hand, experience is 
per definition the experience that something “imposes itself on me from the outside, 
and is present to me without my making any mental effort, and […] is mostly out of my 
voluntary control” (forcible presence).885 However these descriptions have nothing to do 
with metatheoretical views of subjectivity, and still less do they describe “the non-
object-directed or intransitive self-awareness constitutive of experience.”886 Quite on 
the contrary, both these subjective dimensions are defined in reference to object-
experience, and mediated by intentional consciousness. As such, they seemingly reduce 
subjective experience to its “world-representing components.”887 As a consequence, the 
theory possibly faces the problems of circularity and infinite regress related to ―objectal‖ 
accounts of subjectivity.888 Therefore, a number of authors have argued that the concept 
of ―sensorimotor understanding‖ needs to be enriched with an account of the 
unmediated sense of being an agent, that is a constitutive dimension of enactive 
perception.889 By integrating this primitive sense of self-awareness, the possible 
objection just raised, and the explanatory gap between (i) the metatheoretical view of 
the subject as autonomous and (ii) the ―objectal‖ account of sensorimotor subjectivity 
can be overcome.  
 
In addition to these contemporary philosophical debates, the questions of selfhood 
and agency in perception has been revived as a consequence of recent 
neurophysiological research. This revival was instigated first and foremost by Von Holst 
& Mittelstaedt, who argued for the central generation of action awareness and hence for 
the non-peripheral nature of “[…] forces of organization – of coordination and 
control.”890 In contemporary neurophysiological literature, the return of the 
―Helmholtzian‖ model of perception and action control is known as the efference copy or 
comparator model, that unfolds from the following basic insight:891 
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[…] Helmholtz […] [asserted] that our knowledge […] is derived by using our motor 
system as an exploring organ […] Generating a movement is the activity of the ―I‖ 
which keeps track of the instructions. (A modern term is efference copy, meaning 
the record that is maintained of the outgoing efferent signals from the central 
nervous system to the muscles.) The associated change in sensory signals is 
registered, and inferences can be drawn from a ―before‖ and ―after‖ comparison. 
Through knowledge of the actuated movement it can be determined what in the 
changes of the sensory impressions can be ascribed to the movements; what 
remains, by inference is of the real world. 
In accordance with the Helmholtzian view of perception, the comparator model 
hypothesizes that perception emerges from a comparison between an internal 
predictions about the expected sensory consequences of motor commands, and actual 
sensory feedback. Perception, in this account, “reflects the error generated by this 
comparison.”892 In the past years, a string of research has been published arguing that 
the centrifugal ―sense of effort‖ is a central component of self-experience, and 
conversely, that a defect in this centrally generated self-reflexivity causes the 
diminished self-experience that is a hallmark of psychotic and schizophrenic 
symptoms.893 More particularly, it is hypothesized that reality disturbances and positive 
symptoms (hallucinations, delusions, etc.) emerge from a malfunctioning of the 
efference copy mechanism, or the self-monitor that indexes voluntary actions as self-
generated. As a consequence, the perceptual process lacks a referential axis and 
“internally generated information, such as one‖s own thoughts and intentions, would 
then be perceived as originating externally.”894 What seems to be especially impaired is 
pre-reflective sense of agentive subjectivity, or in philosophical terms, of internally 
articulated bodily self-consciousness.  
However, this model has also revived philosophical discussions pertaining to the 
question of the naturalizability of the self or subject. As Synofzik et al. write, for 
example, the efference copy model can be interpreted as a part of the broader project of 
constructing a “comprehensive naturalistic account” of selfhood and subjectivity.895 
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According to some, this leads us right back into Hume‖s Labyrinth. Frank, for example, 
criticizes the alleged circularity of the approach:896 
[H]ow can the copy of a de re self-referring loop which involves no consciousness, 
[…] generate self-consciousness without changing or falsifying the thing that is 
copied? […] [T]hat which, according to the model, should function as the criterion 
for whether an action is one‖s own, has no ownness to it and therefore […] cannot 
function as the criterion. […] ―[R]eflective self-understanding of [one‖s] own 
engagement with the world‖ (Campbell, 2004, p. 487) presupposes a non-reflective 
consciousness of the subject as well as of its mental states. This necessary pre-
condition is something that the comparator-model does not account for. 
In other words, once again, the concern raised is that the model does not account for 
the “non-objectifying form of self-consciousness” that is presupposed by and precedes 
the self as an intentional object of experience.897 As a consequence, the model allegedly 
ends up in the circular mode of explanation that was once pinpointed by Kant as the 
unavoidable consequence of every attempt to naturalize or objectify the I think that 
should be able to accompany all representations (see section 4.5). To restate the 
quotation of Kant in this respect:898  
That which should necessarily be represented as numerically identical cannot be 
thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that 
precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible […].  
These contemporary debates illustrate the possible contemporary relevance of the 
analysis presented in this dissertation. 
 
As Hatfield noted, “[t]here is no danger that the mysteries of seeing will be 
completely solved in the near future.”899 If anything, this dissertation has pointed out 
that the question of the psychogenesis of the object indeed constitutes a borderland 
between the exact sciences and philosophy, as Helmholtz insisted. Although the 
problem has been recuperated by the exact sciences at present, it remains a multi-
dimensional issue, that calls for metaphysical, epistemological, philosophical and 
physiological reflection. As is illustrated by the discussions sketched above, the 
problems of the nature of subjectivity, the structure of voluntary action, and the basic 
architecture of man‖s relation to the world, have never been far away, and resurge with 
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a unforeseen urgency in the wake of current attempts to naturalize subjectivity. The 
observation that “there is no such thing as ―just doing science‖ without also producing 
philosophy” applies to the study of perception especially.900 An in-depth historical 
understanding of the philosophical problems that are at stake when dealing with the 
problem of perception, could prove to be a valuable compass in navigating the 
proliferation of different points of view, as well as a tool for a critical inquiry into the 
limits of the natural sciences when it comes to answering the question of what it is to see, 
and the related problem of what the mind or subject must be like to make sense of the 
underdetermined world of nervous excitation.  
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